The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

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Now, in regard to his reminding me of the moral rule that persons
who tell what they do not know to be true falsify as much as
those who knowingly tell falsehoods. I remember the rule, and it
must be borne in mind that in what I have read to you, I do not
say that I know such a conspiracy to exist. To that I reply, I
believe it. If the Judge says that I do not believe it, then he
says what he does not know, and falls within his own rule, that
he who asserts a thing which he does not know to be true,
falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. I want
to call your attention to a little discussion on that branch of
the case, and the evidence which brought my mind to the
conclusion which I expressed as my belief. If, in arraying that
evidence I had stated anything which was false or erroneous, it
needed but that Judge Douglas should point it out, and I would
have taken it back, with all the kindness in the world. I do not
deal in that way. If I have brought forward anything not a fact,
if he will point it out, it will not even ruffle me to take it
back. But if he will not point out anything erroneous in the
evidence, is it not rather for him to show, by a comparison of
the evidence, that I have reasoned falsely, than to call the
"kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman" a liar? If I have
reasoned to a false conclusion, it is the vocation of an able
debater to show by argument that I have wandered to an erroneous
conclusion. I want to ask your attention to a portion of the
Nebraska Bill, which Judge Douglas has quoted:

"It being the true intent and meaning of this Act, not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form
and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way,
subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

Thereupon Judge Douglas and others began to argue in favor of "popular
sovereignty," the right of the people to have slaves if they wanted them,
and to exclude slavery if they did not want them. "But," said, in
substance, a Senator from Ohio (Mr. Chase, I believe), "we more than
suspect that you do not mean to allow the people to exclude slavery if
they wish to; and if you do mean it, accept an amendment which I propose,
expressly authorizing the people to exclude slavery."

I believe I have the amendment here before me, which was offered, and
under which the people of the Territory, through their representatives,
might, if they saw fit, prohibit the existence of slavery therein. And
now I state it as a fact, to be taken back if there is any mistake about
it, that Judge Douglas and those acting with him voted that amendment
down. I now think that those men who voted it down had a real reason for
doing so. They know what that reason was. It looks to us, since we have
seen the Dred Scott decision pronounced, holding that "under the
Constitution" the people cannot exclude slavery, I say it looks to
outsiders, poor, simple, "amiable, intelligent gentlemen," as though the
niche was left as a place to put that Dred Scott decision in,--a niche
which would have been spoiled by adopting the amendment. And now, I say
again, if this was not the reason, it will avail the Judge much more to
calmly and good-humoredly point out to these people what that other
reason was for voting the amendment down, than, swelling himself up, to
vociferate that he may be provoked to call somebody a liar.

Again: There is in that same quotation from the Nebraska Bill this
clause: "It being the true intent and meaning of this bill not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State." I have always been
puzzled to know what business the word "State" had in that connection.
Judge Douglas knows. He put it there. He knows what he put it there for.
We outsiders cannot say what he put it there for. The law they were
passing was not about States, and was not making provisions for States.
What was it placed there for? After seeing the Dred Scott decision, which
holds that the people cannot exclude slavery from a Territory, if another
Dred Scott decision shall come, holding that they cannot exclude it from
a State, we shall discover that when the word was originally put there,
it was in view of something which was to come in due time, we shall see
that it was the other half of something. I now say again, if there is any
different reason for putting it there, Judge Douglas, in a good-humored
way, without calling anybody a liar, can tell what the reason was.

When the Judge spoke at Clinton, he came very near making a charge of
falsehood against me. He used, as I found it printed in a newspaper,
which, I remember, was very nearly like the real speech, the following
language:

"I did not answer the charge [of conspiracy] before, for the reason that
I did not suppose there was a man in America with a heart so corrupt as
to believe such a charge could be true. I have too much respect for Mr.
Lincoln to suppose he is serious in making the charge."

