The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

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"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and
ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said
State of Kansas."

Now, Trumbull alleges that these last words were stricken out of the bill
when it came back, and he says this was a provision for submitting the
constitution to a vote of the people; and his argument is this:

"Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions at the
election for the adoption of the constitution, unless such an election
was to be held?"

This is Trumbull's argument. Now, Judge Douglas does not meet the charge
at all, but he stands up and says there was no such proposition in that
bill for submitting the constitution to be framed to a vote of the
people. Trumbull admits that the language is not a direct provision for
submitting it, but it is a provision necessarily implied from another
provision. He asks you how it is possible to ratify the land proposition
at the election for the adoption of the constitution, if there was no
election to be held for the adoption of the constitution. And he goes on
to show that it is not any less a law because the provision is put in
that indirect shape than it would be if it were put directly. But I
presume I have said enough to draw attention to this point, and I pass it
by also.

Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and at
very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending, said in
a speech in the Senate that he supposed the constitution to be made would
have to be submitted to the people. He asks, if Trumbull thought so then,
what ground is there for anybody thinking otherwise now? Fellow-citizens,
this much may be said in reply: That bill had been in the hands of a
party to which Trumbull did not belong. It had been in the hands of the
committee at the head of which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had
a printed copy of the original Toomb's bill. I have not the evidence on
that point except a sort of inference I draw from the general course of
business there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of
altering, were going on in committee, Trumbull had no means of knowing,
until the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterwards, when it was
reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull in
reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the bearings
of the alterations. He was hastily borne into the debate, and it does not
follow that because there was something in it Trumbull did not perceive,
that something did not exist. More than this, is it true that what
Trumbull did can have any effect on what Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull
had been in the plot with these other men, would that let Douglas out of
it? Would it exonerate Douglas that Trumbull did n't then perceive he
was in the plot? He also asks the question: Why did n't Trumbull propose
to amend the bill, if he thought it needed any amendment? Why, I believe
that everything Judge Trumbull had proposed, particularly in connection
with this question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor
of the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his
friends. He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to anything
on this subject would receive the slightest consideration. Judge Trumbull
did bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the fact that there
was no provision for submitting the constitution about to be made for the
people of Kansas to a vote of the people. I believe I may venture to say
that Judge Douglas made some reply to this speech of Judge Trumbull's,
but he never noticed that part of it at all. And so the thing passed by.
I think, then, the fact that Judge Trumbull offered no amendment does not
throw much blame upon him; and if it did, it does not reach the question
of fact as to what Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull
had himself been in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who
were in it from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the
trial it should be discovered that I had been implicated in that murder,
but that the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at all
touch the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck that
they discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to be guilty
too.

Another one of the points Judge Douglas makes upon Judge Trumbull is,
that when he spoke in Chicago he made his charge to rest upon the fact
that the bill had the provision in it for submitting the constitution to
a vote of the people when it went into his Judge Douglas's hands, that it
was missing when he reported it to the Senate, and that in a public
speech he had subsequently said the alterations in the bill were made
while it was in committee, and that they were made in consultation
between him (Judge Douglas) and Toomb's. And Judge Douglas goes on to
comment upon the fact of Trumbull's adducing in his Alton speech the
proposition that the bill not only came back with that proposition
stricken out, but with another clause and another provision in it, saying
that "until the complete execution of this Act there shall be no election
in said Territory,"--which, Trumbull argued, was not only taking the
provision for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but was
adding an affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from
exercising the right under a bill that was merely silent on the question.
Now, in regard to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the issue, that he
shifts his ground,--and I believe he uses the term that, "it being proven
false, he has changed ground," I call upon all of you, when you come to
examine that portion of Trumbull's speech (for it will make a part of
mine), to examine whether Trumbull has shifted his ground or not. I say
he did not shift his ground, but that he brought forward his original
charge and the evidence to sustain it yet more fully, but precisely as he
originally made it. Then, in addition thereto, he brought in a new piece
of evidence. He shifted no ground. He brought no new piece of evidence
inconsistent with his former testimony; but he brought a new piece,
tending, as he thought, and as I think, to prove his proposition. To
illustrate: A man brings an accusation against another, and on trial the
man making the charge introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a
second trial he introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as
before, and a third witness, who tells the same thing, and in addition
gives further testimony corroborative of the charge. So with Trumbull.
There was no shifting of ground, nor inconsistency of testimony between
the new piece of evidence and what he originally introduced.

