The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 3

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[It almost a natural law that, when dead--no matter how bad we were--we
are automatically beatified.]

When that Compromise was made it did not repeal the old Missouri
Compromise. It left a region of United States territory half as large as
the present territory of the United States, north of the line of 36
degrees 30 minutes, in which slavery was prohibited by Act of Congress.
This Compromise did not repeal that one. It did not affect or propose to
repeal it. But at last it became Judge Douglas's duty, as he thought (and
I find no fault with him), as Chairman of the Committee on Territories,
to bring in a bill for the organization of a territorial
government,--first of one, then of two Territories north of that line.
When he did so, it ended in his inserting a provision substantially
repealing the Missouri Compromise. That was because the Compromise of
1850 had not repealed it. And now I ask why he could not have let that
Compromise alone? We were quiet from the agitation of the slavery
question. We were making no fuss about it. All had acquiesced in the
Compromise measures of 1850. We never had been seriously disturbed by any
Abolition agitation before that period. When he came to form governments
for the Territories north of the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, why could
he not have let that matter stand as it was standing? Was it necessary to
the organization of a Territory? Not at all. Iowa lay north of the line,
and had been organized as a Territory and come into the Union as a State
without disturbing that Compromise. There was no sort of necessity for
destroying it to organize these Territories. But, gentlemen, it would
take up all my time to meet all the little quibbling arguments of Judge
Douglas to show that the Missouri Compromise was repealed by the
Compromise of 1850. My own opinion is, that a careful investigation of
all the arguments to sustain the position that that Compromise was
virtually repealed by the Compromise of 1850 would show that they are the
merest fallacies. I have the report that Judge Douglas first brought into
Congress at the time of the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, which in
its original form did not repeal the Missouri Compromise, and he there
expressly stated that he had forborne to do so because it had not been
done by the Compromise of 1850. I close this part of the discussion on my
part by asking him the question again, "Why, when we had peace under the
Missouri Compromise, could you not have let it alone?"

In complaining of what I said in my speech at Springfield, in which he
says I accepted my nomination for the senatorship (where, by the way, he
is at fault, for if he will examine it, he will find no acceptance in
it), he again quotes that portion in which I said that "a house divided
against itself cannot stand." Let me say a word in regard to that matter.

He tries to persuade us that there must be a variety in the different
institutions of the States of the Union; that that variety necessarily
proceeds from the variety of soil, climate, of the face of the country,
and the difference in the natural features of the States. I agree to all
that. Have these very matters ever produced any difficulty amongst us?
Not at all. Have we ever had any quarrel over the fact that they have
laws in Louisiana designed to regulate the commerce that springs from the
production of sugar? Or because we have a different class relative to the
production of flour in this State? Have they produced any differences?
Not at all. They are the very cements of this Union. They don't make the
house a house divided against itself. They are the props that hold up the
house and sustain the Union.

But has it been so with this element of slavery? Have we not always had
quarrels and difficulties over it? And when will we cease to have
quarrels over it? Like causes produce like effects. It is worth while to
observe that we have generally had comparative peace upon the slavery
question, and that there has been no cause for alarm until it was excited
by the effort to spread it into new territory. Whenever it has been
limited to its present bounds, and there has been no effort to spread it,
there has been peace. All the trouble and convulsion has proceeded from
efforts to spread it over more territory. It was thus at the date of the
Missouri Compromise. It was so again with the annexation of Texas; so
with the territory acquired by the Mexican war; and it is so now.
Whenever there has been an effort to spread it, there has been agitation
and resistance. Now, I appeal to this audience (very few of whom are my
political friends), as national men, whether we have reason to expect
that the agitation in regard to this subject will cease while the causes
that tend to reproduce agitation are actively at work? Will not the same
cause that produced agitation in 1820, when the Missouri Compromise was
formed, that which produced the agitation upon the annexation of Texas,
and at other times, work out the same results always? Do you think that
the nature of man will be changed, that the same causes that produced
agitation at one time will not have the same effect at another?

