The Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Complete

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They at the same time got California into the Union as a free State. This
was far the best part of all they had struggled for by the Wilmot
Proviso. They also got the area of slavery somewhat narrowed in the
settlement of the boundary of Texas. Also they got the slave trade
abolished in the District of Columbia.

For all these desirable objects the North could afford to yield
something; and they did yield to the South the Utah and New Mexico
provision. I do not mean that the whole North, or even a majority,
yielded, when the law passed; but enough yielded--when added to the vote
of the South, to carry the measure. Nor can it be pretended that the
principle of this arrangement requires us to permit the same provision to
be applied to Nebraska, without any equivalent at all. Give us another
free State; press the boundary of Texas still farther back; give us
another step toward the destruction of slavery in the District, and you
present us a similar case. But ask us not to repeat, for nothing, what
you paid for in the first instance. If you wish the thing again, pay
again. That is the principle of the compromises of '50, if, indeed, they
had any principles beyond their specific terms--it was the system of
equivalents.

Again, if Congress, at that time, intended that all future Territories
should, when admitted as States, come in with or without slavery at their
own option, why did it not say so? With such a universal provision, all
know the bills could not have passed. Did they, then--could
they-establish a principle contrary to their own intention? Still
further, if they intended to establish the principle that, whenever
Congress had control, it should be left to the people to do as they
thought fit with slavery, why did they not authorize the people of the
District of Columbia, at their option, to abolish slavery within their
limits?

I personally know that this has not been left undone because it was
unthought of. It was frequently spoken of by members of Congress, and by
citizens of Washington, six years ago; and I heard no one express a doubt
that a system of gradual emancipation, with compensation to owners, would
meet the approbation of a large majority of the white people of the
District. But without the action of Congress they could say nothing; and
Congress said "No." In the measures of 1850, Congress had the subject of
slavery in the District expressly on hand. If they were then establishing
the principle of allowing the people to do as they please with slavery,
why did they not apply the principle to that people?

Again it is claimed that by the resolutions of the Illinois Legislature,
passed in 1851, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was demanded. This
I deny also. Whatever may be worked out by a criticism of the language of
those resolutions, the people have never understood them as being any
more than an indorsement of the compromises of 1850, and a release of our
senators from voting for the Wilmot Proviso. The whole people are living
witnesses that this only was their view. Finally, it is asked, "If we did
not mean to apply the Utah and New Mexico provision to all future
territories, what did we mean when we, in 1852, indorsed the compromises
of 1850?"

For myself I can answer this question most easily. I meant not to ask a
repeal or modification of the Fugitive Slave law. I meant not to ask for
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. I meant not to
resist the admission of Utah and New Mexico, even should they ask to come
in as slave States. I meant nothing about additional Territories,
because, as I understood, we then had no Territory whose character as to
slavery was not already settled. As to Nebraska, I regarded its character
as being fixed by the Missouri Compromise for thirty years--as
unalterably fixed as that of my own home in Illinois. As to new
acquisitions, I said, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." When
we make new acquisitions, we will, as heretofore, try to manage them
somehow. That is my answer; that is what I meant and said; and I appeal
to the people to say each for himself whether that is not also the
universal meaning of the free States.

And now, in turn, let me ask a few questions. If, by any or all these
matters, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was commanded, why was not
the command sooner obeyed? Why was the repeal omitted in the Nebraska
Bill of 1853? Why was it omitted in the original bill of 1854? Why in the
accompanying report was such a repeal characterized as a departure from
the course pursued in 1850 and its continued omission recommended?

I am aware Judge Douglas now argues that the subsequent express repeal is
no substantial alteration of the bill. This argument seems wonderful to
me. It is as if one should argue that white and black are not different.
He admits, however, that there is a literal change in the bill, and that
he made the change in deference to other senators who would not support
the bill without. This proves that those other senators thought the
change a substantial one, and that the Judge thought their opinions worth
deferring to. His own opinions, therefore, seem not to rest on a very
firm basis, even in his own mind; and I suppose the world believes, and
will continue to believe, that precisely on the substance of that change
this whole agitation has arisen.

