The Project Gutenberg Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte

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CHRISTINE BONAPARTE.

--[Madame Bacciocchi went by the name of Marianne at St. Cyr, of
Christine while on her travels, and of Eliza under the Consulate.--
Bourrienne.]--

P.S.--Do not fail to remember me to your wife, whom I strongly
desire to be acquainted with. They told me at Paris I was very like
her. If you recollect my features you can judge. C. B.


This letter is in the handwriting of Lucien Bonaparte.'

--[Joseph Bonaparte in his Notes says, "It is false that Madame
Bonaparte ever called herself Christine; it is false that she ever
wrote the letter of which M. de Bourrienne here gives a copy." It
will be observed that Bourrienne says it was written by her brother
Lucien. This is an error. The letter is obviously from Christine
Boyer, the wife of Lucien Bonaparte, whose marriage had given such
displeasure to Napoleon. (See Erreurs, tome i. p. 240, and Iung's
Lucien, tome i p. 161).]--

General Bonaparte had been near a month at Passeriano when he received
the following autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria:


TO MONSIEUR LE GENERAL BONAPARTE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

MONSIEUR LE GENERAL BONAPARTE--When I thought I had given my
plenipotentiaries full powers to terminate the important negotiation
with which they were charged, I learn, with as much pain as
surprise, that in consequence of swerving continually from the
stipulations of the preliminaries, the restoration of tranquillity,
with the tidings of which I desire to gladden the hearts of my
subjects, and which the half of Europe devoutly prays for, becomes
day after day more uncertain.

Faithful to the performance of my engagements, I am ready to execute
what was agreed to at Leoben, and require from you but the
reciprocal performance of so sacred a duty. This is what has
already been declared in my name, and what I do not now hesitate
myself to declare. If, perhaps, the execution of some of the
preliminary articles be now impossible, in consequence of the events
which have since occurred, and in which I had no part, it may be
necessary to substitute others in their stead equally adapted to the
interests and equally conformable to the dignity of the two nations.
To such alone will I put my hand. A frank and sincere explanation,
dictated by the same feelings which govern me, is the only way to
lead to so salutary a result. In order to accelerate this result as
far as in me lies, and to put an end at once to the state of
uncertainty we remain in, and which has already lasted too long, I
have determined to despatch to the place of the present negotiations
Comte de Cobentzel, a man who possesses my most unlimited
confidence, and who is instructed as to my intentions and furnished
with my most ample powers. I have authorised him to receive and
accept every proposition tending to the reconciliation of the two
parties which may be in conformity with the principles of equity and
reciprocal fitness, and to conclude accordingly.

After this fresh assurance of the spirit of conciliation which
animates me, I doubt not you will perceive that peace lies in your
own hands, and that on your determination will depend the happiness
or misery of many thousand men. If I mistake as to the means I
think best adapted to terminate the calamities which for along time
have desolated Europe, I shall at least have the consolation of
reflecting that I have done all that depended on me. With the
consequences which may result I can never be reproached.

I have been particularly determined to the course I now take by the
opinion I entertain of your upright character, and by the personal
esteem I have conceived towards you, of which I am very happy, M. le
General Bonaparte, to give you here an assurance.

(Signed) FRANCIS.


In fact, it was only on the arrival of the Comte de Cobentzel that the
negotiations were seriously set on foot. Bonaparte had all along clearly
perceived that Gallo and Meerweldt were not furnished with adequate
powers. He saw also clearly enough that if the month of September were,
to be trifled away in unsatisfactory negotiations, as the month which
preceded it had been, it would be difficult in October to strike a blow
at the house of Austria on the side of Carinthia. The Austrian Cabinet
perceived with satisfaction the approach of the bad weather, and insisted
more strongly on its ultimatum, which was the Adige, with Venice.

Before the 18th Fructidor the Emperor of Austria hoped that the movement
which was preparing in Paris would operate badly for France and
favourably to the European cause. The Austrian plenipotentiaries, in
consequence, raised their pretensions, and sent notes and an ultimatum
which gave the proceedings more an air of trifling than of serious
negotiation. Bonaparte's original ideas, which I have under his hand,
were as follows:

1. The Emperor to have Italy as far as the Adda.
2. The King of Sardinia as far as the Adda.
3. The Genoese Republic to have the boundary of Tortona as far as
the Po (Tortona to be demolished), as also the imperial fiefs.
(Coni to be ceded to France, or to be demolished.)
4. The Grand Duke of Tuscany to be restored.
5. The Duke of Parma to be restored.