This has been the result so far as my observation of the slavery question
and my reading in history extends. What right have we then to hope that
the trouble will cease,--that the agitation will come to an end,--until
it shall either be placed back where it originally stood, and where the
fathers originally placed it, or, on the other hand, until it shall
entirely master all opposition? This is the view I entertain, and this is
the reason why I entertained it, as Judge Douglas has read from my
Springfield speech.

Now, my friends, there is one other thing that I feel myself under some
sort of obligation to mention. Judge Douglas has here to-day--in a very
rambling way, I was about saying--spoken of the platforms for which he
seeks to hold me responsible. He says, "Why can't you come out and make
an open avowal of principles in all places alike?" and he reads from an
advertisement that he says was used to notify the people of a speech to
be made by Judge Trumbull at Waterloo. In commenting on it he desires to
know whether we cannot speak frankly and manfully, as he and his friends
do. How, I ask, do his friends speak out their own sentiments? A
Convention of his party in this State met on the 21st of April at
Springfield, and passed a set of resolutions which they proclaim to the
country as their platform. This does constitute their platform, and it is
because Judge Douglas claims it is his platform--that these are his
principles and purposes--that he has a right to declare he speaks his
sentiments "frankly and manfully." On the 9th of June Colonel John
Dougherty, Governor Reynolds, and others, calling themselves National
Democrats, met in Springfield and adopted a set of resolutions which are
as easily understood, as plain and as definite in stating to the country
and to the world what they believed in and would stand upon, as Judge
Douglas's platform Now, what is the reason that Judge Douglas is not
willing that Colonel Dougherty and Governor Reynolds should stand upon
their own written and printed platform as well as he upon his? Why must
he look farther than their platform when he claims himself to stand by
his platform?

Again, in reference to our platform: On the 16th of June the Republicans
had their Convention and published their platform, which is as clear and
distinct as Judge Douglas's. In it they spoke their principles as plainly
and as definitely to the world. What is the reason that Judge Douglas is
not willing I should stand upon that platform? Why must he go around
hunting for some one who is supporting me or has supported me at some
time in his life, and who has said something at some time contrary to
that platform? Does the Judge regard that rule as a good one? If it turn
out that the rule is a good one for me--that I am responsible for any and
every opinion that any man has expressed who is my friend,--then it is a
good rule for him. I ask, is it not as good a rule for him as it is for
me? In my opinion, it is not a good rule for either of us. Do you think
differently, Judge?

[Mr. DOUGLAS: I do not.]

Judge Douglas says he does not think differently. I am glad of it. Then
can he tell me why he is looking up resolutions of five or six years ago,
and insisting that they were my platform, notwithstanding my protest that
they are not, and never were my platform, and my pointing out the
platform of the State Convention which he delights to say nominated me
for the Senate? I cannot see what he means by parading these resolutions,
if it is not to hold me responsible for them in some way. If he says to
me here that he does not hold the rule to be good, one way or the other,
I do not comprehend how he could answer me more fully if he answered me
at greater length. I will therefore put in as my answer to the
resolutions that he has hunted up against me, what I, as a lawyer, would
call a good plea to a bad declaration. I understand that it is an axiom
of law that a poor plea may be a good plea to a bad declaration. I think
that the opinions the Judge brings from those who support me, yet differ
from me, is a bad declaration against me; but if I can bring the same
things against him, I am putting in a good plea to that kind of
declaration, and now I propose to try it.

At Freeport, Judge Douglas occupied a large part of his time in producing
resolutions and documents of various sorts, as I understood, to make me
somehow responsible for them; and I propose now doing a little of the
same sort of thing for him. In 1850 a very clever gentleman by the name
of Thompson Campbell, a personal friend of Judge Douglas and myself, a
political friend of Judge Douglas and opponent of mine, was a candidate
for Congress in the Galena District. He was interrogated as to his views
on this same slavery question. I have here before me the interrogatories,
and Campbell's answers to them--I will read them:




INTERROGATORIES:

"1st. Will you, if elected, vote for and cordially support a bill
prohibiting slavery in the Territories of the United States?

"2d. Will you vote for and support a bill abolishing slavery in the
District of Columbia?