I confess this is rather a curious view, that out of respect for me he
should consider I was making what I deemed rather a grave charge in fun.
I confess it strikes me rather strangely. But I let it pass. As the Judge
did not for a moment believe that there was a man in America whose heart
was so "corrupt" as to make such a charge, and as he places me among the
"men in America" who have hearts base enough to make such a charge, I
hope he will excuse me if I hunt out another charge very like this; and
if it should turn out that in hunting I should find that other, and it
should turn out to be Judge Douglas himself who made it, I hope he will
reconsider this question of the deep corruption of heart he has thought
fit to ascribe to me. In Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858, which
I hold in my hand, he says:

"In this connection there is another topic to which I desire to allude. I
seldom refer to the course of newspapers, or notice the articles which
they publish in regard to myself; but the course of the Washington Union
has been so extraordinary for the last two or three months, that I think
it well enough to make some allusion to it. It has read me out of the
Democratic party every other day, at least for two or three months, and
keeps reading me out, and, as if it had not succeeded, still continues to
read me out, using such terms as 'traitor,' 'renegade,' 'deserter,' and
other kind and polite epithets of that nature. Sir, I have no vindication
to make of my Democracy against the Washington Union, or any other
newspapers. I am willing to allow my history and action for the last
twenty years to speak for themselves as to my political principles and my
fidelity to political obligations. The Washington Union has a personal
grievance. When its editor was nominated for public printer, I declined
to vote for him, and stated that at some time I might give my reasons for
doing so. Since I declined to give that vote, this scurrilous abuse,
these vindictive and constant attacks have been repeated almost daily on
me. Will any friend from Michigan read the article to which I allude?"

This is a part of the speech. You must excuse me from reading the entire
article of the Washington Union, as Mr. Stuart read it for Mr. Douglas.
The Judge goes on and sums up, as I think, correctly:

"Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions advanced
boldly by the Washington Union editorially, and apparently
authoritatively; and any man who questions any of them is denounced as an
Abolitionist, a Free-soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first, that
the primary object of all government at its original institution is the
protection of person and property; second, that the Constitution of the
United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;
and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or
otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in
another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited,
are direct violations of the original intention of the government and
Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of
the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage of the rights of
property, inasmuch as it was involuntarily done on the part of the owner.

"Remember that this article was published in the Union on the 17th of
November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the adhesion
of the Union, to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:

"KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION.--The vexed question is settled. The problem
is saved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to
Kansas affairs is over and gone ..."

And a column nearly of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into
the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it
which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?

"ARTICLE 7, Section I. The right of property is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to
such slave and its increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of
the owner of any property whatever."

Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended
after 1864 by a two-thirds vote:

"But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the
ownership of slaves."

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they
are identical in spirit with the authoritative article in the Washington
Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution."

I pass over some portions of the speech, and I hope that any one who
feels interested in this matter will read the entire section of the
speech, and see whether I do the Judge injustice. He proceeds:

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed
by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 10th of
November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that
a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that
there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of
this Union."

I stop the quotation there, again requesting that it may all be read. I
have read all of the portion I desire to comment upon. What is this
charge that the Judge thinks I must have a very corrupt heart to make? It
was a purpose on the part of certain high functionaries to make it
impossible for the people of one State to prohibit the people of any
other State from entering it with their "property," so called, and making
it a slave State. In other words, it was a charge implying a design to
make the institution of slavery national. And now I ask your attention to
what Judge Douglas has himself done here. I know he made that part of the
speech as a reason why he had refused to vote for a certain man for
public printer; but when we get at it, the charge itself is the very one
I made against him, that he thinks I am so corrupt for uttering. Now,
whom does he make that charge against? Does he make it against that
newspaper editor merely? No; he says it is identical in spirit with the
Lecompton Constitution, and so the framers of that Constitution are
brought in with the editor of the newspaper in that "fatal blow being
struck." He did not call it a "conspiracy." In his language, it is a
"fatal blow being struck." And if the words carry the meaning better when
changed from a "conspiracy" into a "fatal blow being struck," I will
change my expression, and call it "fatal blow being struck." We see the
charge made not merely against the editor of the Union, but all the
framers of the Lecompton Constitution; and not only so, but the article
was an authoritative article. By whose authority? Is there any question
but he means it was by the authority of the President and his
Cabinet,--the Administration?

