The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

A >> Abraham Lincoln >> The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete


Now, in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his
speech) about the Compromise of 1850 containing the principles of the
Nebraska Bill, although I have often presented my views upon that
subject, yet as I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you
please, detain you a little with them. I have always maintained, so far
as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska
Bill in the Compromise of 1850 at all,--nothing whatever. Where can you
find the principle of the Nebraska Bill in that Compromise? If anywhere,
in the two pieces of the Compromise organizing the Territories of New
Mexico and Utah. It was expressly provided in these two acts that when
they came to be admitted into the Union they should be admitted with or
without slavery, as they should choose, by their own constitutions.
Nothing was said in either of those acts as to what was to be done in
relation to slavery during the Territorial existence of those
Territories, while Henry Clay constantly made the declaration (Judge
Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old
Mexican laws would control that question during the Territorial
existence, and that these old Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that
be used as a principle for declaring that during the Territorial
existence as well as at the time of framing the constitution the people,
if you please, might have slaves if they wanted them? I am not discussing
the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican
and Utah laws patterns for the Nebraska Bill? I maintain that the
organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general principle
at all. It had no feature of establishing a general principle. The acts
to which I have referred were a part of a general system of Compromises.
They did not lay down what was proposed as a regular policy for the
Territories, only an agreement in this particular case to do in that way,
because other things were done that were to be a compensation for it.
They were allowed to come in in that shape, because in another way it was
paid for, considering that as a part of that system of measures called
the Compromise of 1850, which finally included half-a-dozen acts. It
included the admission of California as a free State, which was kept out
of the Union for half a year because it had formed a free constitution.
It included the settlement of the boundary of Texas, which had been
undefined before, which was in itself a slavery question; for if you
pushed the line farther west, you made Texas larger, and made more slave
territory; while, if you drew the line toward the east, you narrowed the
boundary and diminished the domain of slavery, and by so much increased
free territory. It included the abolition of the slave trade in the
District of Columbia. It included the passage of a new Fugitive Slave
law. All these things were put together, and, though passed in separate
acts, were nevertheless, in legislation (as the speeches at the time will
show), made to depend upon each other. Each got votes with the
understanding that the other measures were to pass, and by this system of
compromise, in that series of measures, those two bills--the New Mexico
and Utah bills--were passed: and I say for that reason they could not be
taken as models, framed upon their own intrinsic principle, for all
future Territories. And I have the evidence of this in the fact that
Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more than a year afterward, perhaps,
when he first introduced bills for the purpose of framing new
Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills of New Mexico and
Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska Bill, I think you will
discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not wish to dwell
at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own opinion is,
that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico
and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not designed as
patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska Bill
did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious
distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that
the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between
the free and slave States. But there is still a difference, I think,
between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the
real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the
Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making
any difference between slavery and liberty; that he is in favor of
eradicating, of pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this
country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment
he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery.
Everything that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of
policy carefully excludes the thought that there is anything wrong in
slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to
exclude the thought that there is anything whatever wrong in slavery. If
you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed
sentences expressed by him,--as his declaration that he "don't care
whether slavery is voted up or down,"--you will see at once that this is
perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If you do
admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don't care
whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas declares that if
any community wants slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that
logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit
that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that anybody has a
right to do wrong. He insists that upon the score of equality the owners
of slaves and owners of property--of horses and every other sort of
property--should be alike, and hold them alike in a new Territory. That
is perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike and are
equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is wrong, you
cannot institute any equality between right and wrong. And from this
difference of sentiment,--the belief on the part of one that the
institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief which looks
to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong, and this other sentiment,
that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that sentiment, which will
tolerate no idea of preventing the wrong from growing larger, and looks
to there never being an end to it through all the existence of
things,--arises the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends
on the one hand and the Republicans on the other. Now, I confess myself
as belonging to that class in the country who contemplate slavery as a
moral, social, and political evil, having due regard for its actual
existence amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any
satisfactory way, and to all the constitutional obligations which have
been thrown about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to
the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when as
a wrong it may come to an end.

Judge Douglas has again, for, I believe, the fifth time, if not the
seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or
combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence
Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as he never
favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not
choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in
the Judge's party. He got it up himself. It was all his and their work.
He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the
Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had; though at last, when they
reached it, they quarreled over it, and their friends divided upon it. I
am very free to confess to Judge Douglas that I have no objection to the
division; but I defy the Judge to show any evidence that I have in any
way promoted that division, unless he insists on being a witness himself
in merely saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here to
understand exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that
division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the
Democratic party were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess you
do. Any Democrat who remembers that division will remember also that he
was at the time very glad of it, and then he will be able to see all
there is between the National Democrats and the Republicans. What we now
think of the two divisions of Democrats, you then thought of the Fremont
and Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.

