The Project Gutenberg Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte

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Napoleon, when at St. Helena, gave a very different reading to these
incidents. On this subject he was heard to say, "If I except Labedoyere,
who flew to me with enthusiasm and affection, and another individual,
who, of his own accord, rendered me important services, nearly all the
other generals whom I met on my route evinced hesitation and uncertainty;
they yielded only to the impulse about them, if indeed they did not
manifest a hostile feeling towards me. This was the case with Ney, with
Massena, St. Cyr, Soult, as well as with Macdonald and the Duke of
Belluno, so that if the Bourbons had reason to complain of the complete
desertion of the soldiers and the people, they had no right to reproach
the chiefs of the army with conspiring against them, who had shown
themselves mere children in politics, and would be looked upon as neither
emigrants nor patriots."

Between Lyons and Fontainebleau Napoleon often travelled several miles
ahead of his army with no other escort than a few Polish lancers. His
advanced guard now generally consisted of the troops (miscalled Royal)
who happened to be before him on the road whither they had been sent to
oppose him, and to whom couriers were sent forward to give notice of the
Emperor's approach, in order that they might be quite ready to join him
with the due military ceremonies. White flags and cockades everywhere
disappeared; the tri-colour resumed its pride of place. It was spring,
and true to its season the violet had reappeared! The joy of the
soldiers and the lower orders was almost frantic, but even among the
industrious poor there were not wanting many who regretted this
precipitate return to the old order of things--to conscription, war, and
bloodshed, while in the superior classes of society there was a pretty
general consternation. The vain, volatile soldiery, however, thought of
nothing but their Emperor, saw nothing before them but the restoration of
all their laurels, the humiliation of England, and the utter defeat of
the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians.

On the night between the 19th and 20th of March Napoleon reached
Fontainebleau, and again paused, as had formerly been his custom, with
short, quick steps through the antiquated but splendid galleries of that
old palace. What must have been his feelings on revisiting the chamber
in which, the year before, it is said he had attempted suicide!

Louis XVIII., left the Palace of the Tuileries at nearly the same hour
that Bonaparte entered that of Fontainebleau.

The most forlorn hope of the Bourbons was now in a considerable army
posted between Fontainebleau and Paris. Meanwhile the two armies
approached each other at Melun; that of the King was commanded by Marshal
Macdonald. On the 20th his troops were drawn up in three lines to
receive the invaders, who were said to be advancing from Fontainebleau.
There was a long pause of suspense, of a nature which seldom fails to
render men more accessible to strong and sudden emotions. The glades of
the forest, and the acclivity which leads to it, were in full view of the
Royal army, but presented the appearance of a deep solitude. All was
silence, except when the regimental bands of music, at the command of the
officers, who remained generally faithful, played the airs of "Vive Henri
Quatre," "O Richard," "La Belle Gabrielle," and other tunes connected
with the cause and family of the Bourbons. The sounds excited no
corresponding sentiments among the soldiers.

At length, about noon, a galloping of horse was heard. An open carriage
appeared, surrounded by a few hussars, and drawn by four horses. It came
on at full speed, and Napoleon, jumping from the vehicle, was in the
midst of the ranks which had been formed to oppose him. His escort threw
themselves from their horses, mingled with their ancient comrades, and
the effect of their exhortations was instantaneous on men whose minds
were already half made up to the purpose which they now accomplished.
There was a general shout of "Vive Napoleon!" The last army of the
Bourbons passed from their side, and no further obstruction existed
betwixt Napoleon and the capital, which he was once more--but for a brief
space--to inhabit as a sovereign.

Louis, accompanied only by a few household troops, had scarcely turned
his back on the capital of his ancestors when Lavalette hastened from a
place of concealment and seized on the Post-office in the name of
Napoleon. By this measure all the King's proclamations' were
intercepted, and the restoration of the Emperor was announced to all the
departments. General Excelmans, who had just renewed his oath to Louis,
pulled down with his own hands the white flag that was floating over the
Tuileries, and hoisted the three-coloured banner.