But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that last
provision of the bill, and that on his motion it was stricken out and a
substitute inserted. That I presume is the truth. I presume it is true
that that last proposition was stricken out by Judge Douglas. Trumbull
has not said it was not; Trumbull has himself said that it was so
stricken out. He says: "I am now speaking of the bill as Judge Douglas
reported it back. It was amended somewhat in the Senate before it passed,
but I am speaking of it as he brought it back." Now, when Judge Douglas
parades the fact that the provision was stricken out of the bill when it
came back, he asserts nothing contrary to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull
has only said that he originally put it in, not that he did not strike it
out. Trumbull says it was not in the bill when it went to the committee.
When it came back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were
made by him in consultation with Toomb's. Trumbull alleges, therefore, as
his conclusion, that Judge Douglas put it in. Then, if Douglas wants to
contradict Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not put it
in, and not that he did n't take it out again. It is said that a bear is
sometimes hard enough pushed to drop a cub; and so I presume it was in
this case. I presume the truth is that Douglas put it in, and afterward
took it out. That, I take it, is the truth about it. Judge Trumbull says
one thing, Douglas says another thing, and the two don't contradict one
another at all. The question is, what did he put it in for? In the first
place, what did he take the other provision out of the bill for,--the
provision which Trumbull argued was necessary for submitting the
constitution to a vote of the people? What did he take that out for; and,
having taken it out, what did he put this in for? I say that in the run
of things it is not unlikely forces conspire to render it vastly
expedient for Judge Douglas to take that latter clause out again. The
question that Trumbull has made is that Judge Douglas put it in; and he
don't meet Trumbull at all unless he denies that.

In the clause of Judge Douglas's speech upon this subject he uses this
language toward Judge Trumbull. He says:

"He forges his evidence from beginning to end; and by falsifying the
record, he endeavors to bolster up his false charge."

Well, that is a pretty serious statement--Trumbull forges his evidence
from beginning to end. Now, upon my own authority I say that it is not
true. What is a forgery? Consider the evidence that Trumbull has brought
forward. When you come to read the speech, as you will be able to,
examine whether the evidence is a forgery from beginning to end. He had
the bill or document in his hand like that [holding up a paper]. He says
that is a copy of the Toomb's bill,--the amendment offered by Toomb's. He
says that is a copy of the bill as it was introduced and went into Judge
Douglas's hands. Now, does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? That is
one thing Trumbull brought forward. Judge Douglas says he forged it from
beginning to end! That is the "beginning," we will say. Does Douglas say
that is a forgery? Let him say it to-day, and we will have a subsequent
examination upon this subject. Trumbull then holds up another document
like this, and says that is an exact copy of the bill as it came back in
the amended form out of Judge Douglas's hands. Does Judge Douglas say
that is a forgery? Does he say it in his general sweeping charge? Does he
say so now? If he does not, then take this Toomb's bill and the bill in
the amended form, and it only needs to compare them to see that the
provision is in the one and not in the other; it leaves the inference
inevitable that it was taken out.

But, while I am dealing with this question, let us see what Trumbull's
other evidence is. One other piece of evidence I will read. Trumbull says
there are in this original Toomb's bill these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and
ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said
State of Kansas."

Now, if it is said that this is a forgery, we will open the paper here
and see whether it is or not. Again, Trumbull says, as he goes along,
that Mr. Bigler made the following statement in his place in the Senate,
December 9, 1857:

"I was present when that subject was discussed by senators before the
bill was introduced, and the question was raised and discussed, whether
the constitution, when formed, should be submitted to a vote of the
people. It was held by those most intelligent on the subject that, in
view of all the difficulties surrounding that Territory, the danger of
any experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be better there
should be no such provision in the Toomb's bill; and it was my
understanding, in all the intercourse I had, that the Convention would
make a constitution, and send it here, without submitting it to the
popular vote."

