The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

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I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay, when he
was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society, that it had
a tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves, said that:

"Those who would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate
emancipation must do more than put down the benevolent efforts of the
Colonization Society: they must go back to the era of our liberty and
independence, and muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous
return; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they must
penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love
of liberty!"

And I do think--I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion--that
Judge Douglas and whoever, like him, teaches that the negro has no share,
humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going
back to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far as in him
lies, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he
is blowing out the moral lights around us, when he contends that whoever
wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he is penetrating, so far as
lies in his power, the human soul, and eradicating the light of reason
and the love of liberty, when he is in every possible way preparing the
public mind, by his vast influence, for making the institution of slavery
perpetual and national.

There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your
attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I shall
not occupy the entire time that I have, as that one point may not take me
clear through it.

Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at
Freeport, there was one in about this language:

"Are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the
United States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?"

I answered, as I thought, in this way: that I am not generally opposed to
the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a
proposition for the acquisition of additional territory according as my
supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate this slavery
question amongst us. I then proposed to Judge Douglas another
interrogatory, which was correlative to that: "Are you in favor of
acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how it may affect us upon
the slavery question?" Judge Douglas answered,--that is, in his own way
he answered it. I believe that, although he took a good many words to
answer it, it was a little more fully answered than any other. The
substance of his answer was that this country would continue to expand;
that it would need additional territory; that it was as absurd to suppose
that we could continue upon our present territory, enlarging in
population as we are, as it would be to hoop a boy twelve years of age,
and expect him to grow to man's size without bursting the hoops. I
believe it was something like that. Consequently, he was in favor of the
acquisition of further territory as fast as we might need it, in
disregard of how it might affect the slavery question. I do not say this
as giving his exact language, but he said so substantially; and he would
leave the question of slavery, where the territory was acquired, to be
settled by the people of the acquired territory. ["That's the doctrine."]
May be it is; let us consider that for a while. This will probably, in
the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of this
slavery question. If Judge Douglas's policy upon this question succeeds,
and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is crushed out, the
next thing will be a grab for the territory of poor Mexico, an invasion
of the rich lands of South America, then the adjoining islands will
follow, each one of which promises additional slave-fields. And this
question is to be left to the people of those countries for settlement.
When we get Mexico, I don't know whether the Judge will be in favor of
the Mexican people that we get with it settling that question for
themselves and all others; because we know the Judge has a great horror
for mongrels, and I understand that the people of Mexico are most
decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand that there is not more than
one person there out of eight who is pure white, and I suppose from the
Judge's previous declaration that when we get Mexico, or any considerable
portion of it, that he will be in favor of these mongrels settling the
question, which would bring him somewhat into collision with his horror
of an inferior race.

It is to be remembered, though, that this power of acquiring additional
territory is a power confided to the President and the Senate of the
United States. It is a power not under the control of the representatives
of the people any further than they, the President and the Senate, can be
considered the representatives of the people. Let me illustrate that by a
case we have in our history. When we acquired the territory from Mexico
in the Mexican War, the House of Representatives, composed of the
immediate representatives of the people, all the time insisted that the
territory thus to be acquired should be brought in upon condition that
slavery should be forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the
language that slavery had been prohibited from coming into this country.
That was insisted upon constantly and never failed to call forth an
assurance that any territory thus acquired should have that prohibition
in it, so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last
the President and Senate acquired the territory without asking the House
of Representatives anything about it, and took it without that
prohibition. They have the power of acquiring territory without the
immediate representatives of the people being called upon to say anything
about it, and thus furnishing a very apt and powerful means of bringing
new territory into the Union, and, when it is once brought into the
country, involving us anew in this slavery agitation. It is therefore, as
I think, a very important question for due consideration of the American
people, whether the policy of bringing in additional territory, without
considering at all how it will operate upon the safety of the Union in
reference to this one great disturbing element in our national politics,
shall be adopted as the policy of the country. You will bear in mind that
it is to be acquired, according to the Judge's view, as fast as it is
needed, and the indefinite part of this proposition is that we have only
Judge Douglas and his class of men to decide how fast it is needed. We
have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how fast
territory is needed by the necessities of the country. Whoever wants to
go out filibustering, then, thinks that more territory is needed. Whoever
wants wider slave-fields feels sure that some additional territory is
needed as slave territory. Then it is as easy to show the necessity of
additional slave-territory as it is to assert anything that is incapable
of absolute demonstration. Whatever motive a man or a set of men may have
for making annexation of property or territory, it is very easy to
assert, but much less easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the
wants of the country.