But if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there is
an unholy and unnatural alliance between the Republicans and the National
Democrats, I now want to enter my protest against receiving him as an
entirely competent witness upon that subject. I want to call to the
Judge's attention an attack he made upon me in the first one of these
debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme
Abolitionism upon me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which he
declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention, in October,
1854, at Springfield, Illinois, and he declared I had taken part in that
Convention. It turned out that although a few men calling themselves an
anti-Nebraska State Convention had sat at Springfield about that time,
yet neither did I take any part in it, nor did it pass the resolutions or
any such resolutions as Judge Douglas read. So apparent had it become
that the resolutions which he read had not been passed at Springfield at
all, nor by a State Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days
afterward, at Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that he had been misled by
Charles H. Lanphier, editor of the State Register, and Thomas L. Harris,
member of Congress in that district, and he promised in that speech that
when he went to Springfield he would investigate the matter. Since then
Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume has made the
investigation; but a month has passed since he has been there, and, so
far as I know, he has made no report of the result of his investigation.
I have waited as I think sufficient time for the report of that
investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and hear it. A fraud, an
absolute forgery was committed, and the perpetration of it was traced to
the three,--Lanphier, Harris, and Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in
any way so as to exonerate any one of them, is what Judge Douglas's
report would probably show.

It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were
published in the Illinois State Register on the 16th of October, 1854, as
being the resolutions of an anti-Nebraska Convention which had sat in
that same month of October, at Springfield. But it is also true that the
publication in the Register was a forgery then, and the question is still
behind, which of the three, if not all of them, committed that forgery.
The idea that it was done by mistake is absurd. The article in the
Illinois State Register contains part of the real proceedings of that
Springfield Convention, showing that the writer of the article had the
real proceedings before him, and purposely threw out the genuine
resolutions passed by the Convention and fraudulently substituted the
others. Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of the Register, so that
there seems to be but little room for his escape. But then it is to be
borne in mind that Lanphier had less interest in the object of that
forgery than either of the other two. The main object of that forgery at
that time was to beat Yates and elect Harris to Congress, and that object
was known to be exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that time. Harris
and Douglas were both in Springfield when the Convention was in session,
and although they both left before the fraud appeared in the Register,
subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon that
Convention.

The fraud having been apparently successful upon the occasion, both
Harris and Douglas have more than once since then been attempting to put
it to new uses. As the fisherman's wife, whose drowned husband was
brought home with his body full of eels, said when she was asked what was
to be done with him, "Take the eels out and set him again," so Harris and
Douglas have shown a disposition to take the eels out of that stale fraud
by which they gained Harris's election, and set the fraud again more than
once. On the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas attempted a repetition of it upon
Trumbull on the floor of the Senate of the United States, as will appear
from the appendix of the Congressional Globe of that date.

On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the House
of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents,--the appendix
to the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 21st of August last, all
three--Lanphier, Douglas, and Harris--reattempted it upon me at Ottawa.
It has been clung to and played out again and again as an exceedingly
high trump by this blessed trio. And now that it has been discovered
publicly to be a fraud we find that Judge Douglas manifests no surprise
at it at all. He makes no complaint of Lanphier, who must have known it
to be a fraud from the beginning. He, Lanphier, and Harris are just as
cozy now and just as active in the concoction of new schemes as they were
before the general discovery of this fraud. Now, all this is very natural
if they are all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if
any one of them is innocent. Lanphier perhaps insists that the rule of
honor among thieves does not quite require him to take all upon himself,
and consequently my friend Judge Douglas finds it difficult to make a
satisfactory report upon his investigation. But meanwhile the three are
agreed that each is "a most honorable man."

Judge Douglas requires an indorsement of his truth and honor by a
re-election to the United States Senate, and he makes and reports against
me and against Judge Trumbull, day after day, charges which we know to be
utterly untrue, without for a moment seeming to think that this one
unexplained fraud, which he promised to investigate, will be the least
drawback to his claim to belief. Harris ditto. He asks a re-election to
the lower House of Congress without seeming to remember at all that he is
involved in this dishonorable fraud! The Illinois State Register, edited
by Lanphier, then, as now, the central organ of both Harris and Douglas,
continues to din the public ear with this assertion, without seeming to
suspect that these assertions are at all lacking in title to belief.

