On War

C >> Carl von Clausewitz >> On War


The papers thus left are those now made public in the following volumes,
exactly in the condition in which they were found, without a word
being added or erased. Still, however, there was much to do before
publication, in the way of putting them in order and consulting about
them; and I am deeply indebted to several sincere friends for the
assistance they have afforded me, particularly Major O'Etzel, who kindly
undertook the correction of the Press, as well as the preparation of the
maps to accompany the historical parts of the work. I must also mention
my much-loved brother, who was my support in the hour of my misfortune,
and who has also done much for me in respect of these papers; amongst
other things, by carefully examining and putting them in order, he found
the commencement of the revision which my dear husband wrote in the year
1827, and mentions in the Notice hereafter annexed as a work he had in
view. This revision has been inserted in the place intended for it in
the first book (for it does not go any further).

There are still many other friends to whom I might offer my thanks for
their advice, for the sympathy and friendship which they have shown me;
but if I do not name them all, they will, I am sure, not have any doubts
of my sincere gratitude. It is all the greater, from my firm conviction
that all they have done was not only on my own account, but for the
friend whom God has thus called away from them so soon.

If I have been highly blessed as the wife of such a man during one and
twenty years, so am I still, notwithstanding my irreparable loss, by
the treasure of my recollections and of my hopes, by the rich legacy
of sympathy and friendship which I owe the beloved departed, by the
elevating feeling which I experience at seeing his rare worth so
generally and honourably acknowledged.

The trust confided to me by a Royal Couple is a fresh benefit for
which I have to thank the Almighty, as it opens to me an honourable
occupation, to which Idevote myself. May this occupation be blessed,
and may the dear little Prince who is now entrusted to my care, some
day read this book, and be animated by it to deeds like those of his
glorious ancestors.


Written at the Marble Palace, Potsdam, 30th June, 1832.

MARIE VON CLAUSEWITZ, Born Countess Bruhl, Oberhofmeisterinn to H.R.H.
the Princess William.




NOTICE

I LOOK upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has now been made,
as only a mass which is still in a manner without form, and which has
yet to be again revised. In this revision the two kinds of War will be
everywhere kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire
a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and a closer application.
The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the
OVERTHROW OF THE ENEMY, whether it be that we aim at his destruction,
politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude
peace on our terms; and next, those in which our object is MERELY TO
MAKE SOME CONQUESTS ON THE FRONTIERS OF HIS COUNTRY, either for the
purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account
as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transition from one
kind to the other must certainly continue to exist, but the completely
different nature of the tendencies of the two must everywhere appear,
and must separate from each other things which are incompatible.

Besides establishing this real difference in Wars, another practically
necessary point of view must at the same time be established, which is,
that WAR IS ONLY A CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. This
point of view being adhered to everywhere, will introduce much more
unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more
easily disentangled from each other. Although the chief application of
this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book,
still it must be completely developed in the first book, and also lend
assistance throughout the revision of the first six books. Through such
a revision the first six books will get rid of a good deal of dross,
many rents and chasms will be closed up, and much that is of a general
nature will be transformed into distinct conceptions and forms.

The seventh book--on attack--for the different chapters of which
sketches are already made, is to be considered as a reflection of the
sixth, and must be completed at once, according to the above-mentioned
more distinct points of view, so that it will require no fresh revision,
but rather may serve as a model in the revision of the first six books.

For the eighth book--on the Plan of a War, that is, of the organisation
of a whole War in general--several chapters are designed, but they are
not at all to be regarded as real materials, they are merely a track,
roughly cleared, as it were, through the mass, in order by that means to
ascertain the points of most importance. They have answered this object,
and I propose, on finishing the seventh book, to proceed at once to the
working out of the eighth, where the two points of view above mentioned
will be chiefly affirmed, by which everything will be simplified, and
at the same time have a spirit breathed into it. I hope in this book to
iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen, and at
least to show the object of action, and the real point to be considered
in War.

Now, when I have brought my ideas clearly out by finishing this eighth
book, and have properly established the leading features of War, it will
be easier for me to carry the spirit of these ideas in to the first
six books, and to make these same features show themselves everywhere.
Therefore I shall defer till then the revision of the first six books.

Should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is found can only
be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form; but as these
are open to endless misconceptions, they will doubtless give rise to a
number of crude criticisms: for in these things, every one thinks, when
he takes up his pen, that whatever comes into his head is worth saying
and printing, and quite as incontrovertible as that twice two make four.
If such a one would take the pains, as I have done, to think over the
subject, for years, and to compare his ideas with military history, he
would certainly be a little more guarded in his criticism.