Is there any sort of question but he means to make that charge? Then
there are the editors of the Union, the framers of the Lecompton
Constitution, the President of the United States and his Cabinet, and all
the supporters of the Lecompton Constitution, in Congress and out of
Congress, who are all involved in this "fatal blow being struck." I
commend to Judge Douglas's consideration the question of how corrupt a
man's heart must be to make such a charge!

Now, my friends, I have but one branch of the subject, in the little time
I have left, to which to call your attention; and as I shall come to a
close at the end of that branch, it is probable that I shall not occupy
quite all the time allotted to me. Although on these questions I would
like to talk twice as long as I have, I could not enter upon another head
and discuss it properly without running over my time. I ask the attention
of the people here assembled and elsewhere to the course that Judge
Douglas is pursuing every day as bearing upon this question of making
slavery national. Not going back to the records, but taking the speeches
he makes, the speeches he made yesterday and day before, and makes
constantly all over the country, I ask your attention to them. In the
first place, what is necessary to make the institution national? Not war.
There is no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their
muskets, and, with a young nigger stuck on every bayonet, march into
Illinois and force them upon us. There is no danger of our going over
there and making war upon them. Then what is necessary for the
nationalization of slavery? It is simply the next Dred Scott decision. It
is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the
Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under
the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do
it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This
being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be
made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to
that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on
public sentiment. In this and like communities, public sentiment is
everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing
can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper
than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes
and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. This must be borne
in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast
influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe
anything when they once find out Judge Douglas professes to believe it.
Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party,--a
party which he claims has a majority of all the voters in the country.
This man sticks to a decision which forbids the people of a Territory
from excluding slavery, and he does so, not because he says it is right
in itself,--he does not give any opinion on that,--but because it has
been decided by the court; and being decided by the court, he is, and you
are, bound to take it in your political action as law, not that he judges
at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to him a
"Thus saith the Lord." He places it on that ground alone; and you will
bear in mind that thus committing himself unreservedly to this decision
commits him to the next one just as firmly as to this. He did not commit
himself on account of the merit or demerit of the decision, but it is a
"Thus saith the Lord." The next decision, as much as this, will be a
"Thus saith the Lord." There is nothing that can divert or turn him away
from this decision. It is nothing that I point out to him that his great
prototype, General Jackson, did not believe in the binding force of
decisions. It is nothing to him that Jefferson did not so believe. I have
said that I have often heard him approve of Jackson's course in
disregarding the decision of the Supreme Court pronouncing a National
Bank constitutional. He says I did not hear him say so. He denies the
accuracy of my recollection. I say he ought to know better than I, but I
will make no question about this thing, though it still seems to me that
I heard him say it twenty times. I will tell him, though, that he now
claims to stand on the Cincinnati platform, which affirms that Congress
cannot charter a National Bank, in the teeth of that old standing
decision that Congress can charter a bank. And I remind him of another
piece of history on the question of respect for judicial decisions, and
it is a piece of Illinois history belonging to a time when the large
party to which Judge Douglas belonged were displeased with a decision of
the Supreme Court of Illinois, because they had decided that a Governor
could not remove a Secretary of State. You will find the whole story in
Ford's History of Illinois, and I know that Judge Douglas will not deny
that he was then in favor of over-slaughing that decision by the mode of
adding five new judges, so as to vote down the four old ones. Not only
so, but it ended in the Judge's sitting down on that very bench as one of
the five new judges to break down the four old ones It was in this way
precisely that he got his title of judge. Now, when the Judge tells me
that men appointed conditionally to sit as members of a court will have
to be catechized beforehand upon some subject, I say, "You know, Judge;
you have tried it." When he says a court of this kind will lose the
confidence of all men, will be prostituted and disgraced by such a
proceeding, I say, "You know best, Judge; you have been through the
mill." But I cannot shake Judge Douglas's teeth loose from the Dred Scott
decision. Like some obstinate animal (I mean no disrespect) that will
hang on when he has once got his teeth fixed, you may cut off a leg, or
you may tear away an arm, still he will not relax his hold. And so I may
point out to the Judge, and say that he is bespattered all over, from the
beginning of his political life to the present time, with attacks upon
judicial decisions; I may cut off limb after limb of his public record,
and strive to wrench him from a single dictum of the court,--yet I cannot
divert him from it. He hangs, to the last, to the Dred Scott decision.
These things show there is a purpose strong as death and eternity for
which he adheres to this decision, and for which he will adhere to all
other decisions of the same court.

