The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 4

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THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Volume Four

CONSTITUTIONAL EDITION



THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES II



LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS FOURTH DEBATE,
AT CHARLESTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1858.


LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--It will be very difficult for an audience so large
as this to hear distinctly what a speaker says, and consequently it is
important that as profound silence be preserved as possible.

While I was at the hotel to-day, an elderly gentleman called upon me to
know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality
between the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself
on this occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the question was
asked me I thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying
something in regard to it. I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have
been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political
equality of the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been,
in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to
hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in
addition to this, that there is a physical difference between the white
and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living
together on terms of social and political equality. And in as much as
they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the
position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in
favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say
upon this occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to
have the superior position the negro should be denied everything. I do
not understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I
must necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just
let her alone. I am now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly never have
had a black woman for either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite
possible for us to get along without making either slaves or wives of
negroes. I will add to this that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a
man, woman, or child who was in favor of producing a perfect equality,
social and political, between negroes and white men. I recollect of but
one distinguished instance that I ever heard of so frequently as to be
entirely satisfied of its correctness, and that is the case of Judge
Douglas's old friend Colonel Richard M. Johnson. I will also add to the
remarks I have made (for I am not going to enter at large upon this
subject), that I have never had the least apprehension that I or my
friends would marry negroes if there was no law to keep them from it; but
as Judge Douglas and his friends seem to be in great apprehension that
they might, if there were no law to keep them from it, I give him the
most solemn pledge that I will to the very last stand by the law of this
State which forbids the marrying of white people with negroes. I will add
one further word, which is this: that I do not understand that there is
any place where an alteration of the social and political relations of
the negro and the white man can be made, except in the State
Legislature,--not in the Congress of the United States; and as I do not
really apprehend the approach of any such thing myself, and as Judge
Douglas seems to be in constant horror that some such danger is rapidly
approaching, I propose as the best means to prevent it that the Judge be
kept at home, and placed in the State Legislature to fight the measure. I
do not propose dwelling longer at this time on this subject.

When Judge Trumbull, our other Senator in Congress, returned to Illinois
in the month of August, he made a speech at Chicago, in which he made
what may be called a charge against Judge Douglas, which I understand
proved to be very offensive to him. The Judge was at that time out upon
one of his speaking tours through the country, and when the news of it
reached him, as I am informed, he denounced Judge Trumbull in rather
harsh terms for having said what he did in regard to that matter. I was
traveling at that time, and speaking at the same places with Judge
Douglas on subsequent days, and when I heard of what Judge Trumbull had
said of Douglas, and what Douglas had said back again, I felt that I was
in a position where I could not remain entirely silent in regard to the
matter. Consequently, upon two or three occasions I alluded to it, and
alluded to it in no other wise than to say that in regard to the charge
brought by Trumbull against Douglas, I personally knew nothing, and
sought to say nothing about it; that I did personally know Judge
Trumbull; that I believed him to be a man of veracity; that I believed
him to be a man of capacity sufficient to know very well whether an
assertion he was making, as a conclusion drawn from a set of facts, was
true or false; and as a conclusion of my own from that, I stated it as my
belief if Trumbull should ever be called upon, he would prove everything
he had said. I said this upon two or three occasions. Upon a subsequent
occasion, Judge Trumbull spoke again before an audience at Alton, and
upon that occasion not only repeated his charge against Douglas, but
arrayed the evidence he relied upon to substantiate it. This speech was
published at length; and subsequently at Jacksonville Judge Douglas
alluded to the matter. In the course of his speech, and near the close of
it, he stated in regard to myself what I will now read:

"Judge Douglas proceeded to remark that he should not hereafter occupy
his time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that, Lincoln
having indorsed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold
him (Lincoln) responsible for the slanders."

I have done simply what I have told you, to subject me to this invitation
to notice the charge. I now wish to say that it had not originally been
my purpose to discuss that matter at all But in-as-much as it seems to be
the wish of Judge Douglas to hold me responsible for it, then for once in
my life I will play General Jackson, and to the just extent I take the
responsibility.

I wish to say at the beginning that I will hand to the reporters that
portion of Judge Trumbull's Alton speech which was devoted to this
matter, and also that portion of Judge Douglas's speech made at
Jacksonville in answer to it. I shall thereby furnish the readers of this
debate with the complete discussion between Trumbull and Douglas. I
cannot now read them, for the reason that it would take half of my first
hour to do so. I can only make some comments upon them. Trumbull's charge
is in the following words:

"Now, the charge is, that there was a plot entered into to have a
constitution formed for Kansas, and put in force, without giving the
people an opportunity to vote upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in the
plot."