CHAPTER X.

1797.

Influence of the 18th Fructidor on the negotiations--Bonaparte's
suspicion of Bottot--His complaints respecting the non-erasure of
Bourrienne--Bourrienne's conversation with the Marquis of Gallo--
Bottot writes from Paris to Bonaparte on the part of the Directory
Agents of the Directory employed to watch Bonaparte--Influence of
the weather on the conclusion of peace--Remarkable observation of
Bonaparte--Conclusion of the treaty--The Directory dissatisfied with
the terms of the peace--Bonaparte's predilection for representative
government--Opinion on Bonaparte.

After the 18th Fructidor Bonaparte was more powerful, Austria less
haughty and confident. Venice was the only point of real difficulty.
Austria wanted the line of the Adige, with Venice, in exchange for
Mayence, and the boundary of the Rhine until that river enters Holland.
The Directory wished to have the latter boundary, and to add Mantua to
the Italian Republic, without giving up all the line of the Adige and
Venice. The difficulties were felt to be so irreconcilable that within
about a month of the conclusion of peace the Directory wrote to General
Bonaparte that a resumption of hostilities was preferable to the state of
uncertainty which was agitating and ruining France. The Directory,
therefore, declared that both the armies of the Rhine should take the
field. It appears from the Fructidorian correspondence, which has been
already given, that the majority of the Directory then looked upon a
peace such as Bonaparte afterwards made as infamous.

But Bonaparte, from the moment the Venetian insurrection broke out,
perceived that Venice might be used for the pacification. Bonaparte,
who was convinced that, in order to bring matters to an issue, Venice and
the territory beyond the Adige must fall beneath the Hapsburg sceptre,
wrote to the Directory that he could not commence operations,
advantageously, before the end of March, 1798; but that if the objections
to giving Venice to the Emperor of Austria were persisted in, hostilities
would certainly be resumed in the month of October, for the Emperor would
not renounce Venice. In that case it would be necessary to be ready on
the Rhine for an advance in Germany, as the army of Italy, if it could
make head against the Archduke Charles, was not sufficiently strong for
any operations on a grand scale. At this period the conclusion of peace
was certainly very doubtful; it was even seriously considered in, what
form the rupture should be notified.

Towards the end of September Bottot, Barras' secretary, arrived at
Passeriano. He was despatched by the Directory. Bonaparte immediately
suspected he was a new spy, come on a secret mission, to watch him. He
was therefore received and treated with coolness; but Bonaparte never
had, as Sir Walter Scott asserts, the idea of ordering him to be shot.
That writer is also in error when he says that Bottot was sent to
Passeriano to reproach Bonaparte for failing to fulfil his promise of
sending money to the Directory.

Bonaparte soon gave Bottot an opportunity of judging of the kind of
spirit which prevailed at headquarters. He suddenly tendered his
resignation, which he had already several times called upon the Directory
to accept. He accused the Government, at table, in Bottot's presence,
of horrible ingratitude. He recounted all his subjects of complaint,
in loud and impassioned language, without any restraint, and before
twenty or thirty persons.

Indignant at finding that his reiterated demands for the erasure of my
name from the list of emigrants had been slighted, and that, in spite of
his representations, conveyed to Paris by General Bernadotte, Louis
Bonaparte, and others, I was still included in that fatal list, he
apostrophised M. Bottot at dinner one day, before forty individuals,
among whom were the diplomatists Gallo, Cobentzel, and Meerweldt. The
conversation turned upon the Directory. "Yes, truly," cried Bonaparte,
in a loud voice, "I have good reason to complain; and, to pass from great
to little things, look, I pray you, at Bourrienne's case. He possesses
my most unbounded confidence. He alone is entrusted, under my orders,
with all the details of the negotiation. This you well know; and yet
your Directory will not strike him off the list. In a word it is not
only an inconceivable, but an extremely stupid piece of business; for he
has all my secrets; he knows my ultimatum, and could by a single word
realize a handsome fortune, and laugh at your obstinacy. Ask M. de Gallo
if this be not true."

Bottot wished to offer some excuse; but the general murmur which followed
this singular outburst reduced him to silence.