And now it only remains for me to say that I think it is a very grave
question for the people of this Union to consider, whether, in view of
the fact that this slavery question has been the only one that has ever
endangered our Republican institutions, the only one that has ever
threatened or menaced a dissolution of the Union, that has ever disturbed
us in such a way as to make us fear for the perpetuity of our
liberty,--in view of these facts, I think it is an exceedingly
interesting and important question for this people to consider whether we
shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional territory, discarding
altogether from our consideration, while obtaining new territory, the
question how it may affect us in regard to this, the only endangering
element to our liberties and national greatness. The Judge's view has
been expressed. I, in my answer to his question, have expressed mine. I
think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are
before the public. I am willing and anxious that they should consider
them fully; that they should turn it about and consider the importance of
the question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether it is or is
not wise in the people of this Union, in the acquisition of new
territory, to consider whether it will add to the disturbance that is
existing amongst us--whether it will add to the one only danger that has
ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union or our own liberties. I think
it is extremely important that they shall decide, and rightly decide,
that question before entering upon that policy.

And now, my friends, having said the little I wish to say upon this head,
whether I have occupied the whole of the remnant of my time or not, I
believe I could not enter upon any new topic so as to treat it fully,
without transcending my time, which I would not for a moment think of
doing. I give way to Judge Douglas.




SIXTH JOINT DEBATE,

AT QUINCY, OCTOBER 13, 1858.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have had no immediate conference with Judge
Douglas, but I will venture to say that he and I will perfectly agree
that your entire silence, both when I speak and when he speaks, will be
most agreeable to us.

In the month of May, 1856, the elements in the State of Illinois which
have since been consolidated into the Republican party assembled together
in a State Convention at Bloomington. They adopted at that time what, in
political language, is called a platform. In June of the same year the
elements of the Republican party in the nation assembled together in a
National Convention at Philadelphia. They adopted what is called the
National Platform. In June, 1858,--the present year,--the Republicans of
Illinois reassembled at Springfield, in State Convention, and adopted
again their platform, as I suppose not differing in any essential
particular from either of the former ones, but perhaps adding something
in relation to the new developments of political progress in the country.

The Convention that assembled in June last did me the honor, if it be
one, and I esteem it such, to nominate me as their candidate for the
United States Senate. I have supposed that, in entering upon this
canvass, I stood generally upon these platforms. We are now met together
on the 13th of October of the same year, only four months from the
adoption of the last platform, and I am unaware that in this canvass,
from the beginning until to-day, any one of our adversaries has taken
hold of our platforms, or laid his finger upon anything that he calls
wrong in them.

In the very first one of these joint discussions between Senator Douglas
and myself, Senator Douglas, without alluding at all to these platforms,
or any one of them, of which I have spoken, attempted to hold me
responsible for a set of resolutions passed long before the meeting of
either one of these conventions of which I have spoken. And as a ground
for holding me responsible for these resolutions, he assumed that they
had been passed at a State Convention of the Republican party, and that I
took part in that Convention. It was discovered afterward that this was
erroneous, that the resolutions which he endeavored to hold me
responsible for had not been passed by any State Convention anywhere, had
not been passed at Springfield, where he supposed they had, or assumed
that they had, and that they had been passed in no convention in which I
had taken part. The Judge, nevertheless, was not willing to give up the
point that he was endeavoring to make upon me, and he therefore thought
to still hold me to the point that he was endeavoring to make, by showing
that the resolutions that he read had been passed at a local convention
in the northern part of the State, although it was not a local convention
that embraced my residence at all, nor one that reached, as I suppose,
nearer than one hundred and fifty or two hundred miles of where I was
when it met, nor one in which I took any part at all. He also introduced
other resolutions, passed at other meetings, and by combining the whole,
although they were all antecedent to the two State Conventions and the
one National Convention I have mentioned, still he insisted, and now
insists, as I understand, that I am in some way responsible for them.

At Jonesboro, on our third meeting, I insisted to the Judge that I was in
no way rightfully held responsible for the proceedings of this local
meeting or convention, in which I had taken no part, and in which I was
in no way embraced; but I insisted to him that if he thought I was
responsible for every man or every set of men everywhere, who happen to
be my friends, the rule ought to work both ways, and he ought to be
responsible for the acts and resolutions of all men or sets of men who
were or are now his supporters and friends, and gave him a pretty long
string of resolutions, passed by men who are now his friends, and
announcing doctrines for which he does not desire to be held responsible.