"3d. Will you oppose the admission of any Slave States which may be
formed out of Texas or the Territories?

"4th. Will you vote for and advocate the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law
passed at the recent session of Congress?

"5th. Will you advocate and vote for the election of a Speaker of the
House of Representatives who shall be willing to organize the committees
of that House so as to give the Free States their just influence in the
business of legislation?

"6th. What are your views, not only as to the constitutional right of
Congress to prohibit the slave-trade between the States, but also as to
the expediency of exercising that right immediately?"




CAMPBELL'S REPLY.

"To the first and second interrogatories, I answer unequivocally in the
affirmative.

"To the third interrogatory I reply, that I am opposed to the admission
of any more Slave States into the Union, that may be formed out of Texas
or any other Territory.

"To the fourth and fifth interrogatories I unhesitatingly answer in the
affirmative.

"To the sixth interrogatory I reply, that so long as the Slave States
continue to treat slaves as articles of commerce, the Constitution
confers power on Congress to pass laws regulating that peculiar COMMERCE,
and that the protection of Human Rights imperatively demands the
interposition of every constitutional means to prevent this most inhuman
and iniquitous traffic.

"T. CAMPBELL."


I want to say here that Thompson Campbell was elected to Congress
on that platform, as the Democratic candidate in the Galena District,
against Martin P. Sweet.

[Judge DOUGLAS: Give me the date of the letter.]

The time Campbell ran was in 1850. I have not the exact date here. It was
some time in 1850 that these interrogatories were put and the answer
given. Campbell was elected to Congress, and served out his term. I think
a second election came up before he served out his term, and he was not
re-elected. Whether defeated or not nominated, I do not know. [Mr.
Campbell was nominated for re-election by the Democratic party, by
acclamation.] At the end of his term his very good friend Judge Douglas
got him a high office from President Pierce, and sent him off to
California. Is not that the fact? Just at the end of his term in Congress
it appears that our mutual friend Judge Douglas got our mutual friend
Campbell a good office, and sent him to California upon it. And not only
so, but on the 27th of last month, when Judge Douglas and myself spoke at
Freeport in joint discussion, there was his same friend Campbell, come
all the way from California, to help the Judge beat me; and there was
poor Martin P. Sweet standing on the platform, trying to help poor me to
be elected. That is true of one of Judge Douglas's friends.

So again, in that same race of 1850, there was a Congressional Convention
assembled at Joliet, and it nominated R. S. Molony for Congress, and
unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"Resolved, That we are uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of
slavery; and while we would not make such opposition a ground of
interference with the interests of the States where it exists, yet we
moderately but firmly insist that it is the duty of Congress to oppose
its extension into Territory now free, by all means compatible with the
obligations of the Constitution, and with good faith to our sister
States; that these principles were recognized by the Ordinance of 1787,
which received the sanction of Thomas Jefferson, who is acknowledged by
all to be the great oracle and expounder of our faith."

Subsequently the same interrogatories were propounded to Dr. Molony which
had been addressed to Campbell as above, with the exception of the 6th,
respecting the interstate slave trade, to which Dr. Molony, the
Democratic nominee for Congress, replied as follows:

"I received the written interrogatories this day, and, as you will see by
the La Salle Democrat and Ottawa Free Trader, I took at Peru on the 5th,
and at Ottawa on the 7th, the affirmative side of interrogatories 1st and
2d; and in relation to the admission of any more Slave States from Free
Territory, my position taken at these meetings, as correctly reported in
said papers, was emphatically and distinctly opposed to it. In relation
to the admission of any more Slave States from Texas, whether I shall go
against it or not will depend upon the opinion that I may hereafter form
of the true meaning and nature of the resolutions of annexation. If, by
said resolutions, the honor and good faith of the nation is pledged to
admit more Slave States from Texas when she (Texas) may apply for the
admission of such State, then I should, if in Congress, vote for their
admission. But if not so PLEDGED and bound by sacred contract, then a
bill for the admission of more Slave States from Texas would never
receive my vote.

"To your fourth interrogatory I answer most decidedly in the affirmative,
and for reasons set forth in my reported remarks at Ottawa last Monday.

"To your fifth interrogatory I also reply in the affirmative most
cordially, and that I will use my utmost exertions to secure the
nomination and election of a man who will accomplish the objects of said
interrogatories. I most cordially approve of the resolutions adopted at
the Union meeting held at Princeton on the 27th September ult.

"Yours, etc., R. S. MOLONY."




All I have to say in regard to Dr. Molony is that he was the
regularly nominated Democratic candidate for Congress in his district;
was elected at that time; at the end of his term was appointed to a
land-office at Danville. (I never heard anything of Judge Douglas's
instrumentality in this.) He held this office a considerable time, and
when we were at Freeport the other day there were handbills scattered
about notifying the public that after our debate was over R. S. Molony
would make a Democratic speech in favor of Judge Douglas. That is all I
know of my own personal knowledge. It is added here to this resolution,
and truly I believe, that among those who participated in the Joliet
Convention, and who supported its nominee, with his platform as laid down
in the resolution of the Convention and in his reply as above given, we
call at random the following names, all of which are recognized at this
day as leading Democrats:

"Cook County,--E. B. Williams, Charles McDonell, Arno Voss,
Thomas Hoyne, Isaac Cook."

I reckon we ought to except Cook.

"F. C. Sherman.
"Will,--Joel A. Matteson, S. W. Bowen.
"Kane,--B. F. Hall, G. W. Renwick, A. M. Herrington, Elijah Wilcox.
"McHenry,--W. M. Jackson, Enos W. Smith, Neil Donnelly.
La Salle,--John Hise, William Reddick."

William Reddick! another one of Judge Douglas's friends that stood on the
stand with him at Ottawa, at the time the Judge says my knees trembled so
that I had to be carried away. The names are all here:

"Du Page,--Nathan Allen.
"De Kalb,--Z. B. Mayo."

Here is another set of resolutions which I think are apposite to the
matter in hand.

On the 28th of February of the same year a Democratic District Convention
was held at Naperville to nominate a candidate for Circuit Judge. Among
the delegates were Bowen and Kelly of Will; Captain Naper, H. H. Cody,
Nathan Allen, of Du Page; W. M. Jackson, J. M. Strode, P. W. Platt, and
Enos W. Smith of McHenry; J. Horssnan and others of Winnebago. Colonel
Strode presided over the Convention. The following resolutions were
unanimously adopted,--the first on motion of P. W. Platt, the second on
motion of William M. Jackson:

"Resolved, That this Convention is in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, both
in Principle and Practice, and that we know of no good reason why any
person should oppose the largest latitude in Free Soil, Free Territory
and Free speech.

"Resolved, That in the opinion of this Convention, the time has arrived
when all men should be free, whites as well as others."

[Judge DOUGLAS: What is the date of those resolutions?]

I understand it was in 1850, but I do not know it. I do not state a thing
and say I know it, when I do not. But I have the highest belief that this
is so. I know of no way to arrive at the conclusion that there is an
error in it. I mean to put a case no stronger than the truth will allow.
But what I was going to comment upon is an extract from a newspaper in De
Kalb County; and it strikes me as being rather singular, I confess, under
the circumstances. There is a Judge Mayo in that county, who is a
candidate for the Legislature, for the purpose, if he secures his
election, of helping to re-elect Judge Douglas. He is the editor of a
newspaper [De Kalb County Sentinel], and in that paper I find the extract
I am going to read. It is part of an editorial article in which he was
electioneering as fiercely as he could for Judge Douglas and against me.
It was a curious thing, I think, to be in such a paper. I will agree to
that, and the Judge may make the most of it:

"Our education has been such that we have been rather in favor of the
equality of the blacks; that is, that they should enjoy all the
privileges of the whites where they reside. We are aware that this is not
a very popular doctrine. We have had many a confab with some who are now
strong 'Republicans' we taking the broad ground of equality, and they the
opposite ground.