I conclude, then, that the public never demanded the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise.

I now come to consider whether the appeal with its avowed principles, is
intrinsically right. I insist that it is not. Take the particular case. A
controversy had arisen between the advocates and opponents of slavery, in
relation to its establishment within the country we had purchased of
France. The southern, and then best, part of the purchase was already in
as a slave State. The controversy was settled by also letting Missouri in
as a slave State; but with the agreement that within all the remaining
part of the purchase, north of a certain line, there should never be
slavery. As to what was to be done with the remaining part, south of the
line, nothing was said; but perhaps the fair implication was, it should
come in with slavery if it should so choose. The southern part, except a
portion heretofore mentioned, afterward did come in with slavery, as the
State of Arkansas. All these many years, since 1820, the northern part
had remained a wilderness. At length settlements began in it also. In due
course Iowa came in as a free State, and Minnesota was given a
territorial government, without removing the slavery restriction.
Finally, the sole remaining part north of the line--Kansas and
Nebraska--was to be organized; and it is proposed, and carried, to blot
out the old dividing line of thirty-four years' standing, and to open the
whole of that country to the introduction of slavery. Now this, to my
mind, is manifestly unjust. After an angry and dangerous controversy, the
parties made friends by dividing the bone of contention. The one party
first appropriates her own share, beyond all power to be disturbed in the
possession of it, and then seizes the share of the other party. It is as
if two starving men had divided their only loaf, the one had hastily
swallowed his half, and then grabbed the other's half just as he was
putting it to his mouth.

Let me here drop the main argument, to notice what I consider rather an
inferior matter. It is argued that slavery will not go to Kansas and
Nebraska, in any event. This is a palliation, a lullaby. I have some hope
that it will not; but let us not be too confident. As to climate, a
glance at the map shows that there are five slave States--Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, and also the District of
Columbia, all north of the Missouri Compromise line. The census returns
of 1850 show that within these there are eight hundred and sixty-seven
thousand two hundred and seventy-six slaves, being more than one fourth
of all the slaves in the nation.

It is not climate, then, that will keep slavery out of these Territories.
Is there anything in the peculiar nature of the country? Missouri adjoins
these Territories by her entire western boundary, and slavery is already
within every one of her western counties. I have even heard it said that
there are more slaves in proportion to whites in the northwestern county
of Missouri than within any other county in the State. Slavery pressed
entirely up to the old western boundary of the State, and when rather
recently a part of that boundary at the northwest was moved out a little
farther west, slavery followed on quite up to the new line. Now, when the
restriction is removed, what is to prevent it from going still farther?
Climate will not, no peculiarity of the country will, nothing in nature
will. Will the disposition of the people prevent it? Those nearest the
scene are all in favor of the extension. The Yankees who are opposed to
it may be most flumerous; but, in military phrase, the battlefield is too
far from their base of operations.

But it is said there now is no law in Nebraska on the subject of slavery,
and that, in such case, taking a slave there operates his freedom. That
is good book-law, but it is not the rule of actual practice. Wherever
slavery is it has been first introduced without law. The oldest laws we
find concerning it are not laws introducing it, but regulating it as an
already existing thing. A white man takes his slave to Nebraska now. Who
will inform the negro that he is free? Who will take him before court to
test the question of his freedom? In ignorance of his legal emancipation
he is kept chopping, splitting, and plowing. Others are brought, and move
on in the same track. At last, if ever the time for voting comes on the
question of slavery the institution already, in fact, exists in the
country, and cannot well be removed. The fact of its presence, and the
difficulty of its removal, will carry the vote in its favor. Keep it out
until a vote is taken, and a vote in favor of it cannot be got in any
population of forty thousand on earth, who have been drawn together by
the ordinary motives of emigration and settlement. To get slaves into the
Territory simultaneously with the whites in the incipient stages of
settlement is the precise stake played for and won in this Nebraska
measure.

