The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 6,

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One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's
Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at
Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here
and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their
places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States.
We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which
arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our
situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly
helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness
to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's
force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with
the force you have.

A. LINCOLN.




HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY OF REBELLION

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

MAY 16, 1862

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims
at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was
clandestinely prepared during the Winter of 1860 and 1861, and
assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional
government at Montgomery, in Alabama on the 18th day of February,
1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the
flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and the capture of Fort
Sumter, Which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation.
Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were
obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege.
The mails in every direction were stopped and the lines of telegraph
cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had
been called out by the government for the defense of Washington were
prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined
treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no
adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress
had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It
became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing
means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should
let the government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself
of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of
insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its
blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the
departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the
office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their
unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should
proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, and
especially the California treasure ships then on their way to this
coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to
purchase or charter and arm as quickly as possible five steamships
for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the
navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase or charter and arm an equal
number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York
to purchase or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander
Gillis to purchase or charter and arm and put to sea two other
vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Dupont, with a
view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I
directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid
and efficient services, in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D.
Morgan, the Governor of New York, or in his absence George D. Morgan,
William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were
by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to
act for his department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the
forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense.

The several departments of the government at that time contained so
large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible
to provide safely through official agents only for the performance of
the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their
ability, loyalty, and patriotism.

The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by
private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard
cities, inland across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the
northern lakes. I believe by these and other similar measures taken
in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the
government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of
the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial
persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such
misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary
proceedings, and were necessarily overruled.

I recall these transactions now because my attention has been
directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of
Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these
words:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War by investing
Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money
and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction,
without requiring from him any guaranty for the faithful performance
of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were
available, and by involving the government in a vast number of
contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business
pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the
purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly
injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the
House."

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in
justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to
rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is
unanimously entertained by the heads of department who participated
in the proceedings which the House of Representatives have censured.
It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that although he fully approved the
proceedings they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that
not only the President, but all the other heads of departments, were
at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or
fault was committed in the premises.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862. 12.40

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and
baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably
safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000.

A. LINCOLN, President.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 26, 1862. 1 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Falmouth, Virginia:

Despatches from Geary just received have been sent you. Should not
the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at
Fredericksburg, move this way--to Manassas Junction or Alexandria?
As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these
questions.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Can you not cut the Alula Creek railroad? Also, what impression have
you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of
Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

May 27.1862. 9.58 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to
march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1862.

GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston:

The President directs that the militia be relieved, and the
enlistments made for three years, or during the war. This, I think,
will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest
intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his
whole command with small loss.

Concentrations of our force have been made, which it is hoped will
capture the enemy.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.




TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT,

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield

The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders,
unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of
Rodney, in which case you will move upon him. Acknowledge the
receipt of this order, and the hour it is received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General McClellan at 6.30 P.M. yesterday telegraphed that Fitz-John
Porter's division had fought and driven 13,000 of the enemy, under
General Branch, from Hanover Court-House, and was driving them from a
stand they had made on the railroad at the time the messenger left.
Two hours later he telegraphed that Stoneman had captured an engine
and six cars on the Virginia Central, which he at once sent to
communicate with Porter. Nothing further from McClellan.

If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover
Court-House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg
should not push through and join him.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

What of F.J. Porter's expedition? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON. May 28, 1862. 4 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this
side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue
Ridge looking for them.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862. 5.40 P.M.

GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are
still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of
legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Fremont as much,
and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I
suppose you know Fremont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going
into Harrisonburg.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN

WASHINGTON May 28, 1862. 8.40 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory. Still, if it was a
total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and
Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all
the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to
see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from
Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from
Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That
the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot
be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry informs
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewells, forced his
advance from Charlestown today. General King telegraphs us from
Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000
left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am
painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you,
and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard
to all points.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON
TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT, Moorefield:

The order to remain at Moorefield was based on the supposition that
it would find you there.

Upon subsequent information that the enemy were still operating in
the vicinity of Winchester and Martinsburg, you were directed to move
against the enemy.

The President now again directs you to move against the enemy without
delay. Please acknowledge the receipt of this, and the time
received.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 10 A.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY, McClellan's Headquarters:

Yours just received. I think it cannot be certainly known whether
the force which fought General Porter is the same which recently
confronted McDowell. Another item of evidence bearing on it is that
General Branch commanded against Porter, while it was General
Anderson who was in front of McDowell. He and McDowell were in
correspondence about prisoners.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C.,
May 29, 1862. 10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly
whether any considerable force of the enemy--Jackson or any one else
--is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected
development into your calculations.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Williamsport, Maryland:

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near
Front Royal at twelve (noon) tomorrow. General Fremont will be at or
near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow
and harass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for
General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 12 M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

General McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and
probably will, be at Front Royal by twelve (noon) to-morrow. His
force, when up, will be about 20,000. Please have your force at
Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that
point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by the same time. Your
despatch No.30 received and satisfactory.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

General Fremont's force should, and probably will, be at or near
Strasburg by twelve (noon) tomorrow. Try to have your force, or the
advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MARCY.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862. 1.20 P.M.

GENERAL R. B. MARCY:

Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our
forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on
the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the
country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Manassas Junction:

I somewhat apprehend that Fremont's force, in its present condition,
may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the
enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your
column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force
reaching Front Royal will amount to.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 10.15 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS,
Williamsport, Maryland, via Harper's Ferry:

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and
Winchester, Or any or all of them, he may come in collision with
Fremont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at
Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Fremont if possible;
the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning
of my despatch yesterday.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 12.40.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown:

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Fremont has
nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part
of it. I have a despatch from Fremont this morning, not telling me
where he is; but he says:

"Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously
at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet."