After all, the question still recurs upon us, How did that fraud
originally get into the State Register? Lanphier then, as now, was the
editor of that paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be ignorant of how
and by whom it was originally concocted. Can he be induced to tell, or,
if he has told, can Judge Douglas be induced to tell how it originally
was concocted? It may be true that Lanphier insists that the two men for
whose benefit it was originally devised shall at least bear their share
of it! How that is, I do not know, and while it remains unexplained I
hope to be pardoned if I insist that the mere fact of Judge Douglas
making charges against Trumbull and myself is not quite sufficient
evidence to establish them!

While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint discussions, I
answered certain interrogatories which Judge Douglas had propounded
to me, and then in turn propounded some to him, which he in a sort of
way answered. The third one of these interrogatories I have with me,
and wish now to make some comments upon it. It was in these words:
"If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of
acquiescing in, adhering to, and following such decision as a rule of
political action?"

To this interrogatory Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense of
the word. He contented himself with sneering at the thought that it was
possible for the Supreme Court ever to make such a decision. He sneered
at me for propounding the interrogatory. I had not propounded it without
some reflection, and I wish now to address to this audience some remarks
upon it.

In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe it is, of the
Constitution of the United States, we find the following language:

"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which
I will now read:

"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a
different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution."

I repeat it, "The right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution"! What is it to be "affirmed" in
the Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution, so made that it cannot
be separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution;
durable as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now,
remembering the provision of the Constitution which I have
read--affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of the land; that
the judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or constitution
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that the right of property
in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and
cannot be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the
instrument; part of the instrument;--what follows as a short and even
syllogistic argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the
consideration of men capable of arguing whether, as I state it, in
syllogistic form, the argument has any fault in it:

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United
States.

The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy
the right of property in a slave.

I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the
truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all
to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think,
but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a
fault of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is
not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge
Douglas thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates
of that decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution
where the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed I say, therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true
in fact. But it is true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme
Court who pronounced it. They are estopped from denying it, and being
estopped from denying it, the conclusion follows that, the Constitution
of the United States being the supreme law, no constitution or law can
interfere with it. It being affirmed in the decision that the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution, the conclusion inevitably follows that no State law or
constitution can destroy that right. I then say to Judge Douglas and to
all others that I think it will take a better answer than a sneer to show
that those who have said that the right of property in a slave is
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, are not prepared
to show that no constitution or law can destroy that right. I say I
believe it will take a far better argument than a mere sneer to show to
the minds of intelligent men that whoever has so said is not prepared,
whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as to justify it, to say the
other. This is but an opinion, and the opinion of one very humble man;
but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would
have been made in its present form if the party that made it had not been
sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that the new
Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the people of the
States to exclude slavery, will never be made if that party is not
sustained by the elections. I believe, further, that it is just as sure
to be made as to-morrow is to come, if that party shall be sustained. I
have said, upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course
of arguement that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge
not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new Dred
Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for
his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is. I have turned
his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in
regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have
asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in
regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Jefferson
said that "Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so." And he
said, substantially, that whenever a free people should give up in
absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for
themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone. I have asked his
attention to the fact that the Cincinnati platform, upon which he says he
stands, disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in
denying the power of Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked
his attention to the fact that he himself was one of the most active
instruments at one time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State
of Illinois because it had made a decision distasteful to him,--a
struggle ending in the remarkable circumstance of his sitting down as one
of the new Judges who were to overslaugh that decision; getting his title
of Judge in that very way.

So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas
upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells
himself up and says, "All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme
Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare
question it in any way are the enemies of the Constitution." Now, in this
very devoted adherence to this decision, in opposition to all the great
political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders, in opposition to his
former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner
in which he adheres to it,--not as being right upon the merits, as he
conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being
absolutely obligatory upon every one simply because of the source from
whence it comes, as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may
be,--this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision. It
marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next decision,
whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not
investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong.
So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong.
He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to
take the next decision when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I
think I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all) that Judge
Douglas is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to
take that decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in
various other ways. In these general maxims about liberty, in his
assertions that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted
down,"; that "whoever wants slavery has a right to have it"; that "upon
principles of equality it should be allowed to go everywhere"; that
"there is no inconsistency between free and slave institutions"--in this
he is also preparing (whether purposely or not) the way for making the
institution of slavery national! I repeat again, for I wish no
misunderstanding, that I do not charge that he means it so; but I call
upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best instrument
you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious way, to prepare
the public mind for this movement, operating in the free States, where
there is now an abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find
an instrument so capable of doing it as Judge Douglas, or one employed in
so apt a way to do it?