The Marquis de Gallo had conversed with me but three days before, in the
park of Passeriano, on the subject of my position with regard to France,
of the determination expressed by the Directory not to erase my name, and
of the risk I thereby ran. "We have no desire," continued he, "to renew
the war; we wish sincerely for peace; but it must be an honourable one.
The Republic of Venice presents a large territory for partition, which
would be sufficient for both parties. The cessions at present proposed
are not, however, satisfactory. We want to know Bonaparte's ultimatum;
and I am authorised to offer an estate in Bohemia, with a title and
residence, and an annual revenue of 90,000 florins."

I quickly interrupted M. de Gallo, and assured him that both my
conscience and my duty obliged me to reject his proposal; and so put at
once an end to the conversation.

I took care to let the General-in-Chief know this story, and he was not
surprised at my reply. His conviction, however, was strong, from all
that M. de Gallo had said, and more particularly from the offer he had
made, that Austria was resolved to avoid war, and was anxious for peace.

After I had retired to rest M. Bottot came to my bedroom and asked me,
with a feigned surprise, if it was true that my name was still on the
list of emigrants. On my replying in the affirmative, he requested me to
draw up a note on the subject. This I declined doing, telling him that
twenty notes of the kind he required already existed; that I would take
no further steps; and that I would henceforth await the decision in a
state of perfect inaction.

General Bonaparte thought it quite inexplicable that the Directory should
express dissatisfaction at the view he took of the events of the 18th
Fructidor, as, without his aid, they would doubtless have been overcome.
He wrote a despatch, in which he repeated that his health and his spirits
were affected--that he had need of some years' repose-that he could no
longer endure the fatigue of riding; but that the prosperity and liberty
of his country would always command his warmest interests. In all this
there was not a single word of truth. The Directory thought as much, and
declined to accept his resignation in the most flattering terms.

Bottot proposed to him, on the part of the Directory, to revolutionise
Italy. The General inquired whether the whole of Italy would be included
in the plan. The revolutionary commission had, however, been entrusted
to Bottot in so indefinite a way that he could only hesitate, and give a
vague reply. Bonaparte wished for more precise orders. In the interval
peace was concluded, and the idea of that perilous and extravagant
undertaking was no longer agitated. Bottot, soon after his return to
Paris, wrote a letter to General Bonaparte, in which he complained that
the last moments he had passed at Passeriano had deeply afflicted his
heart. He said that cruel suspicions had followed him even to the gates
of the Directory. These cruel suspicions had, however, been dissipated
by the sentiments of admiration and affection which he had found the
Directory entertained for the person of Bonaparte.

These assurances, which were precisely what Bonaparte had expected, did
not avail to lessen the contempt he entertained for the heads of the
Government, nor to change his conviction of their envy and mistrust of
himself. To their alleged affection he made no return. Bottot assured
the hero of Italy of "the Republican docility" of the Directory, and
touched upon the reproaches Bonaparte had thrown out against them, and
upon his demands which had not been granted. He said:

"The three armies, of the North, of the Rhine, and of the
Sambre-et-Meuse, are to form only one, the army of Germany.--Augereau?
But you yourself sent him. The fault committed by the Directory is
owing to yourself! Bernadotte?--he is gone to join you. Cacault?--he
is recalled. Twelve thousand men for your army?--they are on their
march. The treaty with Sardinia?--it is ratified. Bourrienne?--he is
erased. The revolution of Italy?--it is adjourned. Advise the
Directory, then: I repeat it, they have need of information, and it is
to you they look for it."

The assertion regarding me was false. For six months Bonaparte demanded
my erasure without being able to obtain it. I was not struck off the
list until the 11th of November 1797.

Just before the close of the negotiation Bonaparte, disgusted at the
opposition and difficulties with which he was surrounded, reiterated
again and again the offer of his resignation, and his wish to have a
successor appointed. What augmented his uneasiness was an idea he
entertained that the Directory had penetrated his secret, and attributed
his powerful concurrence on the 18th Fructidor to the true cause--his
personal views of ambition. In spite of the hypocritical assurances of
gratitude made to him in writing, and though the Directory knew that his
services were indispensable, spies were employed to watch his movements,
and to endeavour by means of the persons about him to discover his views.
Some of the General's friends wrote to him from Paris, and for my part I
never ceased repeating to him that the peace, the power of making which
he had in his own hands, would render him far more popular than the
renewal of hostilities undertaken with all the chances of success and
reverse. The signing of the peace, according to his own ideas, and in
opposition to those of the Directory, the way in which he just halted at
Rastadt, and avoided returning to the Congress, and, finally, his
resolution to expatriate himself with an army in order to attempt new
enterprises, sprung more than is generally believed from the ruling idea
that he was distrusted, and that his ruin was meditated. He often
recalled to mind what La Vallette had written to him about his
conversation with Lacuee; and all he saw and heard confirmed the
impression he had received on this subject.

