The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 3

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THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Volume Three

CONSTITUTIONAL EDITION



THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES I

POLITICAL SPEECHES & DEBATES of LINCOLN WITH DOUGLAS
In the Senatorial Campaign of 1858 in Illinois
SPEECH AT SPRINGFIELD, JUNE 17, 1858



[The following speech was delivered at Springfield, Ill., at the close of
the Republican State Convention held at that time and place, and by which
Convention Mr. LINCOLN had been named as their candidate for United
States Senator. Mr. DOUGLAS was not present.]


Mr. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION:--If we could first know
where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to
do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy
was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an
end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that
agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my
opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and
passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this
government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not
expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but
I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or
all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief
that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will
push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old
as well as new, North as well as South.

Have we no tendency to the latter condition?

Let any one who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete
legal combination-piece of machinery, so to speak compounded of the
Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider, not only
what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted, but also
let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or
rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and concert of
action, among its chief architects, from the beginning.

The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the
States by State Constitutions, and from most of the National territory by
Congressional prohibition. Four days later, commenced the struggle which
ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the
National territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.

But, so far, Congress only had acted, and an indorsement by the people,
real or apparent, was indispensable to save the point already gained, and
give chance for more.

This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as
well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty,"
otherwise called "sacred right of self-government," which latter phrase,
though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so
perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: That if
any one man choose to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to
object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska Bill itself, in
the language which follows:

"It being the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate
slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to
leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution
of the United States."

Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter
sovereignty," and "sacred right of self-government." "But," said
opposition members, "let us amend the bill so as to expressly declare
that the people of the Territory may exclude slavery." "Not we," said the
friends of the measure, and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska Bill was passing through Congress, a law case,
involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner
having voluntarily taken him first into a free State, and then into a
territory covered by the Congressional Prohibition, and held him as a
slave for a long time in each, was passing through the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska Bill and
lawsuit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The
negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision
finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the
law case came to, and was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United
States; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election.
Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate,
requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska Bill to state his opinion
whether the people of a territory can constitutionally exclude slavery
from their limits; and the latter answers: "That is a question for the
Supreme Court."

The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement, such as
it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement,
however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred
thousand votes,(approximately 10% of the vote) and so, perhaps, was not
overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his
last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the
people the weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court met
again, did not announce their decision, but ordered a reargument. The
Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but
the incoming President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the
people to abide by the forth-coming decision, whatever it might be. Then,
in a few days, came the decision.

The reputed author of the Nebraska Bill finds an early occasion to make a
speech at this capital indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently
denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early
occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly construe that
decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had
ever been entertained!

At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of
the Nebraska Bill, on the mere question of fact, whether the Lecompton
Constitution was or was not in any just sense made by the people of
Kansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is a
fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted
down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration, that he cares not
whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other
than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public
mind,--the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and
is ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle!
If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle
is the only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred
Scott decision "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled
down like temporary scaffolding; like the mould at the foundry, served
through one blast, and fell back into loose sand; helped to carry an
election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with
the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of
the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point--the
right of a people to make their own constitution--upon which he and the
Republicans have never differed.

The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator
Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in its
present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. The
working points of that machinery are:

Firstly, That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no
descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the
sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This
point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of
the benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution which
declares that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Secondly, That, "subject to the Constitution of the United States,"
neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from
any United States Territory. This point is made in order that individual
men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing
them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the
institution through all the future.

Thirdly, That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free
State makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts
will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave
State the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not
to be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for a while, and
apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the
logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with
Dred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may
lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or
in any other free State.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska
doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion,
at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted
down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially,
also, wither we are tending.

It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back and run the mind
over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will
now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were
transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only
to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders
could not then see. Plainly enough now,--it was an exactly fitted niche,
for the Dred Scott decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect
freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. Why was the
amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down?
Plainly enough now,--the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for
the Dred Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even a
Senator's individual opinion withheld, till after the Presidential
election? Plainly enough now,--the speaking out then would have damaged
the "perfectly free" argument upon which the election was to be carried.
Why the outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the
delay of a reargument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation
in favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and
petting of a spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is
dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty
after-indorsement of the decision by the President and others?