The high figures erroneous, of course. Do you know where Longstreet
is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1862. 2.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT, Moorefield, Virginia:

Yours, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 P.M.
Saturday, has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he
directed to act in view of it. You must be up to the time you
promised, if possible.

Corinth was evacuated last night, and is occupied by our troops
to-day; the enemy gone south to Okolotia, on the railroad to Mobile.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON CITY, May 30, 1862.9.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Rectortown, Va.:

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry:
"The rebels are in line of battle in front of our lines. They have
nine pieces of artillery, and in position, and cavalry. I shelled
the woods in which they were, and they in return threw a large number
of shells into the lines and tents from which I moved last night to
take up a stronger position. I expect a great deal from the battery
on the mountain, having three 9 inch Dahlgren bearing directly on the
enemy's approaches. The enemy appeared this morning and then
retired, with the intention of drawing us on. I shall act on the
defensive, as my position is a strong one. In a skirmish which took
place this afternoon I lost one horse, The enemy lost two men killed
and seven wounded.

"R. SAXTON, Brigadier General."

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General
Fremont.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1862. 10.20 PM.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front
Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of
Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of
Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within
it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry
at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields,
with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A.M. yesterday,
with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the
enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and
stores, and saved the bridge.

General Fremont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at
or near Strasburg at 5 P.M. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport,
with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed
to co-operate. Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an
additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having
entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true.
Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STANTON

TO GENERAL G. A. McCALL, WASHINGTON, May 31, 1562.

GENERAL McCALL:

The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to
justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your
position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., June 1, 1862. 9.30.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the
attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any
only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General
Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and
sending General Dix to Port Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry.
We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy
so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication.
Please look to it.

A. LINCOLN, President.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL I. McDOWELL.

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1862. 6.15 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McDOWELL, Front Royal, Virginia:

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or flank Jackson. Please
tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time
this reaches you.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:

Your despatch of to-day to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the
good news it brings.

Have you anything from Memphis or other parts of the Mississippi
River? Please answer.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, Tennessee:

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel
prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseeans? If you do, please tell
us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. LINCOLN.




TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
[Cipher.]
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 7, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Your despatch about Chattanooga and Dalton was duly received and sent
to General Halleck. I have just received the following answer from
him:

We have Fort Pillow, Randolph, and Memphis.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all
of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think
it probable that you include some combination of the force near
Cumberland Gap under General Morgan.

Do you?

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Winchester:

We are arranging a general plan for the valley of the Shenandoah, and
in accordance with this you will move your main force to the
Shenandoah at or opposite Front Royal as soon as possible.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing Jackson no farther. Get your force
well in hand and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement
of the enemy either back toward Strasburg or toward Franklin, and
await further orders, which will soon be sent you.

A. LINCOLN.




TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON.
[Cipher.]
WASHINGTON, June 9, 1862.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Nashville, 'Tennessee:

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like
number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove
the proposition.

A. LINCOLN.




TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

Accounts, which we do not credit, represent that Jackson is largely
reinforced and turning upon you. Get your forces well in hand and
keep us well and frequently advised; and if you find yourself really
pressed by a superior force of the enemy, fall back cautiously toward
or to Winchester, and we will have in due time Banks in position to
sustain you. Do not fall back upon Harrisonburg unless upon
tolerably clear necessity. We understand Jackson is on the other
side of the Shenandoah from you, and hence cannot in any event press
you into any necessity of a precipitate withdrawal.

A. LINCOLN.

P.S.--Yours, preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, is just
received. On this point use your discretion, remembering that our
object is to give such protection as you can to western Virginia.
Many thanks to yourself, officers, and men for the gallant battle of
last Sunday.
A. L.




MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

June 13, 1862.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: I herewith transmit a memorial addressed and
presented to me in behalf of the State of New York in favor of
enlarging the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canal. While I have not
given nor have leisure to give the subject a careful examination, its
great importance is obvious and unquestionable. The large amount of
valuable statistical information which is collated and presented in
the memorial will greatly facilitate the mature consideration of the
subject, which I respectfully ask for it at your hands.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.




TO GENERAL J. C. FREMONT.

WASHINGTON; June 13. 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL FREMONT:

We cannot afford to keep your force and Banks's and McDowell's
engaged in keeping Jackson south of Strasburg and Front Royal. You
fought Jackson alone and worsted him. He can have no substantial
reinforcements so long as a battle is pending at Richmond. Surely
you and Banks in supporting distance are capable of keeping him from
returning to Winchester. But if Sigel be sent forward to you, and
McDowell (as he must) be put to other work, Jackson will break
through at Front Royal again. He is already on the right side of the
Shenandoah to do it, and on the wrong side of it to attack you. The
orders already sent you and Banks place you and him in the proper
positions for the work assigned you. Jackson cannot move his whole
force on either of you before the other can learn of it and go to his
assistance. He cannot divide his force, sending part against each of
you, because he will be too weak for either. Please do as I directed
in the order of the 8th and my despatch of yesterday, the 12th, and
neither you nor Banks will be overwhelmed by Jackson. By proper
scout lookouts, and beacons of smoke by day and fires by night you
can always have timely notice of the enemy's approach. I know not
as to you, but by some this has been too much neglected.