Then Trumbull follows on:

"In speaking of this meeting again on the 21st December, 1857
[Congressional Globe, same vol., page 113], Senator Bigler said:

"'Nothing was further from my mind than to allude to any social or
confidential interview. The meeting was not of that character. Indeed, it
was semi-official, and called to promote the public good. My recollection
was clear that I left the conference under the impression that it had
been deemed best to adopt measures to admit Kansas as a State through the
agency of one popular election, and that for delegates to this
Convention. This impression was stronger because I thought the spirit of
the bill infringed upon the doctrine of non-intervention, to which I had
great aversion; but with the hope of accomplishing a great good, and as
no movement had been made in that direction in the Territory, I waived
this objection, and concluded to support the measure. I have a few items
of testimony as to the correctness of these impressions, and with their
submission I shall be content. I have before me the bill reported by the
senator from Illinois on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the
admission of Kansas as a State, the third section of which reads as
follows:

"That the following propositions be, and the same are hereby offered to
the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free
acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and
ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said
State of Kansas."

The bill read in his place by the senator from Georgia on the 25th of
June, and referred to the Committee on Territories, contained the same
section word for word. Both these bills were under consideration at the
conference referred to; but, sir, when the senator from Illinois reported
the Toombs bill to the Senate with amendments, the next morning, it did
not contain that portion of the third section which indicated to the
Convention that the constitution should be approved by the people. The
words "and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the
constitution" had been stricken out.

Now, these things Trumbull says were stated by Bigler upon the floor of
the Senate on certain days, and that they are recorded in the
Congressional Globe on certain pages. Does Judge Douglas say this is a
forgery? Does he say there is no such thing in the Congressional Globe?
What does he mean when he says Judge Trumbull forges his evidence from
beginning to end? So again he says in another place that Judge Douglas,
in his speech, December 9, 1857 (Congressional Globe, part I., page 15),
stated:

"That during the last session of Congress, I [Mr. Douglas] reported a
bill from the Committee on Territories, to authorize the people of Kansas
to assemble and form a constitution for themselves. Subsequently the
senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs] brought forward a substitute for my
bill, which, after having been modified by him and myself in
consultation, was passed by the Senate."

Now, Trumbull says this is a quotation from a speech of Douglas, and is
recorded in the Congressional Globe. Is it a forgery? Is it there or not?
It may not be there, but I want the Judge to take these pieces of
evidence, and distinctly say they are forgeries if he dare do it.

[A voice: "He will."]

Well, sir, you had better not commit him. He gives other
quotations,--another from Judge Douglas. He says:

"I will ask the senator to show me an intimation, from any one member of
the Senate, in the whole debate on the Toombs bill, and in the Union,
from any quarter, that the constitution was not to be submitted to the
people. I will venture to say that on all sides of the chamber it was so
understood at the time. If the opponents of the bill had understood it
was not, they would have made the point on it; and if they had made it,
we should certainly have yielded to it, and put in the clause. That is a
discovery made since the President found out that it was not safe to take
it for granted that that would be done, which ought in fairness to have
been done."

Judge Trumbull says Douglas made that speech, and it is recorded. Does
Judge Douglas say it is a forgery, and was not true? Trumbull says
somewhere, and I propose to skip it, but it will be found by any one who
will read this debate, that he did distinctly bring it to the notice of
those who were engineering the bill, that it lacked that provision; and
then he goes on to give another quotation from Judge Douglas, where Judge
Trumbull uses this language:

"Judge Douglas, however, on the same day and in the same debate, probably
recollecting or being reminded of the fact that I had objected to the
Toombs bill when pending that it did not provide for a submission of the
constitution to the people, made another statement, which is to be found
in the same volume of the Globe, page 22, in which he says: 'That the
bill was silent on this subject was true, and my attention was called to
that about the time it was passed; and I took the fair construction to
be, that powers not delegated were reserved, and that of course the
constitution would be submitted to the people.'