The early appearance of bad weather precipitated his determination. On
the 13th of October, at daybreak, on opening my window, I perceived the
mountains covered with snow. The previous night had been superb, and the
autumn till then promised to be fine and late. I proceeded, as I always
did, at seven o'clock in the morning, to the General's chamber. I woke
him, and told him what I had seen. He feigned at first to disbelieve me,
then leaped from his bed, ran to the window, and, convinced of the sudden
change, he calmly said, "What! before the middle of October! What a
country is this! Well, we must make peace!" While he hastily put on his
clothes I read the journals to him, as was my daily custom. He paid but
little attention to them.

Shutting himself up with me in his closet, he reviewed with the greatest
care all the returns from the different corps of his army. "Here are,"
said he, "nearly 80,000 effective men. I feed, I pay them: but I can
bring but 60,000 into the field on the day of battle. I shall gain it,
but afterwards my force will be reduced 20,000 men--by killed, wounded,
and prisoners. Then how oppose all the Austrian forces that will march
to the protection of Vienna? It would be a month before the armies of
the Rhine could support me, if they should be able; and in a fortnight
all the roads and passages will be covered deep with snow. It is
settled--I will make peace. Venice shall pay for the expense of the war
and the boundary of the Rhine: let the Directory and the lawyers say what
they like."

He wrote to the Directory in the following words: "The summits of the
hills are covered with snow; I cannot, on account of the stipulations
agreed to for the recommencement of hostilities, begin before
five-and-twenty days, and by that time we shall be overwhelmed with
snow."

Fourteen years after, another early winter, in a more severe climate, was
destined to have a fatal influence on his fortunes. Had he but then
exercised equal foresight!

It is well known that, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, the two belligerent
powers made peace at the expense of the Republic of Venice, which had
nothing to do with the quarrel in the first instance, and which only
interfered at a late period, probably against her own inclination, and
impelled by the force of inevitable circumstances. But what has been the
result of this great political spoliation? A portion of the Venetian
territory was adjudged to the Cisalpine Republic; it is now in the
possession of Austria.

Another considerable portion, and the capital itself, fell to the lot of
Austria in compensation for the Belgic provinces and Lombard, which she
ceded to France. Austria has now retaken Lombard, and the additions then
made to it, and Belgium is in the possession of the House of Orange.
France obtained Corfu and some of the Ionian isles; these now belong to
England.

--[Afterwards to be ceded by her to Greece. Belgium is free.]--

Romulus never thought he was founding Rome for Goths and priests.
Alexander did not foresee that his Egyptian city would belong to the
Turks; nor did Constantine strip Rome for the benefit of Mahomet II. Why
then fight for a few paltry villages?

Thus have we been gloriously conquering for Austria and England. An
ancient State is overturned without noise, and its provinces, after being
divided among different bordering States, are now all under the dominion
of Austria. We do not possess a foot of ground in all the fine countries
we conquered, and which served as compensations for the immense
acquisitions of the House of Hapsburgh in Italy. Thus that house was
aggrandised by a war which was to itself most disastrous. But Austria
has often found other means of extending her dominion than military
triumphs, as is recorded in the celebrated distich of Mathias Corvinus:

"Bella gerunt alli, to felix Austria nube;
Nam quae Mars allis, dat tibi regna Venus."

["Glad Austria wins by Hymen's silken chain
What other States by doubtful battle gain,
And while fierce Mars enriches meaner lands,
Receives possession from fair Venus' hands."]

