The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 5

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A. LINCOLN.




TO CAPTAIN DAHLGREEN.

EXECUTIVE, MANSION, May 23, 1863.

CAPT. DAHLGREEN.

MY DEAR SIR:--Allow me to introduce Col. J. A. McLernand, M.C. of my own
district in Illinois. If he should desire to visit Fortress Monroe,
please introduce him to the captain of one of the vessels in our service,
and pass him down and back.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.




LETTER OF CONDOLENCE TO ONE OF FIRST CASUALTIES

TO COLONEL ELLSWORTH'S PARENTS, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 25, 1861

TO THE FATHER AND MOTHER OF COL. ELMER E. ELLSWORTH.

MY DEAR SIR AND MADAME:--In the untimely loss of your noble son, our
affliction here is scarcely less than your own. So much of promised
usefulness to one's country, and of bright hopes for one's self and
friends, have never been so suddenly dashed as in his fall. In size, in
years, and in youthful appearance a boy only, his power to command men
was surpassingly great. This power, combined with a fine intellectual
and indomitable energy, and a taste altogether military, constituted in
him, as seemed to me, the best natural talent in that department I ever
knew. And yet he was singularly modest and deferential in social
intercourse. My acquaintance with him began less than two years ago; yet,
through the latter half of the intervening period, it was as intense as
the disparity of our ages and my engrossing engagements would permit. To
me he appeared to have no indulgences or pastimes, and I never heard him
utter a profane or an intemperate word. What was conclusive of his good
heart, he never forgot his parents. The honors he labored for so
laudably, and for which, in the sad end, he so gallantly gave his life,
he meant for them no less than for himself.

In the hope that it may be no intrusion upon the sacredness of your
sorrow, I have ventured to address you this tribute to the memory of my
young friend and your brave and early fallen son.

May God give you the consolation which is beyond all early power.

Sincerely your friend in common affliction,

A. LINCOLN.




TO COLONEL BARTLETT.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1861

COL. W. A. BARTLETT, New York.

The Naval Brigade was to go to Fort Monroe without trouble to the
government, and must so go or not at all.

A. LINCOLN.




MEMORANDUM ABOUT INDIANA REGIMENTS.

WASHINGTON, JUNE 11, 1861

The government has already accepted ten regiments from the State of
Indiana. I think at least six more ought to be received from that
State, two to be those of Colonel James W. McMillan and Colonel
William L. Brown, and the other four to be designated by the Governor
of the State of Indiana, and to be received into the volunteer
service of the United States according to the "Plan of Organization"
in the General Orders of the War Department, No.15. When they report
to Major-General McClellan in condition to pass muster according to
that order, and with the approval of the Secretary of War to be
indorsed hereon, and left in his department, I direct that the whole
six, or any smaller number of such regiments, be received.

A. LINCOLN.




TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 13, 1861

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR SIR:--There is, it seems, a regiment in Massachusetts commanded
by Fletcher Webster, and which HON. Daniel Webster's old friends very
much wish to get into the service. If it can be received with the
approval of your department and the consent of the Governor of
Massachusetts I shall indeed be much gratified. Give Mr. Ashmun a chance
to explain fully.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.




TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 13, 1861
HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR SIR--I think it is entirely safe to accept a fifth regiment from
Michigan, and with your approbation I should say a regiment presented by
Col. T. B. W. Stockton, ready for service within two weeks from now, will
be received. Look at Colonel Stockton's testimonials.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.




TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 17, 1861

HON. SECRETARY Of WAR.

MY DEAR SIR:--With your concurrence, and that of the Governor of Indiana,
I am in favor of accepting into what we call the three years' service any
number not exceeding four additional regiments from that State. Probably
they should come from the triangular region between the Ohio and Wabash
Rivers, including my own old boyhood home. Please see HON. C. M. Allen,
Speaker of the Indiana House of Representatives, and unless you perceive
good reason to the contrary, draw up an order for him according to the
above.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.




TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, JUNE 17,1861

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR. MY DEAR SIR:--With your concurrence, and that of
the Governor of Ohio, I am in favor of receiving into what we call the
three years' service any number not exceeding six additional regiments
from that State, unless you perceive good reasons to the contrary. Please
see HON. John A. Gurley, who bears this, and make an order corresponding
with the above.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.




TO N. W. EDWARDS

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 19, 1861

Hon. N. W. EDWARDS MY DEAR SIR: ............. ............. When you
wrote me some time ago in reference to looking up something in the
departments here, I thought I would inquire into the thing and write you,
but the extraordinary pressure upon me diverted me from it, and soon it
passed out of my mind. The thing you proposed, it seemed to me, I ought
to understand myself before it was set on foot by my direction or
permission; and I really had no time to make myself acquainted with it.
Nor have I yet. And yet I am unwilling, of course, that you should be
deprived of a chance to make something, if it can be done without
injustice to the Government, or to any individual. If you choose to come
here and point out to me how this can be done I shall not only not
object, but shall be gratified to be able to oblige you.

Your friend as ever

A. LINCOLN.




TO SECRETARY CAMERON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 20, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:--Since you spoke to me yesterday about General J. H. Lane,
of Kansas, I have been reflecting upon the subject, and have concluded
that we need the service of such a man out there at once; that we had
better appoint him a brigadier-general of volunteers to-day, and send him
off with such authority to raise a force (I think two regiments better
than three, but as to this I am not particular) as you think will get him
into actual work quickest. Tell him, when he starts, to put it through
not to be writing or telegraphing back here, but put it through.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.




HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

[Indorsement.]

General Lane has been authorized to raise two additional regiments of
volunteers.

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary o f War.




TO THE KENTUCKY DELEGATION.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 29, 1861.
GENTLEMEN OF THE KENTUCKY DELEGATION WHO ARE FOR THE UNION:

I somewhat wish to authorize my friend Jesse Bayles to raise a Kentucky
regiment, but I do not wish to do it without your consent. If you
consent, please write so at the bottom of this.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

We consent:
R. MALLORY.
H. GRIDER.
G. W. DUNLAP.
J. S. JACKSON.
C. A. WICKLIFFE.




August 5, 1861.

I repeat, I would like for Col. Bayles to raise a regiment of cavalry
whenever the Union men of Kentucky desire or consent to it.

A. LINCOLN.




ORDER AUTHORIZING GENERAL SCOTT TO SUSPEND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
JULY 2, 1861

TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:

You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the
United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line
which is now or which shall be used between the city of New York and the
city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally,
or through the officer in command at the point where resistance occurs,
are authorized to suspend that writ.

Given under my hand and the seal of the United States at the city of
Washington, this second day of July, A.D. 1861, and of the independence
of the United States the eighty-fifth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.




TO SECRETARY SEWARD.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, JULY 3, 1861

HON. SECRETARY OF STATE.

MY DEAR SIR:--General Scott had sent me a copy of the despatch of which
you kindly sent one. Thanks to both him and you. Please assemble the
Cabinet at twelve to-day to look over the message and reports.

And now, suppose you step over at once and let us see General Scott (and)
General Cameron about assigning a position to General Fremont.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.




MESSAGE TO CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION,

JULY 4, 1861.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:--Having been
convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution,
your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.

At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the
functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended
within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the
Post-Office Department.

Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dockyards, custom-houses,
and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about
them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this
government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and
near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South
Carolina. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition, new
ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized and were
organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.

The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and
near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike
preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by
well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best
of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A
disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow
found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used against
the government. Accumulations of the public revenue lying within them had
been seized for the same object. The navy was scattered in distant seas,
leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the
government. Officers of the Federal army and navy had resigned in great
numbers; and of those resigning a large proportion had taken up arms
against the government. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this,
the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance
with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States,
declaring the States respectively to be separated from the national
Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these States
had been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the character of
confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and
intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an imperative
duty upon the incoming executive to prevent, if possible, the
consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of
means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made and was
declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen looked to the
exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones.
It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested
from the government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on
time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the
mails, at government expense, to the very people who were resisting the
government; and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any
of the people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President
might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the government on
foot.