The question is asked us: "If slaves will go in notwithstanding the
general principle of law liberates them, why would they not equally go in
against positive statute law--go in, even if the Missouri restriction
were maintained!" I answer, because it takes a much bolder man to venture
in with his property in the latter case than in the former; because the
positive Congressional enactment is known to and respected by all, or
nearly all, whereas the negative principle that no law is free law is not
much known except among lawyers. We have some experience of this
practical difference. In spite of the Ordinance of '87, a few negroes
were brought into Illinois, and held in a state of quasi-slavery, not
enough, however, to carry a vote of the people in favor of the
institution when they came to form a constitution. But into the adjoining
Missouri country, where there was no Ordinance of '87,--was no
restriction,--they were carried ten times, nay, a hundred times, as fast,
and actually made a slave State. This is fact-naked fact.

Another lullaby argument is that taking slaves to new countries does not
increase their number, does not make any one slave who would otherwise be
free. There is some truth in this, and I am glad of it; but it is not
wholly true. The African slave trade is not yet effectually suppressed;
and, if we make a reasonable deduction for the white people among us who
are foreigners and the descendants of foreigners arriving here since
1808, we shall find the increase of the black population outrunning that
of the white to an extent unaccountable, except by supposing that some of
them, too, have been coming from Africa. If this be so, the opening of
new countries to the institution increases the demand for and augments
the price of slaves, and so does, in fact, make slaves of freemen, by
causing them to be brought from Africa and sold into bondage.

But however this may be, we know the opening of new countries to slavery
tends to the perpetuation of the institution, and so does keep men in
slavery who would otherwise be free. This result we do not feel like
favoring, and we are under no legal obligation to suppress our feelings
in this respect.

Equal justice to the South, it is said, requires us to consent to the
extension of slavery to new countries. That is to say, inasmuch as you do
not object to my taking my hog to Nebraska, therefore I must not object
to your taking your slave. Now, I admit that this is perfectly logical if
there is no difference between hogs and negroes. But while you thus
require me to deny the humanity of the negro, I wish to ask whether you
of the South, yourselves, have ever been willing to do as much? It is
kindly provided that of all those who come into the world only a small
percentage are natural tyrants. That percentage is no larger in the slave
States than in the free. The great majority South, as well as North, have
human sympathies, of which they can no more divest themselves than they
can of their sensibility to physical pain. These sympathies in the bosoms
of the Southern people manifest, in many ways, their sense of the wrong
of slavery, and their consciousness that, after all, there is humanity in
the negro. If they deny this, let me address them a few plain questions.
In 1820 you (the South) joined the North, almost unanimously, in
declaring the African slave trade piracy, and in annexing to it the
punishment of death. Why did you do this? If you did not feel that it was
wrong, why did you join in providing that men should be hung for it? The
practice was no more than bringing wild negroes from Africa to such as
would buy them. But you never thought of hanging men for catching and
selling wild horses, wild buffaloes, or wild bears.

Again, you have among you a sneaking individual of the class of native
tyrants known as the "slavedealer." He watches your necessities, and
crawls up to buy your slave, at a speculating price. If you cannot help
it, you sell to him; but if you can help it, you drive him from your
door. You despise him utterly. You do not recognize him as a friend, or
even as an honest man. Your children must not play with his; they may
rollick freely with the little negroes, but not with the slave-dealer's
children. If you are obliged to deal with him, you try to get through the
job without so much as touching him. It is common with you to join hands
with the men you meet, but with the slave-dealer you avoid the
ceremony--instinctively shrinking from the snaky contact. If he grows
rich and retires from business, you still remember him, and still keep up
the ban of non-intercourse upon him and his family. Now, why is this? You
do not so treat the man who deals in corn, cotton, or tobacco.

And yet again: There are in the United States and Territories, including
the District of Columbia, 433,643 free blacks. At five hundred dollars
per head they are worth over two hundred millions of dollars. How comes
this vast amount of property to be running about without owners? We do
not see free horses or free cattle running at large. How is this? All
these free blacks are the descendants of slaves, or have been slaves
themselves; and they would be slaves now but for something which has
operated on their white owners, inducing them at vast pecuniary sacrifice
to liberate them. What is that something? Is there any mistaking it? In
all these cases it is your sense of justice and human sympathy
continually telling you that the poor negro has some natural right to
himself--that those who deny it and make mere merchandise of him deserve
kickings, contempt, and death.