The Directory was far from being satisfied with the treaty of
Campo-Formio, and with difficulty resisted the temptation of not
ratifying it. A fortnight before the signature the Directors wrote to
General Bonaparte that they would not consent to give to the Emperor
Venice, Frioul, Padua, and the 'terra firma' with the boundary of the
Adige. "That," said they, "would not be to make peace, but to adjourn
the war. We shall be regarded as the beaten party, independently of the
disgrace of abandoning Venice, which Bonaparte himself thought so worthy
of freedom. France ought not, and never will wish, to see Italy
delivered up to Austria. The Directory would prefer the chances of a war
to changing a single word of its ultimatum, which is already too
favourable to Austria."

All this was said in vain. Bonaparte made no scruple of disregarding his
instructions. It has been said that the Emperor of Austria made an offer
of a very considerable sum of money, and even of a principality, to
obtain favourable terms. I was never able to find the slightest ground
for this report, which refers to a time when the smallest circumstance
could not escape my notice. The character of Bonaparte stood too high
for him to sacrifice his glory as a conqueror and peacemaker for even the
greatest private advantage. This was so thoroughly known, and he was so
profoundly esteemed by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, that I will
venture to say none of them would have been capable of making the
slightest overture to him of so debasing a proposition. Besides, it
would have induced him to put an end to all intercourse with the
plenipotentiaries. Perhaps what I have just stated of M. de Gallo will
throw some light upon this odious accusation. But let us dismiss this
story with the rest, and among them that of the porcelain tray, which was
said to have been smashed and thrown at the head of M. de Cobentzel.
I certainly know nothing of any such scene; our manners at Passeriano
were not quite so bad!

The presents customary on such occasions were given, and the Emperor of
Austria also took that opportunity to present to General Bonaparte six
magnificent white horses.

Bonaparte returned to Milan by way of Gratz, Laybach, Thrust, Mestre,
Verona, and Mantua.

At this period Napoleon was still swayed by the impulse of the age. He
thought of nothing but representative governments. Often has he said to
me, "I should like the era of representative governments to be dated from
my time." His conduct in Italy and his proclamations ought to give, and
in fact do give, weight to this account of his opinion. But there is no
doubt that this idea was more connected with lofty views of ambition than
a sincere desire for the benefit of the human race; for, at a later
period, he adopted this phrase: "I should like to be the head of the most
ancient of the dynasties cf Europe." What a difference between
Bonaparte, the author of the 'Souper de Beaucaire', the subduer of
royalism at Toulon; the author of the remonstrance to Albitte and
Salicetti, the fortunate conqueror of the 13th Vendemiaire, the
instigator and supporter of the revolution of Fructidor, and the founder
of the Republics of Italy, the fruits of his immortal victories,--and
Bonaparte, First Consul in 1800, Consul for life in 1802, and, above all,
Napoleon, Emperor of the French in 1804, and King of Italy in 1805!




CHAPTER XI.

1797

Effect of the 18th Fructidor on the peace--The standard of the army
of Italy--Honours rendered to the memory of General Hoche and of
Virgil at Mantua--Remarkable letter--In passing through Switzerland
Bonaparte visits the field of Morat--Arrival at Rastadt--Letter from
the Directory calling Bonaparte to Paris--Intrigues against
Josephine--Grand ceremony on the reception of Bonaparte by the
Directory--The theatres--Modesty of Bonaparte--An assassination--
Bonaparte's opinion of the Parisians--His election to the National
Institute--Letter to Camus--Projects--Reflections.

The day of the 18th Fructidor had, without any doubt, mainly contributed
to the conclusion of peace at Campo Formio. On the one hand, the
Directory, hitherto not very pacifically inclined, after having effected
a 'coup d'etat', at length saw the necessity of appeasing the
discontented by giving peace to France. On the other hand, the Cabinet
of Vienna, observing the complete failure of all the royalist plots in
the interior, thought it high time to conclude with the French Republic a
treaty which, notwithstanding all the defeats Austria had sustained,
still left her a preponderating influence over Italy.

Besides, the campaign of Italy, so fertile in glorious achievements of
arms, had not been productive of glory alone. Something of greater
importance followed these conquests. Public affairs had assumed a
somewhat unusual aspect, and a grand moral influence, the effect of
victories and of peace, had begun to extend all over France.
Republicanism was no longer so sanguinary and fierce as it had been some
years before. Bonaparte, negotiating with princes and their ministers on
a footing of equality, but still with all that superiority to which
victory and his genius entitled him, gradually taught foreign courts to
be familiar with Republican France, and the Republic to cease regarding
all States governed by Kings as of necessity enemies.