The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

A >> Abraham Lincoln >> The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete


I know that Douglas has recently made a little effort, not seeming to
notice that he had a different theory, has made an effort to get rid of
that. He has written a letter, addressed to somebody, I believe, who
resides in Iowa, declaring his opposition to the repeal of the laws that
prohibit the Africa slave trade. He bases his opposition to such repeal
upon the ground that these laws are themselves one of the compromises of
the Constitution of the United States. Now, it would be very interesting
to see Judge Douglas or any of his friends turn, to the Constitution of
the United States and point out that compromise, to show where there is
any compromise in the Constitution, or provision in the Constitution;
express or implied, by which the administrators of that Constitution are
under any obligation to repeal the African slave trade. I know, or at
least I think I know, that the framers of that Constitution did expect
the African slave trade would be abolished at the end of twenty years, to
which time their prohibition against its being abolished extended there
is abundant contemporaneous history to show that the framers of the
Constitution expected it to be abolished. But while they so expected,
they gave nothing for that expectation, and they put no provision in the
Constitution requiring it should be so abolished. The migration or
importation of such persons as the States shall see fit to admit shall
not be prohibited, but a certain tax might be levied upon such
importation. But what was to be done after that time? The Constitution is
as silent about that as it is silent, personally, about myself. There is
absolutely nothing in it about that subject; there is only the
expectation of the framers of the Constitution that the slave trade would
be abolished at the end of that time; and they expected it would be
abolished, owing to public sentiment, before that time; and the put that
provision in, in order that it should not be abolished before that time,
for reasons which I suppose they thought to be sound ones, but which I
will not now try to enumerate before you.

But while, they expected the slave trade would be abolished at that time,
they expected that the spread of slavery into the new Territories should
also be restricted. It is as easy to prove that the framers of the
Constitution of the United States expected that slavery should be
prohibited from extending into the new Territories, as it is to prove
that it was expected that the slave trade should be abolished. Both these
things were expected. One was no more expected than the other, and one
was no more a compromise of the Constitution than the other. There was
nothing said in the Constitution in regard to the spread of slavery into
the Territory. I grant that; but there was something very important said
about it by the same generation of men in the adoption of the old
Ordinance of '87, through the influence of which you here in Ohio, our
neighbors in Indiana, we in Illinois, our neighbors in Michigan and
Wisconsin, are happy, prosperous, teeming millions of free men. That
generation of men, though not to the full extent members of the
convention that framed the Constitution, were to some extent members of
that convention, holding seats at the same time in one body and the
other, so that if there was any compromise on either of these subjects,
the strong evidence is that that compromise was in favor of the
restriction of slavery from the new Territories.

But Douglas says that he is unalterably opposed to the repeal of those
laws because, in his view, it is a compromise of the Constitution. You
Kentuckians, no doubt, are somewhat offended with that. You ought not to
be! You ought to be patient! You ought to know that if he said less than
that, he would lose the power of "lugging" the Northern States to your
support. Really, what you would push him to do would take from him his
entire power to serve you. And you ought to remember how long, by
precedent, Judge Douglas holds himself obliged to stick by compromises.
You ought to remember that by the time you yourselves think you are ready
to inaugurate measures for the revival of the African slave trade, that
sufficient time will have arrived, by precedent, for Judge Douglas to
break through, that compromise. He says now nothing more strong than he
said in 1849 when he declared in favor of Missouri Compromise,--and
precisely four years and a quarter after he declared that Compromise to
be a sacred thing, which "no ruthless hand would ever daze to touch," he
himself brought forward the measure ruthlessly to destroy it. By a mere
calculation of time it will only be four years more until he is ready to
take back his profession about the sacredness of the Compromise
abolishing the slave trade. Precisely as soon as you are ready to have
his services in that direction, by fair calculation, you may be sure of
having them.

But you remember and set down to Judge Douglas's debt, or discredit, that
he, last year, said the people of Territories can, in spite of the Dred
Scott decision, exclude your slaves from those Territories; that he
declared, by "unfriendly legislation" the extension of your property into
the new Territories may be cut off, in the teeth of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States.

He assumed that position at Freeport on the 27th of August, 1858. He said
that the people of the Territories can exclude slavery, in so many words:
You ought, however, to bear in mind that he has never said it since. You
may hunt in every speech that he has since made, and he has never used
that expression once. He has never seemed to notice that he is stating
his views differently from what he did then; but by some sort of
accident, he has always really stated it differently. He has always since
then declared that "the Constitution does not carry slavery into the
Territories of the United States beyond the power of the people legally
to control it, as other property." Now, there is a difference in the
language used upon that former occasion and in this latter day. There may
or may not be a difference in the meaning, but it is worth while
considering whether there is not also a difference in meaning.

What is it to exclude? Why, it is to drive it out. It is in some way to
put it out of the Territory. It is to force it across the line, or change
its character so that, as property, it is out of existence. But what is
the controlling of it "as other property"? Is controlling it as other
property the same thing as destroying it, or driving it away? I should
think not. I should think the controlling of it as other property would
be just about what you in Kentucky should want. I understand the
controlling of property means the controlling of it for the benefit of
the owner of it. While I have no doubt the Supreme Court of the United
States would say "God speed" to any of the Territorial Legislatures that
should thus control slave property, they would sing quite a different
tune if, by the pretence of controlling it, they were to undertake to
pass laws which virtually excluded it,--and that upon a very well known
principle to all lawyers, that what a Legislature cannot directly do, it
cannot do by indirection; that as the Legislature has not the power to
drive slaves out, they have no power, by indirection, by tax, or by
imposing burdens in any way on that property, to effect the same end, and
that any attempt to do so would be held by the Dred Scott court
unconstitutional.

Douglas is not willing to stand by his first proposition that they can
exclude it, because we have seen that that proposition amounts to nothing
more nor less than the naked absurdity that you may lawfully drive out
that which has a lawful right to remain. He admitted at first that the
slave might be lawfully taken into the Territories under the Constitution
of the United States, and yet asserted that he might be lawfully driven
out. That being the proposition, it is the absurdity I have stated. He is
not willing to stand in the face of that direct, naked, and impudent
absurdity; he has, therefore, modified his language into that of being
"controlled as other property."

The Kentuckians don't like this in Douglas! I will tell you where it will
go. He now swears by the court. He was once a leading man in Illinois to
break down a court, because it had made a decision he did not like. But
he now not only swears by the court, the courts having got to working for
you, but he denounces all men that do not swear by the courts, as
unpatriotic, as bad citizens. When one of these acts of unfriendly
legislation shall impose such heavy burdens as to, in effect, destroy
property in slaves in a Territory, and show plainly enough that there can
be no mistake in the purpose of the Legislature to make them so
burdensome, this same Supreme Court will decide that law to be
unconstitutional, and he will be ready to say for your benefit "I swear
by the court; I give it up"; and while that is going on he has been
getting all his men to swear by the courts, and to give it up with him.
In this again he serves you faithfully, and, as I say, more wisely than
you serve yourselves.

Again: I have alluded in the beginning of these remarks to the fact that
Judge Douglas has made great complaint of my having expressed the opinion
that this government "cannot endure permanently, half slave and half
free." He has complained of Seward for using different language, and
declaring that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between the
principles of free and slave labor. [A voice: "He says it is not
original with Seward. That it is original with Lincoln."] I will attend
to that immediately, sir. Since that time, Hickman of Pennsylvania
expressed the same sentiment. He has never denounced Mr. Hickman: why?
There is a little chance, notwithstanding that opinion in the mouth of
Hickman, that he may yet be a Douglas man. That is the difference! It is
not unpatriotic to hold that opinion if a man is a Douglas man.

But neither I, nor Seward, nor Hickman is entitled to the enviable or
unenviable distinction of having first expressed that idea. That same
idea was expressed by the Richmond Enquirer, in Virginia, in 1856,--quite
two years before it was expressed by the first of us. And while Douglas
was pluming himself that in his conflict with my humble self, last year,
he had "squelched out" that fatal heresy, as he delighted to call it, and
had suggested that if he only had had a chance to be in New York and meet
Seward he would have "squelched" it there also, it never occurred to him
to breathe a word against Pryor. I don't think that you can discover that
Douglas ever talked of going to Virginia to "squelch" out that idea
there. No. More than that. That same Roger A. Pryor was brought to
Washington City and made the editor of the par excellence Douglas paper,
after making use of that expression, which, in us, is so unpatriotic and
heretical. From all this, my Kentucky friends may see that this opinion
is heretical in his view only when it is expressed by men suspected of a
desire that the country shall all become free, and not when expressed by
those fairly known to entertain the desire that the whole country shall
become slave. When expressed by that class of men, it is in nowise
offensive to him. In this again, my friends of Kentucky, you have Judge
Douglas with you.

There is another reason why you Southern people ought to nominate Douglas
at your convention at Charleston. That reason is the wonderful capacity
of the man,--the power he has of doing what would seem to be impossible.
Let me call your attention to one of these apparently impossible things:

Douglas had three or four very distinguished men of the most extreme
anti-slavery views of any men in the Republican party expressing their
desire for his re-election to the Senate last year. That would, of
itself, have seemed to be a little wonderful; but that wonder is
heightened when we see that Wise of Virginia, a man exactly opposed to
them, a man who believes in the divine right of slavery, was also
expressing his desire that Douglas should be reelected; that another man
that may be said to be kindred to Wise, Mr. Breckinridge, the
Vice-President, and of your own State, was also agreeing with the
anti-slavery men in the North that Douglas ought to be re-elected. Still
to heighten the wonder, a senator from Kentucky, whom I have always loved
with an affection as tender and endearing as I have ever loved any man,
who was opposed to the anti-slavery men for reasons which seemed
sufficient to him, and equally opposed to Wise and Breckinridge, was
writing letters into Illinois to secure the reelection of Douglas. Now,
that all these conflicting elements should be brought, while at daggers'
points with one another, to support him, is a feat that is worthy for you
to note and consider. It is quite probable that each of these classes of
men thought, by the re-election of Douglas, their peculiar views would
gain something: it is probable that the anti-slavery men thought their
views would gain something; that Wise and Breckinridge thought so too, as
regards their opinions; that Mr. Crittenden thought that his views would
gain something, although he was opposed to both these other men. It is
probable that each and all of them thought that they were using Douglas;
and it is yet an unsolved problem whether he was not using them all. If
he was, then it is for you to consider whether that power to perform
wonders is one for you lightly to throw away.

There is one other thing that I will say to you, in this relation. It is
but my opinion, I give it to you without a fee. It is my opinion that it
is for you to take him or be defeated; and that if you do take him you
may be beaten. You will surely be beaten if you do not take him. We, the
Republicans and others forming the opposition of the country, intend to
"stand by our guns," to be patient and firm, and in the long run to beat
you, whether you take him or not. We know that before we fairly beat you
we have to beat you both together. We know that you are "all of a
feather," and that we have to beat you all together, and we expect to do
it. We don't intend to be very impatient about it. We mean to be as
deliberate and calm about it as it is possible to be, but as firm and
resolved as it is possible for men to be. When we do as we say,--beat
you,--you perhaps want to know what we will do with you.

I will tell you, so far as I am authorized to speak for the opposition,
what we mean to do with you. We mean to treat you, as near as we possibly
can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. We mean to leave
you alone, and in no way interfere with your institution; to abide by all
and every compromise of the Constitution, and, in a word, coming back to
the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we
have degenerated) may, according to the examples of those noble fathers,
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. We mean to remember that you are as
good as we; that there is no difference between us other than the
difference of circumstances. We mean to recognize and bear in mind always
that you have as good hearts in your bosoms as other people, or as we
claim to have, and treat you accordingly. We mean to marry your girls
when we have a chance, the white ones I mean; and I have the honor to
inform you that I once did have a chance in that way.

I have told you what we mean to do. I want to know, now, when that thing
takes place, what do you mean to do? I often hear it intimated that you
mean to divide the Union whenever a Republican, or anything like it, is
elected President of the United States. [A voice: "That is so."] "That is
so," one of them says; I wonder if he is a Kentuckian? [A voice: "He is a
Douglas man."] Well, then, I want to know what you are going to do with
your half of it? Are you going to split the Ohio down through, and push
your half off a piece? Or are you going to keep it right alongside of us
outrageous fellows? Or are you going to build up a wall some way between
your country and ours, by which that movable property of yours can't come
over here any more, to the danger of your losing it? Do you think you can
better yourselves, on that subject, by leaving us here under no
obligation whatever to return those specimens of your movable property
that come hither? You have divided the Union because we would not do
right with you, as you think, upon that subject; when we cease to be
under obligations to do anything for you, how much better off do you
think you will be? Will you make war upon us and kill us all? Why,
gentlemen, I think you are as gallant and as brave men as live; that you
can fight as bravely in a good cause, man for man, as any other people
living; that you have shown yourselves capable of this upon various
occasions: but, man for man, you are not better than we are, and there
are not so many of you as there are of us. You will never make much of a
hand at whipping us. If we were fewer in numbers than you, I think that
you could whip us; if we were equal, it would likely be a drawn battle;
but being inferior in numbers, you will make nothing by attempting to
master us.

But perhaps I have addressed myself as long, or longer, to the
Kentuckians than I ought to have done, inasmuch as I have said that
whatever course you take we intend in the end to beat you. I propose to
address a few remarks to our friends, by way of discussing with them the
best means of keeping that promise that I have in good faith made.

It may appear a little episodical for me to mention the topic of which I
will speak now. It is a favorite position of Douglas's that the
interference of the General Government, through the Ordinance of '87, or
through any other act of the General Government never has made or ever
can make a free State; the Ordinance of '87 did not make free States of
Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois; that these States are free upon his "great
principle" of popular sovereignty, because the people of those several
States have chosen to make them so. At Columbus, and probably here, he
undertook to compliment the people that they themselves have made the
State of Ohio free, and that the Ordinance of '87 was not entitled in any
degree to divide the honor with them. I have no doubt that the people of
the State of Ohio did make her free according to their own will and
judgment, but let the facts be remembered.

In 1802, I believe, it was you who made your first constitution, with the
clause prohibiting slavery, and you did it, I suppose, very nearly
unanimously; but you should bear in mind that you--speaking of you as one
people--that you did so unembarrassed by the actual presence of the
institution amongst you; that you made it a free State not with the
embarrassment upon you of already having among you many slaves, which if
they had been here, and you had sought to make a free State, you would
not know what to do with. If they had been among you, embarrassing
difficulties, most probably, would have induced you to tolerate a slave
constitution instead of a free one, as indeed these very difficulties
have constrained every people on this continent who have adopted slavery.

Pray what was it that made you free? What kept you free? Did you not find
your country free when you came to decide that Ohio should be a free
State? It is important to inquire by what reason you found it so. Let us
take an illustration between the States of Ohio and Kentucky. Kentucky is
separated by this River Ohio, not a mile wide. A portion of Kentucky, by
reason of the course of the Ohio, is farther north than this portion of
Ohio, in which we now stand. Kentucky is entirely covered with slavery;
Ohio is entirely free from it: What made that difference? Was it climate?
No. A portion of Kentucky was farther north than this portion of Ohio.
Was it soil? No. There is nothing in the soil of the one more favorable
to slave than the other. It was not climate or soil that mused one side
of the line to be entirely covered with slavery, and the other side free
of it. What was it? Study over it. Tell us, if you can, in all the range
of conjecture, if there be anything you can conceive of that made that
difference, other than that there was no law of any sort keeping it out
of Kentucky, while the Ordinance of '87 kept it out of Ohio. If there is
any other reason than this, I confess that it is wholly beyond my power
to conceive of it. This, then, I offer to combat the idea that that
Ordinance has never made any State free.