Still, notwithstanding this imperfect form, I believe that an impartial
reader thirsting for truth and conviction will rightly appreciate in the
first six books the fruits of several years' reflection and a diligent
study of War, and that, perhaps, he will find in them some leading ideas
which may bring about a revolution in the theory of War.

Berlin, 10th July, 1827.


Besides this notice, amongst the papers left the following unfinished
memorandum was found, which appears of very recent date:

The manuscript on the conduct of the Grande Guerre, which will be
found after my death, in its present state can only be regarded as a
collection of materials from which it is intended to construct a theory
of War. With the greater part I am not yet satisfied; and the sixth book
is to be looked at as a mere essay: I should have completely remodelled
it, and have tried a different line.

But the ruling principles which pervade these materials I hold to be
the right ones: they are the result of a very varied reflection, keeping
always in view the reality, and always bearing in mind what I have
learnt by experience and by my intercourse with distinguished soldiers.

The seventh book is to contain the attack, the subjects of which are
thrown together in a hasty manner: the eighth, the plan for a War, in
which I would have examined War more especially in its political and
human aspects.

The first chapter of the first book is the only one which I consider as
completed; it will at least serve to show the manner in which I proposed
to treat the subject throughout.

The theory of the Grande Guerre, or Strategy, as it is called, is beset
with extraordinary difficulties, and we may affirm that very few men
have clear conceptions of the separate subjects, that is, conceptions
carried up to their full logical conclusions. In real action most men
are guided merely by the tact of judgment which hits the object more or
less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius.

This is the way in which all great Generals have acted, and therein
partly lay their greatness and their genius, that they always hit upon
what was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in action, and
so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question, not
of acting oneself, but of convincing others in a consultation, then
all depends on clear conceptions and demonstration of the inherent
relations, and so little progress has been made in this respect that
most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm
basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a
compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really
without any value.(*)

(*) Herr Clausewitz evidently had before his mind the
endless consultations at the Headquarters of the Bohemian
Army in the Leipsic Campaign 1813.

Clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly useless; besides,
the human mind has a general tendency to clearness, and always wants to
be consistent with the necessary order of things.

Owing to the great difficulties attending a philosophical construction
of the Art of War, and the many attempts at it that have failed, most
people have come to the conclusion that such a theory is impossible,
because it concerns things which no standing law can embrace. We should
also join in this opinion and give up any attempt at a theory, were it
not that a great number of propositions make themselves evident without
any difficulty, as, for instance, that the defensive form, with a
negative object, is the stronger form, the attack, with the positive
object, the weaker--that great results carry the little ones with
them--that, therefore, strategic effects may be referred to certain
centres of gravity--that a demonstration is a weaker application of
force than a real attack, that, therefore, there must be some special
reason for resorting to the former--that victory consists not merely
in the conquest on the field of battle, but in the destruction of armed
forces, physically and morally, which can in general only be effected by
a pursuit after the battle is gained--that successes are always greatest
at the point where the victory has been gained, that, therefore, the
change from one line and object to another can only be regarded as
a necessary evil--that a turning movement is only justified by a
superiority of numbers generally or by the advantage of our lines of
communication and retreat over those of the enemy--that flank positions
are only justifiable on similar grounds--that every attack becomes
weaker as it progresses.




THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR

THAT the conception of the scientific does not consist alone, or
chiefly, in system, and its finished theoretical constructions, requires
nowadays no exposition. System in this treatise is not to be found on
the surface, and instead of a finished building of theory, there are
only materials.

The scientific form lies here in the endeavour to explore the nature of
military phenomena to show their affinity with the nature of the things
of which they are composed. Nowhere has the philosophical argument been
evaded, but where it runs out into too thin a thread the Author has
preferred to cut it short, and fall back upon the corresponding results
of experience; for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit when
they do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the theoretical
leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far, but kept near to
experience, which is their proper soil.

Unquestionably it would be a mistake to try to discover from the
chemical ingredients of a grain of corn the form of the ear of corn
which it bears, as we have only to go to the field to see the ears ripe.
Investigation and observation, philosophy and experience, must neither
despise nor exclude one another; they mutually afford each other the
rights of citizenship. Consequently, the propositions of this book, with
their arch of inherent necessity, are supported either by experience or
by the conception of War itself as external points, so that they are not
without abutments.(*)

(*) That this is not the case in the works of many military
writers especially of those who have aimed at treating of
War itself in a scientific manner, is shown in many
instances, in which by their reasoning, the pro and contra
swallow each other up so effectually that there is no
vestige of the tails even which were left in the case of the
two lions.

It is, perhaps, not impossible to write a systematic theory of War full
of spirit and substance, but ours hitherto, have been very much the
reverse. To say nothing of their unscientific spirit, in their
striving after coherence and completeness of system, they overflow with
commonplaces, truisms, and twaddle of every kind. If we want a striking
picture of them we have only to read Lichtenberg's extract from a code
of regulations in case of fire.

If a house takes fire, we must seek, above all things, to protect the
right side of the house standing on the left, and, on the other hand,
the left side of the house on the right; for if we, for example, should
protect the left side of the house on the left, then the right side of
the house lies to the right of the left, and consequently as the fire
lies to the right of this side, and of the right side (for we have
assumed that the house is situated to the left of the fire), therefore
the right side is situated nearer to the fire than the left, and the
right side of the house might catch fire if it was not protected before
it came to the left, which is protected. Consequently, something might
be burnt that is not protected, and that sooner than something else
would be burnt, even if it was not protected; consequently we must let
alone the latter and protect the former. In order to impress the thing
on one's mind, we have only to note if the house is situated to the
right of the fire, then it is the left side, and if the house is to the
left it is the right side.

In order not to frighten the intelligent reader by such commonplaces,
and to make the little good that there is distasteful by pouring water
upon it, the Author has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal
his impressions and convictions, the result of many years' reflection
on War, of his intercourse with men of ability, and of much personal
experience. Thus the seemingly weakly bound-together chapters of this
book have arisen, but it is hoped they will not be found wanting in
logical connection. Perhaps soon a greater head may appear, and instead
of these single grains, give the whole in a casting of pure metal
without dross.




BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ

(BY TRANSLATOR)

THE Author of the work here translated, General Carl Von Clausewitz, was
born at Burg, near Magdeburg, in 1780, and entered the Prussian Army
as Fahnenjunker (i.e., ensign) in 1792. He served in the campaigns of
1793-94 on the Rhine, after which he seems to have devoted some time
to the study of the scientific branches of his profession. In 1801 he
entered the Military School at Berlin, and remained there till
1803. During his residence there he attracted the notice of General
Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment; and the patronage of
this distinguished officer had immense influence on his future career,
and we may gather from his writings that he ever afterwards continued
to entertain a high esteem for Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he
served as Aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia; and being wounded
and taken prisoner, he was sent into France until the close of that
war. On his return, he was placed on General Scharnhorst's Staff, and
employed in the work then going on for the reorganisation of the Army.
He was also at this time selected as military instructor to the late
King of Prussia, then Crown Prince. In 1812 Clausewitz, with several
other Prussian officers, having entered the Russian service, his first
appointment was as Aide-de-camp to General Phul. Afterwards, while
serving with Wittgenstein's army, he assisted in negotiating the famous
convention of Tauroggen with York. Of the part he took in that affair he
has left an interesting account in his work on the "Russian Campaign."
It is there stated that, in order to bring the correspondence which had
been carried on with York to a termination in one way or another, the
Author was despatched to York's headquarters with two letters, one was
from General d'Auvray, the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein's army, to
General Diebitsch, showing the arrangements made to cut off York's corps
from Macdonald (this was necessary in order to give York a plausible
excuse for seceding from the French); the other was an intercepted
letter from Macdonald to the Duke of Bassano. With regard to the former
of these, the Author says, "it would not have had weight with a man like
York, but for a military justification, if the Prussian Court should
require one as against the French, it was important."

The second letter was calculated at the least to call up in General
York's mind all the feelings of bitterness which perhaps for some days
past bad been diminished by the consciousness of his own behaviour
towards the writer.

As the Author entered General York's chamber, the latter called out to
him, "Keep off from me; I will have nothing more to do with you; your
d----d Cossacks have let a letter of Macdonald's pass through them,
which brings me an order to march on Piktrepohnen, in order there to
effect our junction. All doubt is now at an end; your troops do not
come up; you are too weak; march I must, and I must excuse myself from
further negotiation, which may cost me my head." The Author said that be
would make no opposition to all this, but begged for a candle, as he
had letters to show the General, and, as the latter seemed still to
hesitate, the Author added, "Your Excellency will not surely place me in
the embarrassment of departing without having executed my commission."
The General ordered candles, and called in Colonel von Roeder, the chief
of his staff, from the ante-chamber. The letters were read. After a
pause of an instant, the General said, "Clausewitz, you are a Prussian,
do you believe that the letter of General d'Auvray is sincere, and that
Wittgenstein's troops will really be at the points he mentioned on the
31st?" The Author replied, "I pledge myself for the sincerity of this
letter upon the knowledge I have of General d'Auvray and the other men
of Wittgenstein's headquarters; whether the dispositions he announces
can be accomplished as he lays down I certainly cannot pledge myself;
for your Excellency knows that in war we must often fall short of the
line we have drawn for ourselves." The General was silent for a few
minutes of earnest reflection; then he held out his hand to the Author,
and said, "You have me. Tell General Diebitsch that we must confer early
to-morrow at the mill of Poschenen, and that I am now firmly determined
to separate myself from the French and their cause." The hour was fixed
for 8 A.M. After this was settled, the General added, "But I will not
do the thing by halves, I will get you Massenbach also." He called in
an officer who was of Massenbach's cavalry, and who had just left them.
Much like Schiller's Wallenstein, he asked, walking up and down the
room the while, "What say your regiments?" The officer broke out with
enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance from the French alliance, and said
that every man of the troops in question felt the same.

"You young ones may talk; but my older head is shaking on my shoulders,"
replied the General.(*)

(*) "Campaign in Russia in 1812"; translated from the German
of General Von Clausewitz (by Lord Ellesmere).

After the close of the Russian campaign Clausewitz remained in the
service of that country, but was attached as a Russian staff officer to
Blucher's headquarters till the Armistice in 1813.

In 1814, he became Chief of the Staff of General Walmoden's Russo-German
Corps, which formed part of the Army of the North under Bernadotte.
His name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that campaign,
particularly in connection with the affair of Goehrde.

Clausewitz re-entered the Prussian service in 1815, and served as Chief
of the Staff to Thielman's corps, which was engaged with Grouchy at
Wavre, on the 18th of June.

After the Peace, he was employed in a command on the Rhine. In 1818, he
became Major-General, and Director of the Military School at which he
had been previously educated.

In 1830, he was appointed Inspector of Artillery at Breslau, but soon
after nominated Chief of the Staff to the Army of Observation, under
Marshal Gneisenau on the Polish frontier.

The latest notices of his life and services are probably to be found
in the memoirs of General Brandt, who, from being on the staff of
Gneisenau's army, was brought into daily intercourse with Clausewitz
in matters of duty, and also frequently met him at the table of Marshal
Gneisenau, at Posen.

Amongst other anecdotes, General Brandt relates that, upon one occasion,
the conversation at the Marshal's table turned upon a sermon preached
by a priest, in which some great absurdities were introduced, and a
discussion arose as to whether the Bishop should not be made responsible
for what the priest had said. This led to the topic of theology in
general, when General Brandt, speaking of himself, says, "I expressed an
opinion that theology is only to be regarded as an historical process,
as a MOMENT in the gradual development of the human race. This
brought upon me an attack from all quarters, but more especially
from Clausewitz, who ought to have been on my side, he having been an
adherent and pupil of Kiesewetter's, who had indoctrinated him in the
philosophy of Kant, certainly diluted--I might even say in homoeopathic
doses." This anecdote is only interesting as the mention of Kiesewetter
points to a circumstance in the life of Clausewitz that may have had
an influence in forming those habits of thought which distinguish his
writings.

"The way," says General Brandt, "in which General Clausewitz judged
of things, drew conclusions from movements and marches, calculated the
times of the marches, and the points where decisions would take
place, was extremely interesting. Fate has unfortunately denied him an
opportunity of showing his talents in high command, but I have a firm
persuasion that as a strategist he would have greatly distinguished
himself. As a leader on the field of battle, on the other hand, he would
not have been so much in his right place, from a manque d'habitude du
commandement, he wanted the art d'enlever les troupes."

After the Prussian Army of Observation was dissolved, Clausewitz
returned to Breslau, and a few days after his arrival was seized with
cholera, the seeds of which he must have brought with him from the army
on the Polish frontier. His death took place in November 1831.

His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after his death,
but his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treatise on
"War." In the present attempt to render into English this portion of the
works of Clausewitz, the translator is sensible of many deficiencies,
but he hopes at all events to succeed in making this celebrated treatise
better known in England, believing, as he does, that so far as the
work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of the
importance it possessed at the time of its first publication.

J. J. GRAHAM (Col.)




BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR

CHAPTER I. WHAT IS WAR?

1. INTRODUCTION.

WE propose to consider first the single elements of our subject,
then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its
relations--therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But
it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the
whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of
any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly
in view.

2. DEFINITION.

We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of War used by
publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel.
War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as
a unit the countless number of duels which make up a War, we shall do so
best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical
force to compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavours
to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further
resistance.