And now why will you ask us to deny the humanity of the slave, and
estimate him as only the equal of the hog? Why ask us to do what you will
not do yourselves? Why ask us to do for nothing what two hundred millions
of dollars could not induce you to do?

But one great argument in support of the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise is still to come. That argument is "the sacred right of
self-government." It seems our distinguished Senator has found great
difficulty in getting his antagonists, even in the Senate, to meet him
fairly on this argument. Some poet has said:

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread."

At the hazard of being thought one of the fools of this quotation, I meet
that argument--I rush in--I take that bull by the horns. I trust I
understand and truly estimate the right of self-government. My faith in
the proposition that each man should do precisely as he pleases with all
which is exclusively his own lies at the foundation of the sense of
justice there is in me. I extend the principle to communities of men as
well as to individuals. I so extend it because it is politically wise, as
well as naturally just; politically wise in saving us from broils about
matters which do not concern us. Here, or at Washington, I would not
trouble myself with the oyster laws of Virginia, or the cranberry laws of
Indiana. The doctrine of self-government is right,--absolutely and
eternally right,--but it has no just application as here attempted. Or
perhaps I should rather say that whether it has such application depends
upon whether a negro is or is not a man. If he is not a man, in that case
he who is a man may as a matter of self-government do just what he
pleases with him. But if the negro is a man, is it not to that extent a
total destruction of self-government to say that he too shall not govern
himself? When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but
when he governs himself and also governs another man, that is more than
self-government--that is despotism. If the negro is a man, why, then, my
ancient faith teaches me that "all men are created equal," and that there
can be no moral right in connection with one man's making a slave of
another.

Judge Douglas frequently, with bitter irony and sarcasm, paraphrases our
argument by saying: "The white people of Nebraska are good enough to
govern themselves, but they are not good enough to govern a few miserable
negroes!"

Well, I doubt not that the people of Nebraska are and will continue to be
as good as the average of people elsewhere. I do not say the contrary.
What I do say is that no man is good enough to govern another man without
that other's consent. I say this is the leading principle, the
sheet-anchor of American republicanism. Our Declaration of Independence
says:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, DERIVING THEIR
JUST POWERS PROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED."

I have quoted so much at this time merely to show that, according to our
ancient faith, the just powers of government are derived from the consent
of the governed. Now the relation of master and slave is pro tanto a
total violation of this principle. The master not only governs the slave
without his consent, but he governs him by a set of rules altogether
different from those which he prescribes for himself. Allow all the
governed an equal voice in the government, and that, and that only, is
self-government.

Let it not be said that I am contending for the establishment of
political and social equality between the whites and blacks. I have
already said the contrary. I am not combating the argument of necessity,
arising from the fact that the blacks are already among us; but I am
combating what is set up as moral argument for allowing them to be taken
where they have never yet been--arguing against the extension of a bad
thing, which, where it already exists, we must of necessity manage as we
best can.

In support of his application of the doctrine of self-government, Senator
Douglas has sought to bring to his aid the opinions and examples of our
Revolutionary fathers. I am glad he has done this. I love the sentiments
of those old-time men, and shall be most happy to abide by their
opinions. He shows us that when it was in contemplation for the colonies
to break off from Great Britain, and set up a new government for
themselves, several of the States instructed their delegates to go for
the measure, provided each State should be allowed to regulate its
domestic concerns in its own way. I do not quote; but this in substance.
This was right; I see nothing objectionable in it. I also think it
probable that it had some reference to the existence of slavery among
them. I will not deny that it had. But had it any reference to the
carrying of slavery into new countries? That is the question, and we will
let the fathers themselves answer it.

This same generation of men, and mostly the same individuals of the
generation who declared this principle, who declared independence, who
fought the war of the Revolution through, who afterward made the
Constitution under which we still live--these same men passed the
Ordinance of '87, declaring that slavery should never go to the Northwest
Territory.

I have no doubt Judge Douglas thinks they were very inconsistent in this.
It is a question of discrimination between them and him. But there is not
an inch of ground left for his claiming that their opinions, their
example, their authority, are on his side in the controversy.