I will state, without quoting further, for all will have an opportunity
of reading it hereafter, that Judge Trumbull brings forward what he
regards as sufficient evidence to substantiate this charge.

It will be perceived Judge Trumbull shows that Senator Bigler, upon the
floor of the Senate, had declared there had been a conference among the
senators, in which conference it was determined to have an enabling act
passed for the people of Kansas to form a constitution under, and in this
conference it was agreed among them that it was best not to have a
provision for submitting the constitution to a vote of the people after
it should be formed. He then brings forward to show, and showing, as he
deemed, that Judge Douglas reported the bill back to the Senate with that
clause stricken out. He then shows that there was a new clause inserted
into the bill, which would in its nature prevent a reference of the
constitution back for a vote of the people,--if, indeed, upon a mere
silence in the law, it could be assumed that they had the right to vote
upon it. These are the general statements that he has made.

I propose to examine the points in Judge Douglas's speech in which he
attempts to answer that speech of Judge Trumbull's. When you come to
examine Judge Douglas's speech, you will find that the first point he
makes is:

"Suppose it were true that there was such a change in the bill, and that
I struck it out,--is that a proof of a plot to force a constitution upon
them against their will?"

His striking out such a provision, if there was such a one in the bill,
he argues, does not establish the proof that it was stricken out for the
purpose of robbing the people of that right. I would say, in the first
place, that that would be a most manifest reason for it. It is true, as
Judge Douglas states, that many Territorial bills have passed without
having such a provision in them. I believe it is true, though I am not
certain, that in some instances constitutions framed under such bills
have been submitted to a vote of the people with the law silent upon the
subject; but it does not appear that they once had their enabling acts
framed with an express provision for submitting the constitution to be
framed to a vote of the people, then that they were stricken out when
Congress did not mean to alter the effect of the law. That there have
been bills which never had the provision in, I do not question; but when
was that provision taken out of one that it was in? More especially does
the evidence tend to prove the proposition that Trumbull advanced, when
we remember that the provision was stricken out of the bill almost
simultaneously with the time that Bigler says there was a conference
among certain senators, and in which it was agreed that a bill should be
passed leaving that out. Judge Douglas, in answering Trumbull, omits to
attend to the testimony of Bigler, that there was a meeting in which it
was agreed they should so frame the bill that there should be no
submission of the constitution to a vote of the people. The Judge does
not notice this part of it. If you take this as one piece of evidence,
and then ascertain that simultaneously Judge Douglas struck out a
provision that did require it to be submitted, and put the two together,
I think it will make a pretty fair show of proof that Judge Douglas did,
as Trumbull says, enter into a plot to put in force a constitution for
Kansas, without giving the people any opportunity of voting upon it.

But I must hurry on. The next proposition that Judge Douglas puts is
this:

"But upon examination it turns out that the Toombs bill never did contain
a clause requiring the constitution to be submitted."

This is a mere question of fact, and can be determined by evidence. I
only want to ask this question: Why did not Judge Douglas say that these
words were not stricken out of the Toomb's bill, or this bill from which
it is alleged the provision was stricken out,--a bill which goes by the
name of Toomb's, because he originally brought it forward? I ask why, if
the Judge wanted to make a direct issue with Trumbull, did he not take
the exact proposition Trumbull made in his speech, and say it was not
stricken out? Trumbull has given the exact words that he says were in the
Toomb's bill, and he alleges that when the bill came back, they were
stricken out. Judge Douglas does not say that the words which Trumbull
says were stricken out were not so stricken out, but he says there was no
provision in the Toomb's bill to submit the constitution to a vote of the
people. We see at once that he is merely making an issue upon the meaning
of the words. He has not undertaken to say that Trumbull tells a lie
about these words being stricken out, but he is really, when pushed up to
it, only taking an issue upon the meaning of the words. Now, then, if
there be any issue upon the meaning of the words, or if there be upon the
question of fact as to whether these words were stricken out, I have
before me what I suppose to be a genuine copy of the Toomb's bill, in
which it can be shown that the words Trumbull says were in it were, in
fact, originally there. If there be any dispute upon the fact, I have got
the documents here to show they were there. If there be any controversy
upon the sense of the words,--whether these words which were stricken out
really constituted a provision for submitting the matter to a vote of the
people,--as that is a matter of argument, I think I may as well use
Trumbull's own argument. He says that the proposition is in these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and
ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said
State of Kansas."