It was late in the evening of the 20th that Bonaparte entered Paris in an
open carriage, which was driven straight to the gilded gates of the
Tuileries. He received the acclamations of the military and of the lower
classes of the suburbs, but most of the respectable citizens looked on in
silent wonderment. It was quite evident then that he was recalled by a
party--a party, in truth, numerous and powerful, but not by the unanimous
voice of the nation. The enthusiasm of his immediate adherents, however,
made up for the silence and lukewarmness of others. They filled and
crammed the square of the Carrousel, and the courts and avenues of the
Tuileries; they pressed so closely upon him that he was obliged to cry
out, "My friends, you stifle me!" and his aides de camp were compelled to
carry him in their arms up the grand staircase, and thence into the royal
apartments. It was observed, however, that amongst these ardent friends
were many men who had been the first to desert him in 1814, and that
these individuals were the most enthusiastic in their demonstrations, the
loudest in their shouts!

And thus was Napoleon again at the Tuileries, where, even more than at
Fontainebleau, his mind was flooded by the deep and painful recollections
of the past! A few nights after his return thither he sent for M. Horan,
one of the physicians who had attended Josephine during her last illness.
"So, Monsieur Horan," said he, "you did not leave the Empress during her
malady?"--"No, Sire."

What was the cause of that malady?"--"Uneasiness of mind . . .
grief."--"You believe that?" (and Napoleon laid a strong emphasis on the
word believe, looking steadfastly in the doctor's face). He then asked,
"Was she long ill? Did she suffer much?"--"She was ill a week, Sire;
her Majesty suffered little bodily pain."--"Did she see that she was
dying? Did she show courage?"--"A sign her Majesty made when she could
no longer express herself leaves me no doubt that she felt her end
approaching; she seamed to contemplate it without fear."--"Well!--well!"
and then Napoleon much affected drew close to M. Horan, and added, "You
say that she was in grief; from what did that arise?"--"From passing
events, Sire; from your Majesty's position last year."--"Ah! she used to
speak of me then?"--"Very often." Here Napoleon drew his hand across
his eyes, which seemed filled with tears. He then went on. "Good
woman!--Excellent Josephine! She loved me truly--she--did she not? . . .
Ah! She was a Frenchwoman!"--"Yes, Sire, she loved you, and she
would have proved it had it not been for dread of displeasing you: she
had conceived an idea."--"How? . . . What would she have done?" "She one
day said that as Empress of the French she would drive through Paris
with eight horses to her coach, and all her household in gala livery, to
go and rejoin you at Fontainebleau, and never quit you mare."--"She
would have done it--she was capable of doing it!"

Napoleon again betrayed deep emotion, on recovering from which he asked
the physician the most minute questions about the nature of Josephine's
disease, the friends and attendants who were around her at the hour of
her death, and the conduct of her two children, Eugene and Hortense.




CHAPTER V.

1815.

Message from the Tuileries--My interview with the King--
My appointment to the office of Prefect of the Police--Council at
the Tuileries--Order for arrests--Fouches escape--Davoust
unmolested--Conversation with M. de Blacas--The intercepted letter,
and time lost--Evident understanding between Murat and Napoleon--
Plans laid at Elba--My departure from Paris--The post-master of
Fins--My arrival at Lille--Louis XVIII. detained an hour at the
gates--His majesty obliged to leave France--My departure for
Hamburg--The Duc de Berri at Brussels.

Those who opposed the execution of the treaty concluded with Napoleon at
the time of his abdication were guilty of a great error, for they
afforded him a fair pretext for leaving the island of Elba. The details
of that extraordinary enterprise are known to every one, and I shall not
repeat what has been told over and over again. For my own part, as soon
as I saw with what rapidity Bonaparte was marching upon Lyons, and the
enthusiasm with which he was received by the troops and the people, I
prepared to retire to Belgium, there to await the denouement of this new
drama.

Every preparation for my departure was completed on the evening of the
13th of March, and I was ready to depart, to avoid the persecutions of
which I expected I should be the object, when I received a message from
the Tuileries stating that the King desired to see me. I of course lost
no time in proceeding to the Palace, and went straight to M. Hue to
inquire of him why I had been sent for. He occupied the apartments in
which I passed the three most laborious and anxious years of my life.
M. Hue, perceiving that I felt a certain degree of uneasiness at being
summoned to the Tuileries at that hour of the night, hastened to inform
me that the King wished to appoint me Prefect of the Police. He
conducted me to the King's chamber, where his Majesty thus addressed me
kindly, but in an impressive manner, "M. de Bourrienne, can we rely upon
you? I expect much from your zeal and fidelity."--"Your Majesty,"
replied I, "shall have no reason to complain of my betraying your
confidence."--"Well, I re-establish the Prefecture of the Police, and I
appoint you Prefect. Do your best, M. de Bourrienne, in the discharge of
your duties; I count upon you."