This still does not satisfy Judge Douglas. He still adheres to his
proposition, that I am responsible for what some of my friends in
different parts of the State have done, but that he is not responsible
for what his have done. At least, so I understand him. But in addition to
that, the Judge, at our meeting in Galesburgh, last week, undertakes to
establish that I am guilty of a species of double dealing with the
public; that I make speeches of a certain sort in the north, among the
Abolitionists, which I would not make in the south, and that I make
speeches of a certain sort in the south which I would not make in the
north. I apprehend, in the course I have marked out for myself, that I
shall not have to dwell at very great length upon this subject.

As this was done in the Judge's opening speech at Galesburgh, I had an
opportunity, as I had the middle speech then, of saying something in
answer to it. He brought forward a quotation or two from a speech of mine
delivered at Chicago, and then, to contrast with it, he brought forward
an extract from a speech of mine at Charleston, in which he insisted that
I was greatly inconsistent, and insisted that his conclusion followed,
that I was playing a double part, and speaking in one region one way, and
in another region another way. I have not time now to dwell on this as
long as I would like, and wish only now to requote that portion of my
speech at Charleston which the Judge quoted, and then make some comments
upon it. This he quotes from me as being delivered at Charleston, and I
believe correctly:

"I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white
and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making
voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor
to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in addition to this,
that there is a physical difference between the white and black races
which will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of
social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live while
they do remain together, there must be the position of superior and
inferior. I am as much as any other man in favor of having the superior
position assigned to the white race."

This, I believe, is the entire quotation from Charleston speech, as Judge
Douglas made it his comments are as follows:

"Yes, here you find men who hurrah for Lincoln, and say he is right when
he discards all distinction between races, or when he declares that he
discards the doctrine that there is such a thing as a superior and
inferior race; and Abolitionists are required and expected to vote for
Mr. Lincoln because he goes for the equality of races, holding that in
the Declaration of Independence the white man and negro were declared
equal, and endowed by divine law with equality. And down South, with the
old-line Whigs, with the Kentuckians, the Virginians and the
Tennesseeans, he tells you that there is a physical difference between
the races, making the one superior, the other inferior, and he is in
favor of maintaining the superiority of the white race over the negro."

Those are the Judges comments. Now, I wish to show you that a month, or
only lacking three days of a month, before I made the speech at
Charleston, which the Judge quotes from, he had himself heard me say
substantially the same thing It was in our first meeting, at Ottawa--and
I will say a word about where it was, and the atmosphere it was in, after
a while--but at our first meeting, at Ottawa, I read an extract from an
old speech of mine, made nearly four years ago, not merely to show my
sentiments, but to show that my sentiments were long entertained and
openly expressed; in which extract I expressly declared that my own
feelings would not admit a social and political equality between the
white and black races, and that even if my own feelings would admit of
it, I still knew that the public sentiment of the country would not, and
that such a thing was an utter impossibility, or substantially that. That
extract from my old speech the reporters by some sort of accident passed
over, and it was not reported. I lay no blame upon anybody. I suppose
they thought that I would hand it over to them, and dropped reporting
while I was giving it, but afterward went away without getting it from
me. At the end of that quotation from my old speech, which I read at
Ottawa, I made the comments which were reported at that time, and which I
will now read, and ask you to notice how very nearly they are the same as
Judge Douglas says were delivered by me down in Egypt. After reading, I
added these words:

"Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any great length; but this is
the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution
of slavery or the black race, and this is the whole of it: anything that
argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the
negro, is but a specious and fantastical arrangement of words by which a
man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse. I will say here,
while upon this subject, that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly,
to interfere with the institution in the States where it exists. I
believe I have no right to do so. I have no inclination to do so. I have
no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white
and black races. There is a physical difference between the two which, in
my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together on the
footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that
there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of
the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have never
said anything to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding all this,
there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the
rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,--the right of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled
to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas that he is not my
equal in many respects, certainly not in color, perhaps not in
intellectual and moral endowments; but in the right to eat the bread,
without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my
equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every other man."

I have chiefly introduced this for the purpose of meeting the Judge's
charge that the quotation he took from my Charleston speech was what I
would say down South among the Kentuckians, the Virginians, etc., but
would not say in the regions in which was supposed to be more of the
Abolition element. I now make this comment: That speech from which I have
now read the quotation, and which is there given correctly--perhaps too
much so for good taste--was made away up North in the Abolition District
of this State par excellence, in the Lovejoy District, in the personal
presence of Lovejoy, for he was on the stand with us when I made it. It
had been made and put in print in that region only three days less than a
month before the speech made at Charleston, the like of which Judge
Douglas thinks I would not make where there was any Abolition element. I
only refer to this matter to say that I am altogether unconscious of
having attempted any double-dealing anywhere; that upon one occasion I
may say one thing, and leave other things unsaid, and vice versa, but
that I have said anything on one occasion that is inconsistent with what
I have said elsewhere, I deny, at least I deny it so far as the intention
is concerned. I find that I have devoted to this topic a larger portion
of my time than I had intended. I wished to show, but I will pass it upon
this occasion, that in the sentiment I have occasionally advanced upon
the Declaration of Independence I am entirely borne out by the sentiments
advanced by our old Whig leader, Henry Clay, and I have the book here to
show it from but because I have already occupied more time than I
intended to do on that topic, I pass over it.