Now, Trumbull alleges that these last words were stricken out of the bill
when it came back, and he says this was a provision for submitting the
constitution to a vote of the people; and his argument is this:

"Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions at the
election for the adoption of the constitution, unless such an election
was to be held?"

This is Trumbull's argument. Now, Judge Douglas does not meet the charge
at all, but he stands up and says there was no such proposition in that
bill for submitting the constitution to be framed to a vote of the
people. Trumbull admits that the language is not a direct provision for
submitting it, but it is a provision necessarily implied from another
provision. He asks you how it is possible to ratify the land proposition
at the election for the adoption of the constitution, if there was no
election to be held for the adoption of the constitution. And he goes on
to show that it is not any less a law because the provision is put in
that indirect shape than it would be if it were put directly. But I
presume I have said enough to draw attention to this point, and I pass it
by also.

Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and at
very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending, said in
a speech in the Senate that he supposed the constitution to be made would
have to be submitted to the people. He asks, if Trumbull thought so then,
what ground is there for anybody thinking otherwise now? Fellow-citizens,
this much may be said in reply: That bill had been in the hands of a
party to which Trumbull did not belong. It had been in the hands of the
committee at the head of which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had
a printed copy of the original Toomb's bill. I have not the evidence on
that point except a sort of inference I draw from the general course of
business there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of
altering, were going on in committee, Trumbull had no means of knowing,
until the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterwards, when it was
reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull in
reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the bearings
of the alterations. He was hastily borne into the debate, and it does not
follow that because there was something in it Trumbull did not perceive,
that something did not exist. More than this, is it true that what
Trumbull did can have any effect on what Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull
had been in the plot with these other men, would that let Douglas out of
it? Would it exonerate Douglas that Trumbull did n't then perceive he
was in the plot? He also asks the question: Why did n't Trumbull propose
to amend the bill, if he thought it needed any amendment? Why, I believe
that everything Judge Trumbull had proposed, particularly in connection
with this question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor
of the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his
friends. He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to anything
on this subject would receive the slightest consideration. Judge Trumbull
did bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the fact that there
was no provision for submitting the constitution about to be made for the
people of Kansas to a vote of the people. I believe I may venture to say
that Judge Douglas made some reply to this speech of Judge Trumbull's,
but he never noticed that part of it at all. And so the thing passed by.
I think, then, the fact that Judge Trumbull offered no amendment does not
throw much blame upon him; and if it did, it does not reach the question
of fact as to what Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull
had himself been in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who
were in it from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the
trial it should be discovered that I had been implicated in that murder,
but that the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at all
touch the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck that
they discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to be guilty
too.

Another one of the points Judge Douglas makes upon Judge Trumbull is,
that when he spoke in Chicago he made his charge to rest upon the fact
that the bill had the provision in it for submitting the constitution to
a vote of the people when it went into his Judge Douglas's hands, that it
was missing when he reported it to the Senate, and that in a public
speech he had subsequently said the alterations in the bill were made
while it was in committee, and that they were made in consultation
between him (Judge Douglas) and Toomb's. And Judge Douglas goes on to
comment upon the fact of Trumbull's adducing in his Alton speech the
proposition that the bill not only came back with that proposition
stricken out, but with another clause and another provision in it, saying
that "until the complete execution of this Act there shall be no election
in said Territory,"--which, Trumbull argued, was not only taking the
provision for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but was
adding an affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from
exercising the right under a bill that was merely silent on the question.
Now, in regard to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the issue, that he
shifts his ground,--and I believe he uses the term that, "it being proven
false, he has changed ground," I call upon all of you, when you come to
examine that portion of Trumbull's speech (for it will make a part of
mine), to examine whether Trumbull has shifted his ground or not. I say
he did not shift his ground, but that he brought forward his original
charge and the evidence to sustain it yet more fully, but precisely as he
originally made it. Then, in addition thereto, he brought in a new piece
of evidence. He shifted no ground. He brought no new piece of evidence
inconsistent with his former testimony; but he brought a new piece,
tending, as he thought, and as I think, to prove his proposition. To
illustrate: A man brings an accusation against another, and on trial the
man making the charge introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a
second trial he introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as
before, and a third witness, who tells the same thing, and in addition
gives further testimony corroborative of the charge. So with Trumbull.
There was no shifting of ground, nor inconsistency of testimony between
the new piece of evidence and what he originally introduced.