By a singular coincidence, on the very day (the 13th of March) when I
received this appointment Napoleon, who was at Lyons, signed the decree
which excluded from the amnesty he had granted thirteen individuals,
among whose names mine was inscribed. This decree confirmed me in the
presentiments I had conceived as soon as I heard of the landing of
Bonaparte. On returning home from the Tuileries after receiving my
appointment a multitude of ideas crowded on my mind. At the first moment
I had been prompted only by the wish to serve the cause of the King, but
I was alarmed when I came to examine the extent of the responsibility I
had taken upon myself. However, I determined to meet with courage the
difficulties that presented themselves, and I must say that I had every
reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I was seconded by M.
Foudras, the Inspector-General of the Police.

Even now I am filled with astonishment when I think of the Council that
was held at the Tuileries on the evening of the 13th of March in M. de
Blacas' apartments. The ignorance of the members of that Council
respecting our situation, and their confidence in the useless measures
they had adopted against Napoleon, exceed all conception.

Will it be believed that those great statesmen, who had the control of
the telegraph, the post-office, the police and its agents, money-in
short, everything which constitutes power--asked me to give them
information respecting the advance of Bonaparte? What could I say to
them? I could only repeat the reports which were circulated on the
Exchange, and those which I had collected here and there during the last
twenty-four hours. I did not conceal that the danger was imminent, and
that all their precautions would be of no avail. The question then arose
as to what course should be adapted by the King. It was impossible that
the monarch could remain at the Capital, and yet, where was he to go?
One proposed that he should go to Bordeaux, another to La Vendee, and a
third to Normandy, and a fourth member of the Council was of opinion that
the King should be conducted to Melun. I conceived that if a battle
should take place anywhere it would probably be in the neighbourhood of
that town, but the councillor who made this last suggestion assured us
that the presence of the King in an open carriage and eight horses would
produce a wonderful effect on the minds of the troops. This project was
merely ridiculous; the others appeared to be dangerous and impracticable.
I declared to the Council that, considering the situation of things, it
was necessary to renounce all idea of resistance by force of arms; that
no soldier would fire a musket, and that it was madness to attempt to
take any other view of things. "Defection," said I, "is inevitable.
The soldiers are drinking in their barracks the money which you have been
giving them for some days past to purchase their fidelity. They say
Louis XVIII., is a very decent sort of man, but 'Vive le petit Caporal!'"

Immediately on the landing of Napoleon the King sent an extraordinary
courier to Marmont, who was at Chatillon whither he had gone to take a
last leave of his dying mother. I saw him one day after he had had an
interview with the King; I think it was on the 6th or 7th of March.
After some conversation on the landing of Napoleon, and the means of
preventing him from reaching Paris, Marmont said to me, "This is what I
dwelt most strongly upon in the interview I have just had with the King.
'Sire,' said I, 'I doubt not Bonaparte's intention of coming to Paris,
and the best way to prevent him doing so would be for your Majesty to
remain here. It is necessary to secure the Palace of the Tuileries
against a surprise, and to prepare it for resisting a siege, in which it
would be indispensable to use cannon. You must shut yourself up in your
palace, with the individuals of your household and the principal public
functionaries, while the Due d'Angoulome should go to Bordeaux, the Duc
de Berri to La Vendee, and Monsieur to, the Franche-Comte; but they must
set off in open day, and announce that they are going to collect
defenders for your Majesty.--[Monsieur, the brother of the King, the
Comte d'Artois later Charles X.]

". . . This is what I said to the King this morning, and I added that I
would answer for everything if my advice were followed. I am now going
to direct my aide de camp, Colonel Fabvier, to draw up the plan of
defence." I did not concur in Marmont's opinion. It is certainly
probable that had Louis XVIII. remained in his palace the numerous
defections which took place before the 20th of March would have been
checked and some persons would not have found so ready an excuse for
breaking their oaths of allegiance. There can be little doubt, too, but
Bonaparte would have reflected well before he attempted the siege of the
Tuileries.