At Galesburgh, I tried to show that by the Dred Scott decision, pushed to
its legitimate consequences, slavery would be established in all the
States as well as in the Territories. I did this because, upon a former
occasion, I had asked Judge Douglas whether, if the Supreme Court should
make a decision declaring that the States had not the power to exclude
slavery from their limits, he would adopt and follow that decision as a
rule of political action; and because he had not directly answered that
question, but had merely contented himself with sneering at it, I again
introduced it, and tried to show that the conclusion that I stated
followed inevitably and logically from the proposition already decided by
the court. Judge Douglas had the privilege of replying to me at
Galesburgh, and again he gave me no direct answer as to whether he would
or would not sustain such a decision if made. I give him his third chance
to say yes or no. He is not obliged to do either, probably he will not do
either; but I give him the third chance. I tried to show then that this
result, this conclusion, inevitably followed from the point already
decided by the court. The Judge, in his reply, again sneers at the
thought of the court making any such decision, and in the course of his
remarks upon this subject uses the language which I will now read.
Speaking of me, the Judge says:

"He goes on and insists that the Dred Scott decision would carry slavery
into the free States, notwithstanding the decision itself says the
contrary." And he adds:

"Mr. Lincoln knows that there is no member of the Supreme Court that
holds that doctrine. He knows that every one of them in their opinions
held the reverse."

I especially introduce this subject again for the purpose of saying that
I have the Dred Scott decision here, and I will thank Judge Douglas to
lay his finger upon the place in the entire opinions of the court where
any one of them "says the contrary." It is very hard to affirm a negative
with entire confidence. I say, however, that I have examined that
decision with a good deal of care, as a lawyer examines a decision and,
so far as I have been able to do so, the court has nowhere in its
opinions said that the States have the power to exclude slavery, nor have
they used other language substantially that, I also say, so far as I can
find, not one of the concurring judges has said that the States can
exclude slavery, nor said anything that was substantially that. The
nearest approach that any one of them has made to it, so far as I can
find, was by Judge Nelson, and the approach he made to it was exactly, in
substance, the Nebraska Bill,--that the States had the exclusive power
over the question of slavery, so far as they are not limited by the
Constitution of the United States. I asked the question, therefore, if
the non-concurring judges, McLean or Curtis, had asked to get an express
declaration that the States could absolutely exclude slavery from their
limits, what reason have we to believe that it would not have been voted
down by the majority of the judges, just as Chase's amendment was voted
down by Judge Douglas and his compeers when it was offered to the
Nebraska Bill.

Also, at Galesburgh, I said something in regard to those Springfield
resolutions that Judge Douglas had attempted to use upon me at Ottawa,
and commented at some length upon the fact that they were, as presented,
not genuine. Judge Douglas in his reply to me seemed to be somewhat
exasperated. He said he would never have believed that Abraham Lincoln,
as he kindly called me, would have attempted such a thing as I had
attempted upon that occasion; and among other expressions which he used
toward me, was that I dared to say forgery, that I had dared to say
forgery [turning to Judge Douglas]. Yes, Judge, I did dare to say
forgery. But in this political canvass the Judge ought to remember that I
was not the first who dared to say forgery. At Jacksonville, Judge
Douglas made a speech in answer to something said by Judge Trumbull, and
at the close of what he said upon that subject, he dared to say that
Trumbull had forged his evidence. He said, too, that he should not
concern himself with Trumbull any more, but thereafter he should hold
Lincoln responsible for the slanders upon him. When I met him at
Charleston after that, although I think that I should not have noticed
the subject if he had not said he would hold me responsible for it, I
spread out before him the statements of the evidence that Judge Trumbull
had used, and I asked Judge Douglas, piece by piece, to put his finger
upon one piece of all that evidence that he would say was a forgery! When
I went through with each and every piece, Judge Douglas did not dare then
to say that any piece of it was a forgery. So it seems that there are
some things that Judge Douglas dares to do, and some that he dares not to
do.