But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that last
provision of the bill, and that on his motion it was stricken out and a
substitute inserted. That I presume is the truth. I presume it is true
that that last proposition was stricken out by Judge Douglas. Trumbull
has not said it was not; Trumbull has himself said that it was so
stricken out. He says: "I am now speaking of the bill as Judge Douglas
reported it back. It was amended somewhat in the Senate before it passed,
but I am speaking of it as he brought it back." Now, when Judge Douglas
parades the fact that the provision was stricken out of the bill when it
came back, he asserts nothing contrary to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull
has only said that he originally put it in, not that he did not strike it
out. Trumbull says it was not in the bill when it went to the committee.
When it came back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were
made by him in consultation with Toomb's. Trumbull alleges, therefore, as
his conclusion, that Judge Douglas put it in. Then, if Douglas wants to
contradict Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not put it
in, and not that he did n't take it out again. It is said that a bear is
sometimes hard enough pushed to drop a cub; and so I presume it was in
this case. I presume the truth is that Douglas put it in, and afterward
took it out. That, I take it, is the truth about it. Judge Trumbull says
one thing, Douglas says another thing, and the two don't contradict one
another at all. The question is, what did he put it in for? In the first
place, what did he take the other provision out of the bill for,--the
provision which Trumbull argued was necessary for submitting the
constitution to a vote of the people? What did he take that out for; and,
having taken it out, what did he put this in for? I say that in the run
of things it is not unlikely forces conspire to render it vastly
expedient for Judge Douglas to take that latter clause out again. The
question that Trumbull has made is that Judge Douglas put it in; and he
don't meet Trumbull at all unless he denies that.

In the clause of Judge Douglas's speech upon this subject he uses this
language toward Judge Trumbull. He says:

"He forges his evidence from beginning to end; and by falsifying the
record, he endeavors to bolster up his false charge."

Well, that is a pretty serious statement--Trumbull forges his evidence
from beginning to end. Now, upon my own authority I say that it is not
true. What is a forgery? Consider the evidence that Trumbull has brought
forward. When you come to read the speech, as you will be able to,
examine whether the evidence is a forgery from beginning to end. He had
the bill or document in his hand like that [holding up a paper]. He says
that is a copy of the Toomb's bill,--the amendment offered by Toomb's. He
says that is a copy of the bill as it was introduced and went into Judge
Douglas's hands. Now, does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? That is
one thing Trumbull brought forward. Judge Douglas says he forged it from
beginning to end! That is the "beginning," we will say. Does Douglas say
that is a forgery? Let him say it to-day, and we will have a subsequent
examination upon this subject. Trumbull then holds up another document
like this, and says that is an exact copy of the bill as it came back in
the amended form out of Judge Douglas's hands. Does Judge Douglas say
that is a forgery? Does he say it in his general sweeping charge? Does he
say so now? If he does not, then take this Toomb's bill and the bill in
the amended form, and it only needs to compare them to see that the
provision is in the one and not in the other; it leaves the inference
inevitable that it was taken out.

But, while I am dealing with this question, let us see what Trumbull's
other evidence is. One other piece of evidence I will read. Trumbull says
there are in this original Toomb's bill these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and
ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said
State of Kansas."

Now, if it is said that this is a forgery, we will open the paper here
and see whether it is or not. Again, Trumbull says, as he goes along,
that Mr. Bigler made the following statement in his place in the Senate,
December 9, 1857:

"I was present when that subject was discussed by senators before the
bill was introduced, and the question was raised and discussed, whether
the constitution, when formed, should be submitted to a vote of the
people. It was held by those most intelligent on the subject that, in
view of all the difficulties surrounding that Territory, the danger of
any experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be better there
should be no such provision in the Toomb's bill; and it was my
understanding, in all the intercourse I had, that the Convention would
make a constitution, and send it here, without submitting it to the
popular vote."

Then Trumbull follows on:

"In speaking of this meeting again on the 21st December, 1857
[Congressional Globe, same vol., page 113], Senator Bigler said:

"'Nothing was further from my mind than to allude to any social or
confidential interview. The meeting was not of that character. Indeed, it
was semi-official, and called to promote the public good. My recollection
was clear that I left the conference under the impression that it had
been deemed best to adopt measures to admit Kansas as a State through the
agency of one popular election, and that for delegates to this
Convention. This impression was stronger because I thought the spirit of
the bill infringed upon the doctrine of non-intervention, to which I had
great aversion; but with the hope of accomplishing a great good, and as
no movement had been made in that direction in the Territory, I waived
this objection, and concluded to support the measure. I have a few items
of testimony as to the correctness of these impressions, and with their
submission I shall be content. I have before me the bill reported by the
senator from Illinois on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the
admission of Kansas as a State, the third section of which reads as
follows: