The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

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Now, what is judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is, as a principle,
no other than that if one man chooses to make a slave of another man
neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. Applied in
government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new Territory
into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making
their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits or
to establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to
be enslaved, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are
afterwards to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the
families of communities, of which they are but an incipient member, or
the general head of the family of States as parent of all, however their
action may affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right
to interfere. That is Douglas's popular sovereignty applied.

He has a good deal of trouble with popular sovereignty. His explanations
explanatory of explanations explained are interminable. The most lengthy,
and, as I suppose, the most maturely considered of this long series of
explanations is his great essay in Harper's Magazine. I will not attempt
to enter on any very thorough investigation of his argument as there made
and presented. I will nevertheless occupy a good portion of your time
here in drawing your attention to certain points in it. Such of you as
may have read this document will have perceived that the judge early in
the document quotes from two persons as belonging to the Republican
party, without naming them, but who can readily be recognized as being
Governor Seward of New York and myself. It is true that exactly fifteen
months ago this day, I believe, I for the first time expressed a
sentiment upon this subject, and in such a manner that it should get into
print, that the public might see it beyond the circle of my hearers; and
my expression of it at that time is the quotation that Judge Douglas
makes. He has not made the quotation with accuracy, but justice to him
requires me to say that it is sufficiently accurate not to change the
sense.

The sense of that quotation condensed is this: that this slavery element
is a durable element of discord among us, and that we shall probably not
have perfect peace in this country with it until it either masters the
free principle in our government, or is so far mastered by the free
principle as for the public mind to rest in the belief that it is going
to its end. This sentiment, which I now express in this way, was, at no
great distance of time, perhaps in different language, and in connection
with some collateral ideas, expressed by Governor Seward. Judge Douglas
has been so much annoyed by the expression of that sentiment that he has
constantly, I believe, in almost all his speeches since it was uttered,
been referring to it. I find he alluded to it in his speech here, as well
as in the copyright essay. I do not now enter upon this for the purpose
of making an elaborate argument to show that we were right in the
expression of that sentiment. In other words, I shall not stop to say all
that might properly be said upon this point, but I only ask your
attention to it for the purpose of making one or two points upon it.

If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that judge
Douglas himself says a controversy between the American Colonies and the
Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and
continued from that time until the Revolution; and, while he did not say
so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever
since the Revolution.

Then we need not appeal to history, to the declarations of the framers of
the government, but we know from judge Douglas himself that slavery began
to be an element of discord among the white people of this country as far
back as 1699, or one hundred and sixty years ago, or five generations of
men,--counting thirty years to a generation. Now, it would seem to me
that it might have occurred to Judge Douglas, or anybody who had turned
his attention to these facts, that there was something in the nature of
that thing, slavery, somewhat durable for mischief and discord.

There is another point I desire to make in regard to this matter, before
I leave it. From the adoption of the Constitution down to 1820 is the
precise period of our history when we had comparative peace upon this
question,--the precise period of time when we came nearer to having peace
about it than any other time of that entire one hundred and sixty years
in which he says it began, or of the eighty years of our own
Constitution. Then it would be worth our while to stop and examine into
the probable reason of our coming nearer to having peace then than at any
other time. This was the precise period of time in which our fathers
adopted, and during which they followed, a policy restricting the spread
of slavery, and the whole Union was acquiescing in it. The whole country
looked forward to the ultimate extinction of the institution. It was when
a policy had been adopted, and was prevailing, which led all just and
right-minded men to suppose that slavery was gradually coming to an end,
and that they might be quiet about it, watching it as it expired. I think
Judge Douglas might have perceived that too; and whether he did or not,
it is worth the attention of fair-minded men, here and elsewhere, to
consider whether that is not the truth of the case. If he had looked at
these two facts,--that this matter has been an element of discord for one
hundred and sixty years among this people, and that the only comparative
peace we have had about it was when that policy prevailed in this
government which he now wars upon, he might then, perhaps, have been
brought to a more just appreciation of what I said fifteen months
ago,--that "a house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe that
this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do
not expect the house to fall, I do not expect the Union to dissolve; but
I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or
all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind will rest in the belief
that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will
push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old
as well as new, North as well as South." That was my sentiment at that
time. In connection with it, I said: "We are now far into the fifth year
since a policy was inaugurated with the avowed object and confident
promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of
the policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly
augmented." I now say to you here that we are advanced still farther into
the sixth year since that policy of Judge Douglas--that popular
sovereignty of his--for quieting the slavery question was made the
national policy. Fifteen months more have been added since I uttered that
sentiment; and I call upon you and all other right-minded men to say
whether that fifteen months have belied or corroborated my words.

While I am here upon this subject, I cannot but express gratitude that
this true view of this element of discord among us--as I believe it
is--is attracting more and more attention. I do not believe that Governor
Seward uttered that sentiment because I had done so before, but because
he reflected upon this subject and saw the truth of it. Nor do I believe
because Governor Seward or I uttered it that Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania,
in, different language, since that time, has declared his belief in the
utter antagonism which exists between the principles of liberty and
slavery. You see we are multiplying. Now, while I am speaking of Hickman,
let me say, I know but little about him. I have never seen him, and know
scarcely anything about the man; but I will say this much of him: Of all
the anti-Lecompton Democracy that have been brought to my notice, he
alone has the true, genuine ring of the metal. And now, without indorsing
anything else he has said, I will ask this audience to give three cheers
for Hickman. [The audience responded with three rousing cheers for
Hickman.]

Another point in the copyright essay to which I would ask your attention
is rather a feature to be extracted from the whole thing, than from any
express declaration of it at any point. It is a general feature of that
document, and, indeed, of all of Judge Douglas's discussions of this
question, that the Territories of the United States and the States of
this Union are exactly alike; that there is no difference between them at
all; that the Constitution applies to the Territories precisely as it
does to the States; and that the United States Government, under the
Constitution, may not do in a State what it may not do in a Territory,
and what it must do in a State it must do in a Territory. Gentlemen, is
that a true view of the case? It is necessary for this squatter
sovereignty, but is it true?

Let us consider. What does it depend upon? It depends altogether upon the
proposition that the States must, without the interference of the General
Government, do all those things that pertain exclusively to
themselves,--that are local in their nature, that have no connection with
the General Government. After Judge Douglas has established this
proposition, which nobody disputes or ever has disputed, he proceeds to
assume, without proving it, that slavery is one of those little,
unimportant, trivial matters which are of just about as much consequence
as the question would be to me whether my neighbor should raise horned
cattle or plant tobacco; that there is no moral question about it, but
that it is altogether a matter of dollars and cents; that when a new
Territory is opened for settlement, the first man who goes into it may
plant there a thing which, like the Canada thistle or some other of those
pests of the soil, cannot be dug out by the millions of men who will come
thereafter; that it is one of those little things that is so trivial in
its nature that it has nor effect upon anybody save the few men who first
plant upon the soil; that it is not a thing which in any way affects the
family of communities composing these States, nor any way endangers the
General Government. Judge Douglas ignores altogether the very well known
fact that we have never had a serious menace to our political existence,
except it sprang from this thing, which he chooses to regard as only upon
a par with onions and potatoes.

Turn it, and contemplate it in another view. He says that, according to
his popular sovereignty, the General Government may give to the
Territories governors, judges, marshals, secretaries, and all the other
chief men to govern them, but they, must not touch upon this other
question. Why? The question of who shall be governor of a Territory for a
year or two, and pass away, without his track being left upon the soil,
or an act which he did for good or for evil being left behind, is a
question of vast national magnitude; it is so much opposed in its nature
to locality that the nation itself must decide it: while this other
matter of planting slavery upon a soil,--a thing which, once planted,
cannot be eradicated by the succeeding millions who have as much right
there as the first comers, or, if eradicated, not without infinite
difficulty and a long struggle, he considers the power to prohibit it as
one of these little local, trivial things that the nation ought not to
say a word about; that it affects nobody save the few men who are there.

Take these two things and consider them together, present the question of
planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a
question who shall be Governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there
a man here, is there a man on earth, who would not say the governor
question is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I
ask any honest Democrat if the small, the local, and the trivial and
temporary question is not, Who shall be governor? while the durable, the
important, and the mischievous one is, Shall this soil be planted with
slavery?

This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglas's mind from
his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery really looks
small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would
hurt him, but a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him. That is
the build of the man, and consequently he looks upon the matter of
slavery in this unimportant light.

Judge Douglas ought to remember, when he is endeavoring to force this
policy upon the American people, that while he is put up in that way, a
good many are not. He ought to remember that there was once in this
country a man by the name of Thomas Jefferson, supposed to be a
Democrat,--a man whose principles and policy are not very prevalent
amongst Democrats to-day, it is true; but that man did not take exactly
this view of the insignificance of the element of slavery which our
friend judge Douglas does. In contemplation of this thing, we all know he
was led to exclaim, "I tremble for my country when I remember that God is
just!" We know how he looked upon it when he thus expressed himself.
There was danger to this country,--danger of the avenging justice of God,
in that little unimportant popular sovereignty question of judge Douglas.
He supposed there was a question of God's eternal justice wrapped up in
the enslaving of any race of men, or any man, and that those who did so
braved the arm of Jehovah; that when a nation thus dared the Almighty,
every friend of that nation had cause to dread his wrath. Choose ye
between Jefferson and Douglas as to what is the true view of this element
among us.