[A HIBERNIAN: "Give us something besides Dred Scott."]

Yes; no doubt you want to hear something that don't hurt. Now, having
spoken of the Dred Scott decision, one more word, and I am done. Henry
Clay, my beau-ideal of a statesman, the man for whom I fought all my
humble life, Henry Clay once said of a class of men who would repress all
tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation that they must, if they
would do this, go back to the era of our Independence, and muzzle the
cannon which thunders its annual joyous return; they must blow out the
moral lights around us; they must penetrate the human soul, and eradicate
there the love of liberty; and then, and not till then, could they
perpetuate slavery in this country! To my thinking, Judge Douglas is, by
his example and vast influence, doing that very thing in this community,
when he says that the negro has nothing in the Declaration of
Independence. Henry Clay plainly understood the contrary. Judge Douglas
is going back to the era of our Revolution, and, to the extent of his
ability, muzzling the cannon which thunders its annual joyous return.
When he invites any people, willing to have slavery, to establish it, he
is blowing out the moral lights around us. When he says he "cares not
whether slavery is voted down or up,"--that it is a sacred right of
self-government,--he is, in my judgment, penetrating the human soul and
eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in this American
people. And now I will only say that when, by all these means and
appliances, Judge Douglas shall succeed in bringing public sentiment to
an exact accordance with his own views; when these vast assemblages shall
echo back all these sentiments; when they shall come to repeat his views
and to avow his principles, and to say all that he says on these mighty
questions,--then it needs only the formality of the second Dred Scott
decision, which he indorses in advance, to make slavery alike lawful in
all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.

My friends, that ends the chapter. The Judge can take his half-hour.




SECOND JOINT DEBATE, AT FREEPORT,

AUGUST 27, 1858

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first
met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and he
replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak an
hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour. I
propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was
brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa. Of course
there was brought within the scope in that half-hour's speech something
of his own opening speech. In the course of that opening argument Judge
Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of an
hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and
incidentally, as I thought, intimated to him that I would answer the rest
of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer
as many for me. He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor
did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no
injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in
dealing with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories. I
now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition
that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I
give him an opportunity to respond.

The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his
interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have
done so, I shall propound mine to him.

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at
Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of the
party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I
go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be
perceived that no one is responsible but myself.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I
find them printed in the Chicago Times, and answer them seriatim. In
order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the
interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of
these interrogatories is in these words:

Question 1.--"I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did
in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"
Answer:--I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional
repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

Q. 2.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he
did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the
Union, even if the people want them?" Answer:--I do not now, nor ever
did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into
the Union.

Q. 3.--"I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of
a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that
State may see fit to make?" Answer:--I do not stand pledged against the
admission of a new State into the Union, with such a constitution as the
people of that State may see fit to make.

Q. 4.--"I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia?" Answer:--I do not stand to-day
pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the
prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?" Answer:--I
do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the
different States.

Q. 6.--"I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in
all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the
Missouri Compromise line?" Answer:--I am impliedly, if not expressly,
pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery
in all the United States 'Territories.

Q. 7.--"I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition
of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"
Answer:--I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory;
and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition,
accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not
aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these
questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not
pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his
interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered in
strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that
I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered.
But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I
am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state
what I really think upon them.