We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result
of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different
portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and
places and by different workmen, Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for
instance, and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they
exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortises
exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different
pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too
many or too few,--not omitting even scaffolding,--or, if a single piece
be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet
to bring such piece in,--in such a case, we find it impossible not to
believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one
another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft
drawn up before the first blow was struck.

It should not be overlooked that by the Nebraska Bill the people of a
State as well as Territory were to be left "perfectly free," "subject
only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating for
Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State
are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but
why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why are
the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped
together, and their relation to the Constitution therefore treated as
being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief
Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all
the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the
United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to
exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to
declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the
people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly, this is a mere omission; but
who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the
opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to
exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get
such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the
Nebraska Bill,--I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been
voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest
approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery is
made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, Using the precise
idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska Act. On one occasion,
his exact language is, "Except in cases where the power is restrained by
the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme
over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction." In what cases the
power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution,
is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the
restraint on the power of the Territories, was left open in the Nebraska
Act. Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche,
which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision,
declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a
State to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially be
expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or
voted up" shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise
that such a decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in
all the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming,
and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political
dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming
that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free,
and we shall awake to the reality instead that the Supreme Court has made
Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty
is the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation.
That is what we have to do. How can we best do it?

There are those who denounce us openly to their friends, and yet whisper
to us softly that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with
which to effect that object. They wish us to infer all, from the fact
that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty,
and that he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he
and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and
that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a
living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead
lion, for this work is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he
oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His
avowed mission is impressing the "public heart" to care nothing about it.
A leading Douglas Democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent
will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does
Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not
said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For
years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take
negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is
less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And
unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He
has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one
of a mere right of property; and, as such, how can he oppose the foreign
slave trade, how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be
"perfectly free,"--unless he does it as a protection to the home
production? And as the home producers will probably not ask the
protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser to-day
than he was yesterday; that he may rightfully change when he finds
himself wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer that he
will make any particular change, of which he himself has given no
intimation? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inference?
Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position,
question his motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to
him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle so that
our cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope to have
interposed no adventitious obstacles. But clearly he is not now with us;
he does not pretend to be,--he does not promise ever to be.

Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own
undoubted friends,--those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the
work, who do care for the result. Two years ago the Republicans of the
nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under
the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external
circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile
elements we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the
battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and
pampered enemy. Did we brave all then to falter now,--now, when that same
enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not
doubtful. We shall not fail; if we stand firm, we shall not fail. Wise
counsels may accelerate, or mistakes delay it, but, sooner or later, the
victory is sure to come.




SPEECH AT CHICAGO, JULY 10, 1858.

IN REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS
DELIVERED AT CHICAGO, SATURDAY EVENING, JULY 10, 1858.

(Mr. DOUGLAS WAS NOT PRESENT.)

[Mr. LINCOLN was introduced by C. L. Wilson, Esq., and as he made his
appearance he was greeted with a perfect storm of applause. For some
moments the enthusiasm continued unabated. At last, when by a wave of his
hand partial silence was restored, Mr. LINCOLN said,]

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS:--On yesterday evening, upon the occasion of the
reception given to Senator Douglas, I was furnished with a seat very
convenient for hearing him, and was otherwise very courteously treated by
him and his friends, and for which I thank him and them. During the
course of his remarks my name was mentioned in such a way as, I suppose,
renders it at least not improper that I should make some sort of reply to
him. I shall not attempt to follow him in the precise order in which he
addressed the assembled multitude upon that occasion, though I shall
perhaps do so in the main.

There was one question to which he asked the attention of the crowd,
which I deem of somewhat less importance--at least of propriety--for me
to dwell upon than the others, which he brought in near the close of his
speech, and which I think it would not be entirely proper for me to omit
attending to, and yet if I were not to give some attention to it now, I
should probably forget it altogether. While I am upon this subject, allow
me to say that I do not intend to indulge in that inconvenient mode
sometimes adopted in public speaking, of reading from documents; but I
shall depart from that rule so far as to read a little scrap from his
speech, which notices this first topic of which I shall speak,--that is,
provided I can find it in the paper:

"I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the combination
that has been made against me; the Republican leaders having formed an
alliance, an unholy and unnatural alliance, with a portion of
unscrupulous Federal office-holders. I intend to fight that allied army
wherever I meet them. I know they deny the alliance; but yet these men
who are trying to divide the Democratic party for the purpose of electing
a Republican Senator in my place are just as much the agents and tools of
the supporters of Mr. Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army
just as the Russians dealt with the Allies at Sebastopol,--that is, the
Russians did not stop to inquire, when they fired a broadside, whether it
hit an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to inquire,
nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit the Republican leaders
or their allies, who are holding the Federal offices, and yet acting in
concert with them."

Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think of it!
right at the outset of his canvass, I, a poor, kind, amiable, intelligent
gentleman,--I am to be slain in this way! Why, my friend the Judge is not
only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living one,--he is the
rugged Russian Bear!

But if they will have it--for he says that we deny it--that there is any
such alliance, as he says there is,--and I don't propose hanging very
much upon this question of veracity,--but if he will have it that there
is such an alliance, that the Administration men and we are allied, and
we stand in the attitude of English, French, and Turk, he occupying the
position of the Russian, in that case I beg that he will indulge us while
we barely suggest to him that these allies took Sebastopol.

Gentlemen, only a few more words as to this alliance. For my part, I have
to say that whether there be such an alliance depends, so far as I know,
upon what may be a right definition of the term alliance. If for the
Republican party to see the other great party to which they are opposed
divided among themselves, and not try to stop the division, and rather be
glad of it,--if that is an alliance, I confess I am in; but if it is
meant to be said that the Republicans had formed an alliance going beyond
that, by which there is contribution of money or sacrifice of principle
on the one side or the other, so far as the Republican party is
concerned,--if there be any such thing, I protest that I neither know
anything of it, nor do I believe it. I will, however, say,--as I think
this branch of the argument is lugged in,--I would before I leave it
state, for the benefit of those concerned, that one of those same
Buchanan men did once tell me of an argument that he made for his
opposition to Judge Douglas. He said that a friend of our Senator Douglas
had been talking to him, and had, among other things, said to him:

"...why, you don't want to beat Douglas?" "Yes," said he, "I do want to
beat him, and I will tell you why. I believe his original Nebraska Bill
was right in the abstract, but it was wrong in the time that it was
brought forward. It was wrong in the application to a Territory in regard
to which the question had been settled; it was brought forward at a time
when nobody asked him; it was tendered to the South when the South had
not asked for it, but when they could not well refuse it; and for this
same reason he forced that question upon our party. It has sunk the best
men all over the nation, everywhere; and now, when our President,
struggling with the difficulties of this man's getting up, has reached
the very hardest point to turn in the case, he deserts him and I am for
putting him where he will trouble us no more."

Now, gentlemen, that is not my argument; that is not my argument at all.
I have only been stating to you the argument of a Buchanan man. You will
judge if there is any force in it.

Popular sovereignty! Everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us for a moment
inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty. What is popular
sovereignty? We recollect that at an early period in the history of this
struggle there was another name for the same thing,--"squatter
sovereignty." It was not exactly popular sovereignty, but squatter
sovereignty. What do those terms mean? What do those terms mean when used
now? And vast credit is taken by our friend the Judge in regard to his
support of it, when he declares the last years of his life have been, and
all the future years of his life shall be, devoted to this matter of
popular sovereignty. What is it? Why, it is the sovereignty of the
people! What was squatter sovereignty? I suppose, if it had any
significance at all, it was the right of the people to govern themselves,
to be sovereign in their own affairs while they were squatted down in a
country not their own, while they had squatted on a Territory that did
not belong to them, in the sense that a State belongs to the people who
inhabit it, when it belonged to the nation; such right to govern
themselves was called "squatter sovereignty."