There is another little difficulty about this matter of treating the
Territories and States alike in all things, to which I ask your
attention, and I shall leave this branch of the case. If there is no
difference between them, why not make the Territories States at once?
What is the reason that Kansas was not fit to come into the Union when it
was organized into a Territory, in Judge Douglas's view? Can any of you
tell any reason why it should not have come into the Union at once? They
are fit, as he thinks, to decide upon the slavery question,--the largest
and most important with which they could possibly deal: what could they
do by coming into the Union that they are not fit to do, according to his
view, by staying out of it? Oh, they are not fit to sit in Congress and
decide upon the rates of postage, or questions of ad valorem or specific
duties on foreign goods, or live-oak timber contracts, they are not fit
to decide these vastly important matters, which are national in their
import, but they are fit, "from the jump," to decide this little negro
question. But, gentlemen, the case is too plain; I occupy too much time
on this head, and I pass on.

Near the close of the copyright essay, the judge, I think, comes very
near kicking his own fat into the fire. I did not think, when I commenced
these remarks, that I would read that article, but I now believe I will:

"This exposition of the history of these measures shows conclusively that
the authors of the Compromise measures of 1850 and of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1774.,
and the founders of our system of government subsequent to the
Revolution, regarded the people of the Territories and Colonies as
political communities which were entitled to a free and exclusive power
of legislation in their provisional legislatures, where their
representation could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and
internal polity."

When the judge saw that putting in the word "slavery" would contradict
his own history, he put in what he knew would pass synonymous with it,
"internal polity." Whenever we find that in one of his speeches, the
substitute is used in this manner; and I can tell you the reason. It
would be too bald a contradiction to say slavery; but "internal polity"
is a general phrase, which would pass in some quarters, and which he
hopes will pass with the reading community for the same thing.

"This right pertains to the people collectively, as a law-abiding and
peaceful community, and not in the isolated individuals who may wander
upon the public domain in violation of the law. It can only be exercised
where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a government, and
capable of performing its various functions and duties,--a fact to be
ascertained and determined by" who do you think? Judge Douglas says "by
Congress!" "Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fifteen or twenty
thousand inhabitants, does not affect the principle."

Now, I have only a few comments to make. Popular sovereignty, by his own
words, does not pertain to the few persons who wander upon the public
domain in violation of law. We have his words for that. When it does
pertain to them, is when they are sufficient to be formed into an
organized political community, and he fixes the minimum for that at ten
thousand, and the maximum at twenty thousand. Now, I would like to know
what is to be done with the nine thousand? Are they all to be treated,
until they are large enough to be organized into a political community,
as wanderers upon the public land, in violation of law? And if so treated
and driven out, at what point of time would there ever be ten thousand?
If they were not driven out, but remained there as trespassers upon the
public land in violation of the law, can they establish slavery there?
No; the judge says popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then. Can
they exclude it then? No; popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then.
I would like to know, in the case covered by the essay, what condition
the people of the Territory are in before they reach the number of ten
thousand?

But the main point I wish to ask attention to is, that the question as to
when they shall have reached a sufficient number to be formed into a
regular organized community is to be decided "by Congress." Judge Douglas
says so. Well, gentlemen, that is about all we want. No, that is all the
Southerners want. That is what all those who are for slavery want. They
do not want Congress to prohibit slavery from coming into the new
Territories, and they do not want popular sovereignty to hinder it; and
as Congress is to say when they are ready to be organized, all that the
South has to do is to get Congress to hold off. Let Congress hold off
until they are ready to be admitted as a State, and the South has all it
wants in taking slavery into and planting it in all the Territories that
we now have or hereafter may have. In a word, the whole thing, at a dash
of the pen, is at last put in the power of Congress; for if they do not
have this popular sovereignty until Congress organizes them, I ask if it
at last does not come from Congress? If, at last, it amounts to anything
at all, Congress gives it to them. I submit this rather for your
reflection than for comment. After all that is said, at last, by a dash
of the pen, everything that has gone before is undone, and he puts the
whole question under the control of Congress. After fighting through more
than three hours, if you undertake to read it, he at last places the
whole matter under the control of that power which he has been contending
against, and arrives at a result directly contrary to what he had been
laboring to do. He at last leaves the whole matter to the control of
Congress.

There are two main objects, as I understand it, of this Harper's Magazine
essay. One was to show, if possible, that the men of our Revolutionary
times were in favor of his popular sovereignty, and the other was to show
that the Dred Scott decision had not entirely squelched out this popular
sovereignty. I do not propose, in regard to this argument drawn from the
history of former times, to enter into a detailed examination of the
historical statements he has made. I have the impression that they are
inaccurate in a great many instances,--sometimes in positive statement,
but very much more inaccurate by the suppression of statements that
really belong to the history. But I do not propose to affirm that this is
so to any very great extent, or to enter into a very minute examination
of his historical statements. I avoid doing so upon this principle,--that
if it were important for me to pass out of this lot in the least period
of time possible, and I came to that fence, and saw by a calculation of
my known strength and agility that I could clear it at a bound, it would
be folly for me to stop and consider whether I could or not crawl through
a crack. So I say of the whole history contained in his essay where he
endeavored to link the men of the Revolution to popular sovereignty. It
only requires an effort to leap out of it, a single bound to be entirely
successful. If you read it over, you will find that he quotes here and
there from documents of the Revolutionary times, tending to show that the
people of the colonies were desirous of regulating their own concerns in
their own way, that the British Government should not interfere; that at
one time they struggled with the British Government to be permitted to
exclude the African slave trade,--if not directly, to be permitted to
exclude it indirectly, by taxation sufficient to discourage and destroy
it. From these and many things of this sort, judge Douglas argues that
they were in favor of the people of our own Territories excluding slavery
if they wanted to, or planting it there if they wanted to, doing just as
they pleased from the time they settled upon the Territory. Now, however
his history may apply and whatever of his argument there may be that is
sound and accurate or unsound and inaccurate, if we can find out what
these men did themselves do upon this very question of slavery in the
Territories, does it not end the whole thing? If, after all this labor
and effort to show that the men of the Revolution were in favor of his
popular sovereignty and his mode of dealing with slavery in the
Territories, we can show that these very men took hold of that subject,
and dealt with it, we can see for ourselves how they dealt with it. It is
not a matter of argument or inference, but we know what they thought
about it.

It is precisely upon that part of the history of the country that one
important omission is made by Judge Douglas. He selects parts of the
history of the United States upon the subject of slavery, and treats it
as the whole, omitting from his historical sketch the legislation of
Congress in regard to the admission of Missouri, by which the Missouri
Compromise was established and slavery excluded from a country half as
large as the present United States. All this is left out of his history,
and in nowise alluded to by him, so far as I can remember, save once,
when he makes a remark, that upon his principle the Supreme Court were
authorized to pronounce a decision that the act called the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional. All that history has been left out. But
this part of the history of the country was not made by the men of the
Revolution.

There was another part of our political history, made by the very men who
were the actors in the Revolution, which has taken the name of the
Ordinance of '87. Let me bring that history to your attention. In 1784, I
believe, this same Mr. Jefferson drew up an ordinance for the government
of the country upon which we now stand, or, rather, a frame or draft of
an ordinance for the government of this country, here in Ohio, our
neighbors in Indiana, us who live in Illinois, our neighbors in Wisconsin
and Michigan. In that ordinance, drawn up not only for the government of
that Territory, but for the Territories south of the Ohio River, Mr.
Jefferson expressly provided for the prohibition of slavery. Judge
Douglas says, and perhaps is right, that that provision was lost from
that ordinance. I believe that is true. When the vote was taken upon it,
a majority of all present in the Congress of the Confederation voted for
it; but there were so many absentees that those voting for it did not
make the clear majority necessary, and it was lost. But three years after
that, the Congress of the Confederation were together again, and they
adopted a new ordinance for the government of this Northwest Territory,
not contemplating territory south of the river, for the States owning
that territory had hitherto refrained from giving it to the General
Government; hence they made the ordinance to apply only to what the
Government owned. In fact, the provision excluding slavery was inserted
aside, passed unanimously, or at any rate it passed and became a part of
the law of the land. Under that ordinance we live. First here in Ohio you
were a Territory; then an enabling act was passed, authorizing you to
form a constitution and State Government, provided it was republican and
not in conflict with the Ordinance of '87. When you framed your
constitution and presented it for admission, I think you will find the
legislation upon the subject will show that, whereas you had formed a
constitution that was republican, and not in conflict with the Ordinance
of '87, therefore you were admitted upon equal footing with the original
States. The same process in a few years was gone through with in Indiana,
and so with Illinois, and the same substantially with Michigan and
Wisconsin.