"Whether this statement is consistent with the statement just before
made, that had the point been made it would have been yielded to, or that
it was a new discovery, you will determine."

So I say. I do not know whether Judge Douglas will dispute this, and yet
maintain his position that Trumbull's evidence "was forged from beginning
to end." I will remark that I have not got these Congressional Globes
with me. They are large books, and difficult to carry about, and if Judge
Douglas shall say that on these points where Trumbull has quoted from
them there are no such passages there, I shall not be able to prove they
are there upon this occasion, but I will have another chance. Whenever he
points out the forgery and says, "I declare that this particular thing
which Trumbull has uttered is not to be found where he says it is," then
my attention will be drawn to that, and I will arm myself for the
contest, stating now that I have not the slightest doubt on earth that I
will find every quotation just where Trumbull says it is. Then the
question is, How can Douglas call that a forgery? How can he make out
that it is a forgery? What is a forgery? It is the bringing forward
something in writing or in print purporting to be of certain effect when
it is altogether untrue. If you come forward with my note for one hundred
dollars when I have never given such a note, there is a forgery. If you
come forward with a letter purporting to be written by me which I never
wrote, there is another forgery. If you produce anything in writing or in
print saying it is so and so, the document not being genuine, a forgery
has been committed. How do you make this forgery when every piece of the
evidence is genuine? If Judge Douglas does say these documents and
quotations are false and forged, he has a full right to do so; but until
he does it specifically, we don't know how to get at him. If he does say
they are false and forged, I will then look further into it, and presume
I can procure the certificates of the proper officers that they are
genuine copies. I have no doubt each of these extracts will be found
exactly where Trumbull says it is. Then I leave it to you if Judge
Douglas, in making his sweeping charge that Judge Trumbull's evidence is
forged from beginning to end, at all meets the case,--if that is the way
to get at the facts. I repeat again, if he will point out which one is a
forgery, I will carefully examine it, and if it proves that any one of
them is really a forgery, it will not be me who will hold to it any
longer. I have always wanted to deal with everyone I meet candidly and
honestly. If I have made any assertion not warranted by facts, and it is
pointed out to me, I will withdraw it cheerfully. But I do not choose to
see Judge Trumbull calumniated, and the evidence he has brought forward
branded in general terms "a forgery from beginning to end." This is not
the legal way of meeting a charge, and I submit it to all intelligent
persons, both friends of Judge Douglas and of myself, whether it is.

The point upon Judge Douglas is this: The bill that went into his hands
had the provision in it for a submission of the constitution to the
people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision for a
submission, and that he took the provision out. He says it was known that
the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was
not silent when you got it. It was vocal with the declaration, when you
got it, for a submission of the constitution to the people. And now, my
direct question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill
silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those
particular harmless words. If he had found the bill silent and without
this provision, he might say what he does now. If he supposes it was
implied that the constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people,
how could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary
to strike them out? How could he infer that a submission was still
implied, after its express provision had been stricken from the bill? I
find the bill vocal with the provision, while he silenced it. He took it
out, and although he took out the other provision preventing a submission
to a vote of the people, I ask, Why did you first put it in? I ask him
whether he took the original provision out, which Trumbull alleges was in
the bill. If he admits that he did take it, I ask him what he did it for.
It looks to us as if he had altered the bill. If it looks differently to
him,--if he has a different reason for his action from the one we assign
him--he can tell it. I insist upon knowing why he made the bill silent
upon that point when it was vocal before he put his hands upon it.

I was told, before my last paragraph, that my time was within three
minutes of being out. I presume it is expired now; I therefore close.




Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: It follows as a matter of course that a half-hour answer
to a speech of an hour and a half can be but a very hurried one. I shall
only be able to touch upon a few of the points suggested by Judge
Douglas, and give them a brief attention, while I shall have to totally
omit others for the want of time.

Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from me an
answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro citizenship. So far
as I know the Judge never asked me the question before. He shall have no
occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I am not
in favor of negro citizenship. This furnishes me an occasion for saying a
few words upon the subject. I mentioned in a certain speech of mine,
which has been printed, that the Supreme Court had decided that a negro
could not possibly be made a citizen; and without saying what was my
ground of complaint in regard to that, or whether I had any ground of
complaint, Judge Douglas has from that thing manufactured nearly
everything that he ever says about my disposition to produce an equality
between the negroes and the white people. If any one will read my speech,
he will find I mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course
of the Supreme Court opinions, but I did not state what objection I had
to it. But Judge Douglas tells the people what my objection was when I
did not tell them myself. Now, my opinion is that the different States
have the power to make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the
United States if they choose. The Dred Scott decision decides that they
have not that power. If the State of Illinois had that power, I should be
opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I have to say about it.

Judge Douglas has told me that he heard my speeches north and my speeches
south; that he had heard me at Ottawa and at Freeport in the north and
recently at Jonesboro in the south, and there was a very different cast
of sentiment in the speeches made at the different points. I will not
charge upon Judge Douglas that he wilfully misrepresents me, but I call
upon every fair-minded man to take these speeches and read them, and I
dare him to point out any difference between my speeches north and south.
While I am here perhaps I ought to say a word, if I have the time, in
regard to the latter portion of the Judge's speech, which was a sort of
declamation in reference to my having said I entertained the belief that
this government would not endure half slave and half free. I have said
so, and I did not say it without what seemed to me to be good reasons. It
perhaps would require more time than I have now to set forth these
reasons in detail; but let me ask you a few questions. Have we ever had
any peace on this slavery question? When are we to have peace upon it, if
it is kept in the position it now occupies? How are we ever to have peace
upon it? That is an important question. To be sure, if we will all stop,
and allow Judge Douglas and his friends to march on in their present
career until they plant the institution all over the nation, here and
wherever else our flag waves, and we acquiesce in it, there will be
peace. But let me ask Judge Douglas how he is going to get the people to
do that? They have been wrangling over this question for at least forty
years. This was the cause of the agitation resulting in the Missouri
Compromise; this produced the troubles at the annexation of Texas, in the
acquisition of the territory acquired in the Mexican War. Again, this was
the trouble which was quieted by the Compromise of 1850, when it was
settled "forever" as both the great political parties declared in their
National Conventions. That "forever" turned out to be just four years,
when Judge Douglas himself reopened it. When is it likely to come to an
end? He introduced the Nebraska Bill in 1854 to put another end to the
slavery agitation. He promised that it would finish it all up
immediately, and he has never made a speech since, until he got into a
quarrel with the President about the Lecompton Constitution, in which he
has not declared that we are just at the end of the slavery agitation.
But in one speech, I think last winter, he did say that he did n't quite
see when the end of the slavery agitation would come. Now he tells us
again that it is all over and the people of Kansas have voted down the
Lecompton Constitution. How is it over? That was only one of the attempts
at putting an end to the slavery agitation--one of these "final
settlements." Is Kansas in the Union? Has she formed a constitution that
she is likely to come in under? Is not the slavery agitation still an
open question in that Territory? Has the voting down of that constitution
put an end to all the trouble? Is that more likely to settle it than
every one of these previous attempts to settle the slavery agitation?
Now, at this day in the history of the world we can no more foretell
where the end of this slavery agitation will be than we can see the end
of the world itself. The Nebraska-Kansas Bill was introduced four years
and a half ago, and if the agitation is ever to come to an end we may say
we are four years and a half nearer the end. So, too, we can say we are
four years and a half nearer the end of the world, and we can just as
clearly see the end of the world as we can see the end of this agitation.
The Kansas settlement did not conclude it. If Kansas should sink to-day,
and leave a great vacant space in the earth's surface, this vexed
question would still be among us. I say, then, there is no way of putting
an end to the slavery agitation amongst us but to put it back upon the
basis where our fathers placed it; no way but to keep it out of our new
Territories,--to restrict it forever to the old States where it now
exists. Then the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the
course of ultimate extinction. That is one way of putting an end to the
slavery agitation.