Again, is not Nebraska, while a Territory, a part of us? Do we not own
the country? And if we surrender the control of it, do we not surrender
the right of self-government? It is part of ourselves. If you say we
shall not control it, because it is only part, the same is true of every
other part; and when all the parts are gone, what has become of the
whole? What is then left of us? What use for the General Government, when
there is nothing left for it to govern?

But you say this question should be left to the people of Nebraska,
because they are more particularly interested. If this be the rule, you
must leave it to each individual to say for himself whether he will have
slaves. What better moral right have thirty-one citizens of Nebraska to
say that the thirty-second shall not hold slaves than the people of the
thirty-one States have to say that slavery shall not go into the
thirty-second State at all?

But if it is a sacred right for the people of Nebraska to take and hold
slaves there, it is equally their sacred right to buy them where they can
buy them cheapest; and that, undoubtedly, will be on the coast of Africa,
provided you will consent not to hang them for going there to buy them.
You must remove this restriction, too, from the sacred right of
self-government. I am aware you say that taking slaves from the States to
Nebraska does not make slaves of freemen; but the African slave-trader
can say just as much. He does not catch free negroes and bring them here.
He finds them already slaves in the hands of their black captors, and he
honestly buys them at the rate of a red cotton handkerchief a head. This
is very cheap, and it is a great abridgment of the sacred right of
self-government to hang men for engaging in this profitable trade.

Another important objection to this application of the right of
self-government is that it enables the first few to deprive the
succeeding many of a free exercise of the right of self-government. The
first few may get slavery in, and the subsequent many cannot easily get
it out. How common is the remark now in the slave States, "If we were
only clear of our slaves, how much better it would be for us." They are
actually deprived of the privilege of governing themselves as they would,
by the action of a very few in the beginning. The same thing was true of
the whole nation at the time our Constitution was formed.

Whether slavery shall go into Nebraska, or other new Territories, is not
a matter of exclusive concern to the people who may go there. The whole
nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these
Territories. We want them for homes of free white people. This they
cannot be, to any considerable extent, if slavery shall be planted within
them. Slave States are places for poor white people to remove from, not
to remove to. New free States are the places for poor people to go to,
and better their condition. For this use the nation needs these
Territories.

Still further: there are constitutional relations between the slave and
free States which are degrading to the latter. We are under legal
obligations to catch and return their runaway slaves to them: a sort of
dirty, disagreeable job, which, I believe, as a general rule, the
slaveholders will not perform for one another. Then again, in the control
of the government--the management of the partnership affairs--they have
greatly the advantage of us. By the Constitution each State has two
senators, each has a number of representatives in proportion to the
number of its people, and each has a number of Presidential electors
equal to the whole number of its senators and representatives together.
But in ascertaining the number of the people for this purpose, five
slaves are counted as being equal to three whites. The slaves do not
vote; they are only counted and so used as to swell the influence of the
white people's votes. The practical effect of this is more aptly shown by
a comparison of the States of South Carolina and Maine. South Carolina
has six representatives, and so has Maine; South Carolina has eight
Presidential electors, and so has Maine. This is precise equality so far;
and of course they are equal in senators, each having two. Thus in the
control of the government the two States are equals precisely. But how
are they in the number of their white people? Maine has 581,813, while
South Carolina has 274,567; Maine has twice as many as South Carolina,
and 32,679 over. Thus, each white man in South Carolina is more than the
double of any man in Maine. This is all because South Carolina, besides
her free people, has 384,984 slaves. The South Carolinian has precisely
the same advantage over the white man in every other free State as well
as in Maine. He is more than the double of any one of us in this crowd.
The same advantage, but not to the same extent, is held by all the
citizens of the slave States over those of the free; and it is an
absolute truth, without an exception, that there is no voter in any slave
State but who has more legal power in the government than any voter in
any free State. There is no instance of exact equality; and the
disadvantage is against us the whole chapter through. This principle, in
the aggregate, gives the slave States in the present Congress twenty
additional representatives, being seven more than the whole majority by
which they passed the Nebraska Bill.