I don't stop at this illustration. I come to the State of Indiana; and
what I have said as between Kentucky and Ohio, I repeat as between
Indiana and Kentucky: it is equally applicable. One additional argument
is applicable also to Indiana. In her Territorial condition she more than
once petitioned Congress to abrogate the Ordinance entirely, or at least
so far as to suspend its operation for a time, in order that they should
exercise the "popular sovereignty" of having slaves if they wanted them.
The men then controlling the General Government, imitating the men of the
Revolution, refused Indiana that privilege. And so we have the evidence
that Indiana supposed she could have slaves, if it were not for that
Ordinance; that she besought Congress to put that barrier out of the way;
that Congress refused to do so; and it all ended at last in Indiana being
a free State. Tell me not then that the Ordinance of '87 had nothing to
do with making Indiana a free State, when we find some men chafing
against, and only restrained by, that barrier.

Come down again to our State of Illinois. The great Northwest Territory,
including Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, was acquired
first, I believe, by the British Government, in part at least, from the
French. Before the establishment of our independence it became a part of
Virginia, enabling Virginia afterward to transfer it to the General
Government. There were French settlements in what is now Illinois, and at
the same time there were French settlements in what is now Missouri, in
the tract of country that was not purchased till about 1803. In these
French settlements negro slavery had existed for many years, perhaps more
than a hundred; if not as much as two hundred years,--at Kaskaskia, in
Illinois, and at St. Genevieve, or Cape Girardeau, perhaps, in Missouri.
The number of slaves was not very great, but there was about the same
number in each place. They were there when we acquired the Territory.
There was no effort made to break up the relation of master and slave,
and even the Ordinance of 1787 was not so enforced as to destroy that
slavery in Illinois; nor did the Ordinance apply to Missouri at all.

What I want to ask your attention to; at this point, is that Illinois and
Missouri came into the Union about the same time, Illinois in the latter
part of 1818, and Missouri, after a struggle, I believe sometime in 1820.
They had been filling up with American people about the same period of
time; their progress enabling them to come into the Union about the same
time. At the end of that ten years, in which they had been so preparing
(for it was about that period of time), the number of slaves in Illinois
had actually decreased; while in Missouri, beginning with very few, at
the end of that ten years there were about ten thousand. This being so,
and it being remembered that Missouri and Illinois are, to a certain
extent, in the same parallel of latitude, that the northern half of
Missouri and the southern half of Illinois are in the same parallel of
latitude, so that climate would have the same effect upon one as upon the
other, and that in the soil there is no material difference so far as
bears upon the question of slavery being settled upon one or the
other,--there being none of those natural causes to produce a difference
in filling them, and yet there being a broad difference to their filling
up, we are led again to inquire what was the cause of that difference.

It is most natural to say that in Missouri there was no law to keep that
country from filling up with slaves, while in Illinois there was the
Ordinance of The Ordinance being there, slavery decreased during that ten
years; the Ordinance not being in the other, it increased from a few to
ten thousand. Can anybody doubt the reason of the difference?

I think all these facts most abundantly prove that my friend Judge
Douglas's proposition, that the Ordinance of '87, or the national
restriction of slavery, never had a tendency to make a free State, is a
fallacy,--a proposition without the shadow or substance of truth about
it.

Douglas sometimes says that all the States (and it is part of this same
proposition I have been discussing) that have become free have become so
upon his "great principle"; that the State of Illinois itself came into
the Union as a slave State, and that the people, upon the "great
principle" of popular sovereignty, have since made it a free State. Allow
me but a little while to state to you what facts there are to justify him
in saying that Illinois came into the Union as a slave State.