On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a
letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th
of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was
by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be
thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary
by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good
and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the
officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made
inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid
before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major
Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time,
consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the
end of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion as
before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was
then at the control of the government, or could be raised and brought to
the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be
exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of
the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison
safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be
construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far
to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact, it would be
our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached
Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication
of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation
of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to
be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into
Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer
and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was
received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself
was that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops
had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice
of the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too
vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the
troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at
Fort Sumter was impossible--rendered so by the near exhaustion of
provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a
conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing
an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which
expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to
circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now
presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended
in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South
Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the
fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no
effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or
in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given;
whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in
no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They
well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit
aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly notified--that the
giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all
which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by
resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government
desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely
to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from
actual and immediate dissolution--trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to
time, discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they
assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object--to drive
out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to
immediate dissolution. That this was their object the executive well
understood; and having said to them in the inaugural address, "You can
have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains
not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free
from the power of ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able
to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding
circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of
the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in
expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort sent to
that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready to
give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all
else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate
dissolution or blood."

And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It
presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional
republic or democracy--a government of the people by the same people--can
or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic
foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few
in numbers to control administration according to organic law in any
case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other
pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their
government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the
earth. It forces us to ask: Is there in all republics this inherent and
fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the
liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of
the government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by
force for its preservation.

The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying,
surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet
none of the States commonly called slave States, except Delaware, gave a
regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been
organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise,
and received into the government service. Of course the seceded States,
so called (and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the
inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union.

The border States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some of
them being almost for the Union, while in others--as Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas--the Union sentiment was nearly
repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most
remarkable--perhaps the most important. A convention elected by the
people of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the
Federal Union was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter
fell. To this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed
Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter, many members of
that majority went over to the original disunion minority, and with them
adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether
this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon
Sumter, or their great resentment at the government's resistance to that
assault, is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance
for ratification to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then
somewhat more than a month distant, the convention and the Legislature
(which was also in session at the same time and place), with leading men
of the State not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if
the State were already out of the Union. They pushed military
preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the
United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport,
near Norfolk. They received perhaps invited--into their State large
bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from the so-called
seceded States. They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance
and co-operation with the so-called "Confederate States," and sent
members to their congress at Montgomery. And finally, they permitted the
insurrectionary government to be transferred to their capital at
Richmond.

The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make
its nest within her borders; and this government has no choice left but
to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret as the
loyal citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal
citizens this government is bound to recognize and protect, as being
Virginia.

In the border States, so called,--in fact, the middle States,--there are
those who favor a policy which they call "armed neutrality"; that is, an
arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or
the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion
completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an
impassable wall along the line of separation--and yet not quite an
impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality it would tie the hands
of Union men and freely pass supplies from among them to the
insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it
would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what
proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the disunionists
that which, of all things, they most desire--feed them well and give them
disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to
the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and while very
many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is,
nevertheless, very injurious in effect.

Recurring to the action of the government, it may be stated that at first
a call was made for 75,000 militia; and, rapidly following this, a
proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary
districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was
believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists
announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless
sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and
navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon,
under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity;
trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is
believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency
of Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to
authorize the commanding general in proper cases, according to his
discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in
other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary
processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but
very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been
done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been
called to the proposition that one who has sworn to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them. Of course
some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety
before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were
required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of
execution in nearly one third of the States. Must they be allowed to
finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the
use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in
such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it
relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very
limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all
the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces
lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official
oath be broken if the government should be overthrown when it was
believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But
it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed
that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that "the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require
it," is equivalent to a provision--is a provision--that such privilege
may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion,
and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the
privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted
that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the
Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the
power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency,
it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in
every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be
called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was
intended in this case, by the rebellion.