"We were brought up in a State where blacks were voters, and we do not
know of any inconvenience resulting from it, though perhaps it would not
work as well where the blacks are more numerous. We have no doubt of the
right of the whites to guard against such an evil, if it is one. Our
opinion is that it would be best for all concerned to have the colored
population in a State by themselves [in this I agree with him]; but if
within the jurisdiction of the United States, we say by all means they
should have the right to have their Senators and Representatives in
Congress, and to vote for President. With us 'worth makes the man, and
want of it the fellow.' We have seen many a 'nigger' that we thought more
of than some white men."

That is one of Judge Douglas's friends. Now, I do not want to leave
myself in an attitude where I can be misrepresented, so I will say I do
not think the Judge is responsible for this article; but he is quite as
responsible for it as I would be if one of my friends had said it. I
think that is fair enough.

I have here also a set of resolutions passed by a Democratic State
Convention in Judge Douglas's own good State of Vermont, that I think
ought to be good for him too:

"Resolved, That liberty is a right inherent and inalienable in man, and
that herein all men are equal.

"Resolved, That we claim no authority in the Federal Government to
abolish slavery in the several States, but we do claim for it
Constitutional power perpetually to prohibit the introduction of slavery
into territory now free, and abolish it wherever, under the jurisdiction
of Congress, it exists.

"Resolved, That this power ought immediately to be exercised in
prohibiting the introduction and existence of slavery in New Mexico and
California, in abolishing slavery and the slave-trade in the District of
Columbia, on the high seas, and wherever else, under the Constitution, it
can be reached.

"Resolved, That no more Slave States should be admitted into the Federal
Union.

"Resolved, That the Government ought to return to its ancient policy, not
to extend, nationalize, or encourage, but to limit, localize, and
discourage slavery."

At Freeport I answered several interrogatories that had been propounded
to me by Judge Douglas at the Ottawa meeting. The Judge has not yet seen
fit to find any fault with the position that I took in regard to those
seven interrogatories, which were certainly broad enough, in all
conscience, to cover the entire ground. In my answers, which have been
printed, and all have had the opportunity of seeing, I take the ground
that those who elect me must expect that I will do nothing which will not
be in accordance with those answers. I have some right to assert that
Judge Douglas has no fault to find with them. But he chooses to still try
to thrust me upon different ground, without paying any attention to my
answers, the obtaining of which from me cost him so much trouble and
concern. At the same time I propounded four interrogatories to him,
claiming it as a right that he should answer as many interrogatories for
me as I did for him, and I would reserve myself for a future instalment
when I got them ready. The Judge, in answering me upon that occasion, put
in what I suppose he intends as answers to all four of my
interrogatories. The first one of these interrogatories I have before me,
and it is in these words:

"Question 1.--If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely
unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and
ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English bill,"--some ninety-three
thousand,--"will you vote to admit them?"

As I read the Judge's answer in the newspaper, and as I remember it as
pronounced at the time, he does not give any answer which is equivalent
to yes or no,--I will or I won't. He answers at very considerable length,
rather quarreling with me for asking the question, and insisting that
Judge Trumbull had done something that I ought to say something about,
and finally getting out such statements as induce me to infer that he
means to be understood he will, in that supposed case, vote for the
admission of Kansas. I only bring this forward now for the purpose of
saying that if he chooses to put a different construction upon his
answer, he may do it. But if he does not, I shall from this time forward
assume that he will vote for the admission of Kansas in disregard of the
English bill. He has the right to remove any misunderstanding I may have.
I only mention it now, that I may hereafter assume this to be the true
construction of his answer, if he does not now choose to correct me.

The second interrogatory that I propounded to him was this:

"Question 2.--Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful
way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude
slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?"

To this Judge Douglas answered that they can lawfully exclude slavery
from the Territory prior to the formation of a constitution. He goes on
to tell us how it can be done. As I understand him, he holds that it can
be done by the Territorial Legislature refusing to make any enactments
for the protection of slavery in the Territory, and especially by
adopting unfriendly legislation to it. For the sake of clearness, I state
it again: that they can exclude slavery from the Territory, 1st, by
withholding what he assumes to be an indispensable assistance to it in
the way of legislation; and, 2d, by unfriendly legislation. If I rightly
understand him, I wish to ask your attention for a while to his position.