--[Marmont (tome vii. p. 87) gives the full details of his scheme
for provisioning and garrisoning the Tuileries which the King was to
hold while his family spread themselves throughout the provinces.
The idea had nothing strange in it, for the same advice was given by
General Mathieu Dumas (Souvenirs, tome iii. p. 564), a man not
likely to suggest any rash schemes. Jaucourt, writing to
Talleyrand, obviously believed in the wisdom of the King's
remaining, as did the Czar; see Talleyrand's Correspondence, vol.
ii. pp. 94, 122, 129. Napoleon would certainly have been placed
in a strange difficulty, but a king capable of adopting such a
resolution would never have been required to consider it.]--

Marmont supported his opinion by observing that the admiration and
astonishment excited by the extraordinary enterprise of Napoleon and his
rapid march to Paris would be counterbalanced by the interest inspired by
a venerable monarch defying his bold rival and courageously defending his
throne. While I rendered full justice to the good intentions of the Duke
of Ragusa, yet I did not think that his advice could be adopted. I
opposed it as I opposed all the propositions that were made in the
Council relative to the different places to which the King should retire.
I myself suggested Lille as being the nearest, and as presenting the
greatest degree of safety, especially in the first instance.

It was after midnight when I left the Council of the Tuileries. The
discussion had terminated, and without coming to any precise resolution
it was agreed that the different opinions which had been expressed should
be submitted to Louis XVIII. in order that his Majesty might adopt that
which should appear to him the best. The King adopted my opinion, but it
was not acted upon until five days after.

My appointment to the Prefecture of the Police was, as will be seen, a
late thought of measure, almost as late indeed as Napoleon's proposition
to send me as his Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. In now
accepting office I was well convinced of the inutility of any effort that
might be made to arrest the progress of the fast approaching and menacing
events. Being introduced into the King's cabinet his Majesty asked me
what I thought of the situation of affairs. "I think, Sire, that
Bonaparte will be here in five or six days."--"What, sir?"--"Yes,
Sire."--"But proper measures are taken, the necessary orders given, and
the Marshals are faithful to me."--"Sire, I suspect no man's fidelity;
but I can assure your Majesty that, as Bonaparte has landed, he will be
here within a week. I know him, and your Majesty cannot know him as well
as I do; but I can venture too assure your Majesty with the same
confidence that he will not be here six months hence. He will be hurried
into acts of folly which will ruin him."--"De Bourrienne, I hope the
best from events, but if misfortune again compel me to leave France, and
your second prediction be fulfilled, you may rely on me." During this
short conversation the King appeared perfectly tranquil and resigned.

The next day I again visited the Tuileries, whither I had at those
perilous times frequent occasion to repair. On that day I received a
list of twenty-five persons whom I was ordered to arrest. I took the
liberty to observe that such a proceeding was not only useless but likely
to produce a very injurious effect at that critical moment. The reasons
I urged had not all the effect I expected. However, some relaxation as
to twenty-three of the twenty-five was conceded, but it was insisted that
Fouche and Davoust should be arrested without delay. The King repeatedly
said, "I wish you to arrest Fouche."--"Sire, I beseech your Majesty to
consider the inutility of such a measure."--"I am resolved upon Fouches
arrest. But I am sure you will miss him, for Andre could not catch him."

My nocturnal installation as Prefect of the Police took place some time
after midnight. I had great repugnance to the arrest of Fouche, but the
order having been given, there was no alternative but to obey it. I
communicated the order to M. Foudras, who very coolly observed, "Since we
are to arrest him you need not be afraid, we shall have him fast
tomorrow."

The next day my agents repaired to the Duke of Otranto's hotel, in the
Rue d'Artois. On showing their warrant Fouche said, "What does this
mean? Your warrant is of no force; it is mere waste-paper. It purports
to come from the Prefect of the Police, but there is no such Prefect."
In my opinion Fouche was right, for my appointment, which took place
during the night, had not been legally announced. Be that as it may,
on his refusal to surrender, one of my agents applied to the staff of the
National Guard, requesting the support, in case of need, of an armed
force. General Dessolles repaired to the Tuileries to take the King's
orders on the subject. Meanwhile Fouche, who never lost his
self-possession, after talking to the police officers who remained with
him, pretended to step aside for some indispensable purpose, but the
door which he opened led into a dark passage through which he slipped,
leaving my unfortunate agents groping about in the obscurity. As for
himself, he speedily gained the Rue Taitbout, where he stepped into a
coach, and drove off. This is the whole history of the notable arrest
of Fouche.

As for Davoust, I felt my hands tied with respect to him. I do not mean
to affect generosity, for I acknowledge the enmity I bore him; but I did
not wish it to be supposed that I was acting towards him from a spirit of
personal vengeance. I therefore merely ordered him to be watched. The
other twenty-three were to me in this matter as if they had never
existed; and some of them, perhaps, will only learn in reading my Memoirs
what dangerous characters they were thought to be.

On the 15th of March, after the conversation which, as I have already
related, I had with Louis XVIII, I went to M. de Blacas and repeated to
him what I had stated to the King on the certainty of Bonaparte's speedy
arrival in Paris. I told him that I found it necessary to devote the
short time still in our power to prevent a reaction against the
Royalists, and to preserve public tranquillity until the departure of the
Royal family, and that I would protect the departure of all persons who
had reasons for withdrawing themselves from the scene of the great and
perhaps disastrous events that might ensue. "You may readily believe,
Count," added I, "that considering the great interests with which I am
entrusted, I am not inclined to lose valuable time in arresting the
persons of whose names I have received a list. The execution of such a
measure would be useless; it would lead to nothing, or rather it would
serve to irritate public feeling. My conviction of this fact has
banished from me all idea of keeping under restraint for four or five
days persons whose influence, whether real or supposed, is nil, since
Bonaparte is at Auxerre. Mere supervision appears to me sufficient, and
to that I propose confining myself."--"The King," replied M. de Blacas,
"relies on you. He knows that though only forty-eight hours have elapsed
since you entered upon your functions, you have already rendered greater
services than you are perhaps aware of." I then asked M. de Blacas
whether he had not received any intimation of Bonaparte's intended
departure from the island of Elba by letters or by secret agents. "The
only positive information we received," answered the Minister, "was an
intercepted letter, dated Elba, 6th February. It was addressed to
M. -----, near Grenoble. I will show it you." M. de Blacas opened a
drawer of his writing-table and took out the letter, which he gave to me.
The writer thanked his correspondent for the information he had
transmitted to "the inhabitant of Elba." He was informed that everything
was ready for departure, and that the first favourable opportunity would
be seized, but that it would be desirable first to receive answers to
some questions contained in the letter. These questions related to the
regiments which had been sent into the south, and the places of their
cantonment. It was inquired whether the choice of the commanders was
conformable to what had been agreed on in Paris, and whether Labedoyere
was at his post. The letter was rather long and it impressed me by the
way in which the plan of a landing on the coast of Provence was
discussed. Precise answers were requested on all these points. On
returning the letter to M. de Blacas I remarked that the contents of the
letter called for the adoption of some decided measures, and I asked him
what had been done. He answered, "I immediately sent a copy of the
letter to M. d'Andre, that he might give orders for arresting the
individual to whom it was addressed."

Having had the opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a
vigilant and active Government, I was, I must confess, not a little
amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this
well-planned conspiracy. When M. de Blacas informed me of all that had
been done, I could not repress an exclamation of surprise. "Well," said
he, "and what would you have done?"--"In the first place I would not
have lost twenty-four hours, which were an age in such a crisis." I
then explained the plan I would have adopted. A quarter of an hour
after the receipt of the letter I would have sent trustworthy men to
Grenoble, and above all things I would have taken care not to let the
matter fall into the hands of the police. Having obtained all
information from the correspondent at Grenoble, I would have made him
write a letter to his correspondent at Elba to quiet the eagerness of
Napoleon, telling him that the movement of troops he spoke of had not
been made, that it would take eight days to carry it out, and that it
was necessary to the success of the enterprise to delay the embarkation
for some days. While Bonaparte was thus delayed I would have sent to
the coast of Provence a sufficient body of men devoted to the Royal
cause, sending off in another direction the regiments whose chiefs were
gained over by Napoleon, as the correspondence should reveal their
names. "You are perhaps right, sir," said M. de Blacas, "but what could
I do? I am new here. I had not the control of the police, and I
trusted to M. d'Andre."--"Well," said I, "Bonaparte will be here on the
20th of March." With these words I parted from M. de Blacas. I
remarked a great change in him. He had already lost a vast deal of that
hauteur of favouritism which made him so much disliked.